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Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata["host-mount"] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant's MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1. | |
| Title | CubeSandbox: Unrestricted host-directory bind-mount: any sandbox-create caller mounts arbitrary host paths (RW) into their MicroVM | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 CWE-269 CWE-284 |
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cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-16T21:20:47.047Z
Reserved: 2026-11-02T19:50:36.444Z
Link: CVE-2026-120699
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-16T21:17:20.980
Modified: 2026-11-16T22:18:14.877
Link: CVE-2026-120699
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-16T22:30:21Z