In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler
t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as
a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer
contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte
buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.
Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header
fields to guard against undersized messages.
Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.
In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a
remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len
against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed
integer overflow on offset.
Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after
skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
30 May 2026, 11:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CVSS |
v2 : v3 : |
v2 : unknown
v3 : 8.8 |
21 May 2026, 13:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-05-21 13:16
Updated : 2026-05-30 11:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-43495
Mitre link : CVE-2026-43495
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-43495
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.