Total
35990 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-43470 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfs: return EISDIR on nfs3_proc_create if d_alias is a dir If we found an alias through nfs3_do_create/nfs_add_or_obtain /d_splice_alias which happens to be a dir dentry, we don't return any error, and simply forget about this alias, but the original dentry we were adding and passed as parameter remains negative. This later causes an oops on nfs_atomic_open_v23/finish_open since we supply a negative dentry to do_dentry_open. This has been observed running lustre-racer, where dirs and files are created/removed concurrently with the same name and O_EXCL is not used to open files (frequent file redirection). While d_splice_alias typically returns a directory alias or NULL, we explicitly check d_is_dir() to ensure that we don't attempt to perform file operations (like finish_open) on a directory inode, which triggers the observed oops. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43469 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xprtrdma: Decrement re_receiving on the early exit paths In the event that rpcrdma_post_recvs() fails to create a work request (due to memory allocation failure, say) or otherwise exits early, we should decrement ep->re_receiving before returning. Otherwise we will hang in rpcrdma_xprt_drain() as re_receiving will never reach zero and the completion will never be triggered. On a system with high memory pressure, this can appear as the following hung task: INFO: task kworker/u385:17:8393 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Tainted: G S E 6.19.0 #3 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u385:17 state:D stack:0 pid:8393 tgid:8393 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4248060 flags:0x00080000 Workqueue: xprtiod xprt_autoclose [sunrpc] Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x48b/0x18b0 ? ib_post_send_mad+0x247/0xae0 [ib_core] schedule+0x27/0xf0 schedule_timeout+0x104/0x110 __wait_for_common+0x98/0x180 ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 wait_for_completion+0x24/0x40 rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x444/0x460 [rpcrdma] xprt_rdma_close+0x12/0x40 [rpcrdma] xprt_autoclose+0x5f/0x120 [sunrpc] process_one_work+0x191/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x10d/0x230 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 | |||||
| CVE-2026-43467 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix crash when moving to switchdev mode When moving to switchdev mode when the device doesn't support IPsec, we try to clean up the IPsec resources anyway which causes the crash below, fix that by correctly checking for IPsec support before trying to clean up its resources. [27642.515799] WARNING: arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1276 at do_user_addr_fault+0x18a/0x680, CPU#4: devlink/6490 [27642.517159] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay mlx5_fwctl nfnetlink zram zsmalloc mlx5_ib fuse rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_core ib_core [27642.521358] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 6490 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2026_01_14_16_47 #1 NONE [27642.522923] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [27642.524528] RIP: 0010:do_user_addr_fault+0x18a/0x680 [27642.525362] Code: ff 0f 84 75 03 00 00 48 89 ee 4c 89 e7 e8 5e b9 22 00 49 89 c0 48 85 c0 0f 84 a8 02 00 00 f7 c3 60 80 00 00 74 22 31 c9 eb ae <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 10 48 89 ea 48 89 de 4c 89 f7 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 [27642.528166] RSP: 0018:ffff88810770f6b8 EFLAGS: 00010046 [27642.529038] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88810b980f00 [27642.530158] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff88810770f728 [27642.531270] RBP: 00000000000000a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [27642.532383] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888103f3c4c0 [27642.533499] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810770f728 R15: 0000000000000000 [27642.534614] FS: 00007f197c741740(0000) GS:ffff88856a94c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [27642.535915] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [27642.536858] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 000000011334c003 CR4: 0000000000172eb0 [27642.537982] Call Trace: [27642.538466] <TASK> [27642.538907] exc_page_fault+0x76/0x140 [27642.539583] asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [27642.540282] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x30 [27642.541134] Code: 07 85 c0 75 11 ba ff 00 00 00 f0 0f b1 17 75 06 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 31 c0 c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 9c 5b fa 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 05 48 89 d8 5b c3 89 c6 e8 7e 02 00 00 48 89 d8 5b [27642.543936] RSP: 0018:ffff88810770f7d8 EFLAGS: 00010046 [27642.544803] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: ffff888113ad96d8 [27642.545916] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88810770f818 RDI: 00000000000000a0 [27642.547027] RBP: 0000000000000098 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: ffff88810b980f00 [27642.548140] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888101845a80 R12: 00000000000000a8 [27642.549263] R13: ffffffffa02a9060 R14: 00000000000000a0 R15: ffff8881130d8a40 [27642.550379] complete_all+0x20/0x90 [27642.551010] mlx5e_ipsec_disable_events+0xb6/0xf0 [mlx5_core] [27642.552022] mlx5e_nic_disable+0x12d/0x220 [mlx5_core] [27642.552929] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x66/0xf0 [mlx5_core] [27642.553822] mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x5b/0x120 [mlx5_core] [27642.554821] mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x419/0x590 [mlx5_core] [27642.555757] ? xa_load+0x53/0x90 [27642.556361] __esw_offloads_load_rep+0x54/0x70 [mlx5_core] [27642.557328] mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x45/0xd0 [mlx5_core] [27642.558320] esw_offloads_enable+0xb4b/0xc90 [mlx5_core] [27642.559247] mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x34e/0x4f0 [mlx5_core] [27642.560257] ? mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x222/0x2d0 [mlx5_core] [27642.561284] mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x5ac/0x9c0 [mlx5_core] [27642.562334] ? devlink_rate_set_ops_supported+0x21/0x3a0 [27642.563220] devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x67/0xe0 [27642.564026] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130 [27642.564816] genl_rcv_msg+0x183/0x290 [27642.565466] ? __devlink_nl_pre_doit.isra.0+0x160/0x160 [27642.566329] ? d ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2026-43466 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix DMA FIFO desync on error CQE SQ recovery In case of a TX error CQE, a recovery flow is triggered, mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc() resets dma_fifo_cc to 0 but not dma_fifo_pc, desyncing the DMA FIFO producer and consumer. After recovery, the producer pushes new DMA entries at the old dma_fifo_pc, while the consumer reads from position 0. This causes us to unmap stale DMA addresses from before the recovery. The DMA FIFO is a purely software construct with no HW counterpart. At the point of reset, all WQEs have been flushed so dma_fifo_cc is already equal to dma_fifo_pc. There is no need to reset either counter, similar to how skb_fifo pc/cc are untouched. Remove the 'dma_fifo_cc = 0' reset. This fixes the following WARNING: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1240 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa bonding mlx5_ib mlx5_vfio_pci ipip mlx5_fwctl tunnel4 mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve ip6_gre ip_gre gre nf_tables ip6_tunnel rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core act_mirred act_skbedit act_vlan vhost_net vhost tap ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress vhost_iotlb iptable_raw tunnel6 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio openvswitch nsh rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay zram zsmalloc rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core fuse [last unloaded: nf_tables] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2024_12_30_21_33 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Code: 2b 4d 3b 21 72 26 4d 3b 61 08 73 20 49 89 d8 44 89 f9 5b 4c 89 f2 4c 89 e6 48 89 ef 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 c7 ae 9e ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn+0x7d/0x110 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? report_bug+0x16d/0x180 ? handle_bug+0x4f/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x2e/0x90 dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x10d/0x1b0 mlx5e_tx_wi_dma_unmap+0xbe/0x120 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_poll_tx_cq+0x16d/0x690 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x8b/0xac0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x24/0x190 net_rx_action+0x32a/0x3b0 ? mlx5_eq_comp_int+0x7e/0x270 [mlx5_core] ? notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xa0 handle_softirqs+0xc9/0x270 irq_exit_rcu+0x71/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 | |||||
| CVE-2026-43464 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: RX, Fix XDP multi-buf frag counting for legacy RQ XDP multi-buf programs can modify the layout of the XDP buffer when the program calls bpf_xdp_pull_data() or bpf_xdp_adjust_tail(). The referenced commit in the fixes tag corrected the assumption in the mlx5 driver that the XDP buffer layout doesn't change during a program execution. However, this fix introduced another issue: the dropped fragments still need to be counted on the driver side to avoid page fragment reference counting issues. Such issue can be observed with the test_xdp_native_adjst_tail_shrnk_data selftest when using a payload of 3600 and shrinking by 256 bytes (an upcoming selftest patch): the last fragment gets released by the XDP code but doesn't get tracked by the driver. This results in a negative pp_ref_count during page release and the following splat: WARNING: include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:297 at mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0x4a/0x50 [mlx5_core], CPU#12: ip/3137 Modules linked in: [...] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 3137 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #12 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_page_release_fragmented.isra.0+0x4a/0x50 [mlx5_core] [...] Call Trace: <TASK> mlx5e_dealloc_rx_wqe+0xcb/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_free_rx_descs+0x7f/0x110 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_close_rq+0x50/0x60 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_close_queues+0x36/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_close_channel+0x1c/0x50 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_close_channels+0x45/0x80 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_safe_switch_params+0x1a5/0x230 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_change_mtu+0xf3/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] netif_set_mtu_ext+0xf1/0x230 do_setlink.isra.0+0x219/0x1180 rtnl_newlink+0x79f/0xb60 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x213/0x3a0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x48/0xf0 netlink_unicast+0x24a/0x350 netlink_sendmsg+0x1ee/0x410 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 ____sys_sendmsg+0x232/0x280 ___sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 __sys_sendmsg+0x5f/0xb0 [...] do_syscall_64+0x57/0xc50 This patch fixes the issue by doing page frag counting on all the original XDP buffer fragments for all relevant XDP actions (XDP_TX , XDP_REDIRECT and XDP_PASS). This is basically reverting to the original counting before the commit in the fixes tag. As frag_page is still pointing to the original tail, the nr_frags parameter to xdp_update_skb_frags_info() needs to be calculated in a different way to reflect the new nr_frags. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43462 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: spacemit: Fix error handling in emac_tx_mem_map() The DMA mappings were leaked on mapping error. Free them with the existing emac_free_tx_buf() function. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43461 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: amlogic: spifc-a4: Fix DMA mapping error handling Fix three bugs in aml_sfc_dma_buffer_setup() error paths: 1. Unnecessary goto: When the first DMA mapping (sfc->daddr) fails, nothing needs cleanup. Use direct return instead of goto. 2. Double-unmap bug: When info DMA mapping failed, the code would unmap sfc->daddr inline, then fall through to out_map_data which would unmap it again, causing a double-unmap. 3. Wrong unmap size: The out_map_info label used datalen instead of infolen when unmapping sfc->iaddr, which could lead to incorrect DMA sync behavior. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43455 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: route: hold key->lock in mctp_flow_prepare_output() mctp_flow_prepare_output() checks key->dev and may call mctp_dev_set_key(), but it does not hold key->lock while doing so. mctp_dev_set_key() and mctp_dev_release_key() are annotated with __must_hold(&key->lock), so key->dev access is intended to be serialized by key->lock. The mctp_sendmsg() transmit path reaches mctp_flow_prepare_output() via mctp_local_output() -> mctp_dst_output() without holding key->lock, so the check-and-set sequence is racy. Example interleaving: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- mctp_flow_prepare_output(key, devA) if (!key->dev) // sees NULL mctp_flow_prepare_output( key, devB) if (!key->dev) // still NULL mctp_dev_set_key(devB, key) mctp_dev_hold(devB) key->dev = devB mctp_dev_set_key(devA, key) mctp_dev_hold(devA) key->dev = devA // overwrites devB Now both devA and devB references were acquired, but only the final key->dev value is tracked for release. One reference can be lost, causing a resource leak as mctp_dev_release_key() would only decrease the reference on one dev. Fix by taking key->lock around the key->dev check and mctp_dev_set_key() call. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43454 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: Fix for duplicate device in netdev hooks When handling NETDEV_REGISTER notification, duplicate device registration must be avoided since the device may have been added by nft_netdev_hook_alloc() already when creating the hook. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43452 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: guard option walkers against 1-byte tail reads When the last byte of options is a non-single-byte option kind, walkers that advance with i += op[i + 1] ? : 1 can read op[i + 1] past the end of the option area. Add an explicit i == optlen - 1 check before dereferencing op[i + 1] in xt_tcpudp and xt_dccp option walkers. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43442 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: fix physical SQE bounds check for SQE_MIXED 128-byte ops When IORING_SETUP_SQE_MIXED is used without IORING_SETUP_NO_SQARRAY, the boundary check for 128-byte SQE operations in io_init_req() validated the logical SQ head position rather than the physical SQE index. The existing check: !(ctx->cached_sq_head & (ctx->sq_entries - 1)) ensures the logical position isn't at the end of the ring, which is correct for NO_SQARRAY rings where physical == logical. However, when sq_array is present, an unprivileged user can remap any logical position to an arbitrary physical index via sq_array. Setting sq_array[N] = sq_entries - 1 places a 128-byte operation at the last physical SQE slot, causing the 128-byte memcpy in io_uring_cmd_sqe_copy() to read 64 bytes past the end of the SQE array. Replace the cached_sq_head alignment check with a direct validation of the physical SQE index, which correctly handles both sq_array and NO_SQARRAY cases. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43435 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted. Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange. Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43434 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: check ownership before using vma When installing missing pages (or zapping them), Rust Binder will look up the vma in the mm by address, and then call vm_insert_page (or zap_page_range_single). However, if the vma is closed and replaced with a different vma at the same address, this can lead to Rust Binder installing pages into the wrong vma. By installing the page into a writable vma, it becomes possible to write to your own binder pages, which are normally read-only. Although you're not supposed to be able to write to those pages, the intent behind the design of Rust Binder is that even if you get that ability, it should not lead to anything bad. Unfortunately, due to another bug, that is not the case. To fix this, store a pointer in vm_private_data and check that the vma returned by vma_lookup() has the right vm_ops and vm_private_data before trying to use the vma. This should ensure that Rust Binder will refuse to interact with any other VMA. The plan is to introduce more vma abstractions to avoid this unsafe access to vm_ops and vm_private_data, but for now let's start with the simplest possible fix. C Binder performs the same check in a slightly different way: it provides a vm_ops->close that sets a boolean to true, then checks that boolean after calling vma_lookup(), but this is more fragile than the solution in this patch. (We probably still want to do both, but the vm_ops->close callback will be added later as part of the follow-up vma API changes.) It's still possible to remap the vma so that pages appear in the right vma, but at the wrong offset, but this is a separate issue and will be fixed when Rust Binder gets a vm_ops->close callback. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43429 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: usbtmc: Use usb_bulk_msg_killable() with user-specified timeouts The usbtmc driver accepts timeout values specified by the user in an ioctl command, and uses these timeouts for some usb_bulk_msg() calls. Since the user can specify arbitrarily long timeouts and usb_bulk_msg() uses unkillable waits, call usb_bulk_msg_killable() instead to avoid the possibility of the user hanging a kernel thread indefinitely. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43428 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts The usb_control_msg(), usb_bulk_msg(), and usb_interrupt_msg() APIs in usbcore allow unlimited timeout durations. And since they use uninterruptible waits, this leaves open the possibility of hanging a task for an indefinitely long time, with no way to kill it short of unplugging the target device. To prevent this sort of problem, enforce a maximum limit on the length of these unkillable timeouts. The limit chosen here, somewhat arbitrarily, is 60 seconds. On many systems (although not all) this is short enough to avoid triggering the kernel's hung-task detector. In addition, clear up the ambiguity of negative timeout values by treating them the same as 0, i.e., using the maximum allowed timeout. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43425 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: image: mdc800: kill download URB on timeout mdc800_device_read() submits download_urb and waits for completion. If the timeout fires and the device has not responded, the function returns without killing the URB, leaving it active. A subsequent read() resubmits the same URB while it is still in-flight, triggering the WARN in usb_submit_urb(): "URB submitted while active" Check the return value of wait_event_timeout() and kill the URB if it indicates timeout, ensuring the URB is complete before its status is inspected or the URB is resubmitted. Similar to - commit 372c93131998 ("USB: yurex: fix control-URB timeout handling") - commit b98d5000c505 ("media: rc: iguanair: handle timeouts") | |||||
| CVE-2026-43418 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Prevent CID stalls due to concurrent forks A newly forked task is accounted as MMCID user before the task is visible in the process' thread list and the global task list. This creates the following problem: CPU1 CPU2 fork() sched_mm_cid_fork(tnew1) tnew1->mm.mm_cid_users++; tnew1->mm_cid.cid = getcid() -> preemption fork() sched_mm_cid_fork(tnew2) tnew2->mm.mm_cid_users++; // Reaches the per CPU threshold mm_cid_fixup_tasks_to_cpus() for_each_other(current, p) .... As tnew1 is not visible yet, this fails to fix up the already allocated CID of tnew1. As a consequence a subsequent schedule in might fail to acquire a (transitional) CID and the machine stalls. Move the invocation of sched_mm_cid_fork() after the new task becomes visible in the thread and the task list to prevent this. This also makes it symmetrical vs. exit() where the task is removed as CID user before the task is removed from the thread and task lists. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43417 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Handle vfork()/CLONE_VM correctly Matthieu and Jiri reported stalls where a task endlessly loops in mm_get_cid() when scheduling in. It turned out that the logic which handles vfork()'ed tasks is broken. It is invoked when the number of tasks associated to a process is smaller than the number of MMCID users. It then walks the task list to find the vfork()'ed task, but accounts all the already processed tasks as well. If that double processing brings the number of to be handled tasks to 0, the walk stops and the vfork()'ed task's CID is not fixed up. As a consequence a subsequent schedule in fails to acquire a (transitional) CID and the machine stalls. Cure this by removing the accounting condition and make the fixup always walk the full task list if it could not find the exact number of users in the process' thread list. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43403 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nsfs: tighten permission checks for ns iteration ioctls Even privileged services should not necessarily be able to see other privileged service's namespaces so they can't leak information to each other. Use may_see_all_namespaces() helper that centralizes this policy until the nstree adapts. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43400 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: add upper bound check on user inputs in signal ioctl Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_signal_ioctl can lead to a OOM and could be exploited. So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could potentially avoid OOM. (cherry picked from commit be267e15f99bc97cbe202cd556717797cdcf79a5) | |||||