Total
19 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-1526 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-20 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a "decompression bomb") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive. The vulnerability exists in the PerMessageDeflate.decompress() method, which accumulates all decompressed chunks in memory and concatenates them into a single Buffer without checking whether the total size exceeds a safe threshold. | |||||
| CVE-2026-1527 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-20 | N/A | 4.6 MEDIUM |
| ImpactWhen an application passes user-controlled input to the upgrade option of client.request(), an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to: * Inject arbitrary HTTP headers * Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch) The vulnerability exists because undici writes the upgrade value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters: // lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121 if (upgrade) { header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n` } | |||||
| CVE-2026-1528 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-20 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| ImpactA server can reply with a WebSocket frame using the 64-bit length form and an extremely large length. undici's ByteParser overflows internal math, ends up in an invalid state, and throws a fatal TypeError that terminates the process. Patches Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later. | |||||
| CVE-2026-2229 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-20 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| ImpactThe undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack due to improper validation of the server_max_window_bits parameter in the permessage-deflate extension. When a WebSocket client connects to a server, it automatically advertises support for permessage-deflate compression. A malicious server can respond with an out-of-range server_max_window_bits value (outside zlib's valid range of 8-15). When the server subsequently sends a compressed frame, the client attempts to create a zlib InflateRaw instance with the invalid windowBits value, causing a synchronous RangeError exception that is not caught, resulting in immediate process termination. The vulnerability exists because: * The isValidClientWindowBits() function only validates that the value contains ASCII digits, not that it falls within the valid range 8-15 * The createInflateRaw() call is not wrapped in a try-catch block * The resulting exception propagates up through the call stack and crashes the Node.js process | |||||
| CVE-2026-1525 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-19 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking | |||||
| CVE-2026-2581 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-03-18 | N/A | 5.9 MEDIUM |
| This is an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability (CWE-400) that can lead to Denial of Service (DoS). In vulnerable Undici versions, when interceptors.deduplicate() is enabled, response data for deduplicated requests could be accumulated in memory for downstream handlers. An attacker-controlled or untrusted upstream endpoint can exploit this with large/chunked responses and concurrent identical requests, causing high memory usage and potential OOM process termination. Impacted users are applications that use Undici’s deduplication interceptor against endpoints that may produce large or long-lived response bodies. PatchesThe issue has been patched by changing deduplication behavior to stream response chunks to downstream handlers as they arrive (instead of full-body accumulation), and by preventing late deduplication when body streaming has already started. Users should upgrade to the first official Undici (and Node.js, where applicable) releases that include this patch. | |||||
| CVE-2026-22036 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2026-01-22 | N/A | 5.9 MEDIUM |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Prior to 7.18.0 and 6.23.0, the number of links in the decompression chain is unbounded and the default maxHeaderSize allows a malicious server to insert thousands compression steps leading to high CPU usage and excessive memory allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.18.0 and 6.23.0. | |||||
| CVE-2024-30261 | 2 Fedoraproject, Nodejs | 2 Fedora, Undici | 2025-11-04 | N/A | 2.6 LOW |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. An attacker can alter the `integrity` option passed to `fetch()`, allowing `fetch()` to accept requests as valid even if they have been tampered. This vulnerability was patched in version(s) 5.28.4 and 6.11.1. | |||||
| CVE-2024-30260 | 2 Fedoraproject, Nodejs | 2 Fedora, Undici | 2025-11-04 | N/A | 3.9 LOW |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. Undici cleared Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers for `fetch()`, but did not clear them for `undici.request()`. This vulnerability was patched in version(s) 5.28.4 and 6.11.1. | |||||
| CVE-2024-24758 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-12-17 | N/A | 3.9 LOW |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Proxy-Authentication` headers. This issue has been patched in versions 5.28.3 and 6.6.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. | |||||
| CVE-2024-24750 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-12-17 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. In affected versions calling `fetch(url)` and not consuming the incoming body ((or consuming it very slowing) will lead to a memory leak. This issue has been addressed in version 6.6.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should make sure to always consume the incoming body. | |||||
| CVE-2023-45143 | 2 Fedoraproject, Nodejs | 2 Fedora, Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 3.9 LOW |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client written from scratch for Node.js. Prior to version 5.26.2, Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since undici handles headers more liberally than the spec, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a third-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the third party site. This was patched in version 5.26.2. There are no known workarounds. | |||||
| CVE-2023-24807 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Prior to version 5.19.1, the `Headers.set()` and `Headers.append()` methods are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks when untrusted values are passed into the functions. This is due to the inefficient regular expression used to normalize the values in the `headerValueNormalize()` utility function. This vulnerability was patched in v5.19.1. No known workarounds are available. | |||||
| CVE-2023-23936 | 1 Nodejs | 2 Node.js, Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client for Node.js. Starting with version 2.0.0 and prior to version 5.19.1, the undici library does not protect `host` HTTP header from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. This issue is patched in Undici v5.19.1. As a workaround, sanitize the `headers.host` string before passing to undici. | |||||
| CVE-2022-35949 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require("undici") undici.request({origin: "http://example.com", pathname: "//127.0.0.1"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call. | |||||
| CVE-2022-35948 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`=< undici@5.8.0` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1. Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input as a workaround. | |||||
| CVE-2022-32210 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| `Undici.ProxyAgent` never verifies the remote server's certificate, and always exposes all request & response data to the proxy. This unexpectedly means that proxies can MitM all HTTPS traffic, and if the proxy's URL is HTTP then it also means that nominally HTTPS requests are actually sent via plain-text HTTP between Undici and the proxy server. | |||||
| CVE-2022-31151 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 3.7 LOW |
| Authorization headers are cleared on cross-origin redirect. However, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There are active users using cookie headers in undici. This may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site. This was patched in v5.7.1. By default, this vulnerability is not exploitable. Do not enable redirections, i.e. `maxRedirections: 0` (the default). | |||||
| CVE-2022-31150 | 1 Nodejs | 1 Undici | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js. It is possible to inject CRLF sequences into request headers in undici in versions less than 5.7.1. A fix was released in version 5.8.0. Sanitizing all HTTP headers from untrusted sources to eliminate `\r\n` is a workaround for this issue. | |||||