CVE-2026-58481

{"id": "CVE-2026-58481", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-58481", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-20T17:42:14.900798Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 6.5, "attackVector": "LOCAL", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 4.0, "exploitabilityScore": 2.0}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "Jovancoding", "product": "Network-AI", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 5.12.2"}]}]}], "published": "2026-07-20T17:18:15.857", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-22"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-23"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-21T19:49:44.020", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}