Total
33180 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-53144 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Align BR/EDR JUST_WORKS paring with LE This aligned BR/EDR JUST_WORKS method with LE which since 92516cd97fd4 ("Bluetooth: Always request for user confirmation for Just Works") always request user confirmation with confirm_hint set since the likes of bluetoothd have dedicated policy around JUST_WORKS method (e.g. main.conf:JustWorksRepairing). CVE: CVE-2024-8805 | |||||
| CVE-2024-53140 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: terminate outstanding dump on socket close Netlink supports iterative dumping of data. It provides the families the following ops: - start - (optional) kicks off the dumping process - dump - actual dump helper, keeps getting called until it returns 0 - done - (optional) pairs with .start, can be used for cleanup The whole process is asynchronous and the repeated calls to .dump don't actually happen in a tight loop, but rather are triggered in response to recvmsg() on the socket. This gives the user full control over the dump, but also means that the user can close the socket without getting to the end of the dump. To make sure .start is always paired with .done we check if there is an ongoing dump before freeing the socket, and if so call .done. The complication is that sockets can get freed from BH and .done is allowed to sleep. So we use a workqueue to defer the call, when needed. Unfortunately this does not work correctly. What we defer is not the cleanup but rather releasing a reference on the socket. We have no guarantee that we own the last reference, if someone else holds the socket they may release it in BH and we're back to square one. The whole dance, however, appears to be unnecessary. Only the user can interact with dumps, so we can clean up when socket is closed. And close always happens in process context. Some async code may still access the socket after close, queue notification skbs to it etc. but no dumps can start, end or otherwise make progress. Delete the workqueue and flush the dump state directly from the release handler. Note that further cleanup is possible in -next, for instance we now always call .done before releasing the main module reference, so dump doesn't have to take a reference of its own. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Bury Intel PT virtualization (guest/host mode) behind CONFIG_BROKEN Hide KVM's pt_mode module param behind CONFIG_BROKEN, i.e. disable support for virtualizing Intel PT via guest/host mode unless BROKEN=y. There are myriad bugs in the implementation, some of which are fatal to the guest, and others which put the stability and health of the host at risk. For guest fatalities, the most glaring issue is that KVM fails to ensure tracing is disabled, and *stays* disabled prior to VM-Enter, which is necessary as hardware disallows loading (the guest's) RTIT_CTL if tracing is enabled (enforced via a VMX consistency check). Per the SDM: If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled (if IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the "load IA32_RTIT_CTL" VM-entry control must be 0. On the host side, KVM doesn't validate the guest CPUID configuration provided by userspace, and even worse, uses the guest configuration to decide what MSRs to save/load at VM-Enter and VM-Exit. E.g. configuring guest CPUID to enumerate more address ranges than are supported in hardware will result in KVM trying to passthrough, save, and load non-existent MSRs, which generates a variety of WARNs, ToPA ERRORs in the host, a potential deadlock, etc. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53127 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "mmc: dw_mmc: Fix IDMAC operation with pages bigger than 4K" The commit 8396c793ffdf ("mmc: dw_mmc: Fix IDMAC operation with pages bigger than 4K") increased the max_req_size, even for 4K pages, causing various issues: - Panic booting the kernel/rootfs from an SD card on Rockchip RK3566 - Panic booting the kernel/rootfs from an SD card on StarFive JH7100 - "swiotlb buffer is full" and data corruption on StarFive JH7110 At this stage no fix have been found, so it's probably better to just revert the change. This reverts commit 8396c793ffdf28bb8aee7cfe0891080f8cab7890. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53112 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: uncache inode which has failed entering the group Syzbot has reported the following BUG: kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509! ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x5f/0xb0 ? die+0x9e/0xc0 ? do_trap+0x15a/0x3a0 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160 ? do_error_trap+0x1dc/0x2c0 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160 ? __pfx_do_error_trap+0x10/0x10 ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160 ? exc_invalid_op+0x38/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x2e/0x160 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x144/0x160 ? ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x145/0x160 ocfs2_group_add+0x39f/0x15a0 ? __pfx_ocfs2_group_add+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0xb7/0x160 ? __pfx_rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x10/0x10 ? smack_log+0x123/0x540 ? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0 ? mnt_get_write_access+0x68/0x2b0 ? mnt_get_write_access+0x226/0x2b0 ocfs2_ioctl+0x65e/0x7d0 ? __pfx_ocfs2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 ? smack_file_ioctl+0x29e/0x3a0 ? __pfx_smack_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x43d/0x780 ? __pfx_lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ocfs2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 __se_sys_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ... </TASK> When 'ioctl(OCFS2_IOC_GROUP_ADD, ...)' has failed for the particular inode in 'ocfs2_verify_group_and_input()', corresponding buffer head remains cached and subsequent call to the same 'ioctl()' for the same inode issues the BUG() in 'ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate()' (trying to cache the same buffer head of that inode). Fix this by uncaching the buffer head with 'ocfs2_remove_from_cache()' on error path in 'ocfs2_group_add()'. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53097 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: krealloc: Fix MTE false alarm in __do_krealloc This patch addresses an issue introduced by commit 1a83a716ec233 ("mm: krealloc: consider spare memory for __GFP_ZERO") which causes MTE (Memory Tagging Extension) to falsely report a slab-out-of-bounds error. The problem occurs when zeroing out spare memory in __do_krealloc. The original code only considered software-based KASAN and did not account for MTE. It does not reset the KASAN tag before calling memset, leading to a mismatch between the pointer tag and the memory tag, resulting in a false positive. Example of the error: ================================================================== swapper/0: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __memset+0x84/0x188 swapper/0: Write at addr f4ffff8005f0fdf0 by task swapper/0/1 swapper/0: Pointer tag: [f4], memory tag: [fe] swapper/0: swapper/0: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12. swapper/0: Hardware name: MT6991(ENG) (DT) swapper/0: Call trace: swapper/0: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c swapper/0: show_stack+0x18/0x28 swapper/0: dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 swapper/0: print_report+0x1b8/0x71c swapper/0: kasan_report+0xec/0x14c swapper/0: __do_kernel_fault+0x60/0x29c swapper/0: do_bad_area+0x30/0xdc swapper/0: do_tag_check_fault+0x20/0x34 swapper/0: do_mem_abort+0x58/0x104 swapper/0: el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c swapper/0: el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xcc swapper/0: el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c swapper/0: __memset+0x84/0x188 swapper/0: btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x280/0x3d8 swapper/0: __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x43c/0x468 swapper/0: register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x48/0x60 swapper/0: register_nf_nat_bpf+0x1c/0x40 swapper/0: nf_nat_init+0xc0/0x128 swapper/0: do_one_initcall+0x184/0x464 swapper/0: do_initcall_level+0xdc/0x1b0 swapper/0: do_initcalls+0x70/0xc0 swapper/0: do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 swapper/0: kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x1b8 swapper/0: kernel_init+0x20/0x1a8 swapper/0: ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ================================================================== | |||||
| CVE-2024-53096 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour The mmap_region() function is somewhat terrifying, with spaghetti-like control flow and numerous means by which issues can arise and incomplete state, memory leaks and other unpleasantness can occur. A large amount of the complexity arises from trying to handle errors late in the process of mapping a VMA, which forms the basis of recently observed issues with resource leaks and observable inconsistent state. Taking advantage of previous patches in this series we move a number of checks earlier in the code, simplifying things by moving the core of the logic into a static internal function __mmap_region(). Doing this allows us to perform a number of checks up front before we do any real work, and allows us to unwind the writable unmap check unconditionally as required and to perform a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE validation unconditionally also. We move a number of things here: 1. We preallocate memory for the iterator before we call the file-backed memory hook, allowing us to exit early and avoid having to perform complicated and error-prone close/free logic. We carefully free iterator state on both success and error paths. 2. The enclosing mmap_region() function handles the mapping_map_writable() logic early. Previously the logic had the mapping_map_writable() at the point of mapping a newly allocated file-backed VMA, and a matching mapping_unmap_writable() on success and error paths. We now do this unconditionally if this is a file-backed, shared writable mapping. If a driver changes the flags to eliminate VM_MAYWRITE, however doing so does not invalidate the seal check we just performed, and we in any case always decrement the counter in the wrapper. We perform a debug assert to ensure a driver does not attempt to do the opposite. 3. We also move arch_validate_flags() up into the mmap_region() function. This is only relevant on arm64 and sparc64, and the check is only meaningful for SPARC with ADI enabled. We explicitly add a warning for this arch if a driver invalidates this check, though the code ought eventually to be fixed to eliminate the need for this. With all of these measures in place, we no longer need to explicitly close the VMA on error paths, as we place all checks which might fail prior to a call to any driver mmap hook. This eliminates an entire class of errors, makes the code easier to reason about and more robust. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53093 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-multipath: defer partition scanning We need to suppress the partition scan from occuring within the controller's scan_work context. If a path error occurs here, the IO will wait until a path becomes available or all paths are torn down, but that action also occurs within scan_work, so it would deadlock. Defer the partion scan to a different context that does not block scan_work. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53072 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd/pmc: Detect when STB is not available Loading the amd_pmc module as: amd_pmc enable_stb=1 ...can result in the following messages in the kernel ring buffer: amd_pmc AMDI0009:00: SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000000000000 - 0x0000000000ffffff WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2151 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:217 __ioremap_caller+0x2cd/0x340 Further debugging reveals that this occurs when the requests for S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW and S2D_PHYS_ADDR_HIGH return a value of 0, indicating that the STB is inaccessible. To prevent the ioremap warning and provide clarity to the user, handle the invalid address and display an error message. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53070 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: fix fault at system suspend if device was already runtime suspended If the device was already runtime suspended then during system suspend we cannot access the device registers else it will crash. Also we cannot access any registers after dwc3_core_exit() on some platforms so move the dwc3_enable_susphy() call to the top. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53059 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd() 1. The size of the response packet is not validated. 2. The response buffer is not freed. Resolve these issues by switching to iwl_mvm_send_cmd_status(), which handles both size validation and frees the buffer. | |||||
| CVE-2024-53058 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: TSO: Fix unbalanced DMA map/unmap for non-paged SKB data In case the non-paged data of a SKB carries protocol header and protocol payload to be transmitted on a certain platform that the DMA AXI address width is configured to 40-bit/48-bit, or the size of the non-paged data is bigger than TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE on a certain platform that the DMA AXI address width is configured to 32-bit, then this SKB requires at least two DMA transmit descriptors to serve it. For example, three descriptors are allocated to split one DMA buffer mapped from one piece of non-paged data: dma_desc[N + 0], dma_desc[N + 1], dma_desc[N + 2]. Then three elements of tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[] will be allocated to hold extra information to be reused in stmmac_tx_clean(): tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 0], tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 1], tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 2]. Now we focus on tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].buf, which is the DMA buffer address returned by DMA mapping call. stmmac_tx_clean() will try to unmap the DMA buffer _ONLY_IF_ tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].buf is a valid buffer address. The expected behavior that saves DMA buffer address of this non-paged data to tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].buf is: tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 0].buf = NULL; tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 1].buf = NULL; tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 2].buf = dma_map_single(); Unfortunately, the current code misbehaves like this: tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 0].buf = dma_map_single(); tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 1].buf = NULL; tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 2].buf = NULL; On the stmmac_tx_clean() side, when dma_desc[N + 0] is closed by the DMA engine, tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[N + 0].buf is a valid buffer address obviously, then the DMA buffer will be unmapped immediately. There may be a rare case that the DMA engine does not finish the pending dma_desc[N + 1], dma_desc[N + 2] yet. Now things will go horribly wrong, DMA is going to access a unmapped/unreferenced memory region, corrupted data will be transmited or iommu fault will be triggered :( In contrast, the for-loop that maps SKB fragments behaves perfectly as expected, and that is how the driver should do for both non-paged data and paged frags actually. This patch corrects DMA map/unmap sequences by fixing the array index for tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].buf when assigning DMA buffer address. Tested and verified on DWXGMAC CORE 3.20a | |||||
| CVE-2024-53042 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow() There are code paths from which the function is called without holding the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1]. Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire the RCU read lock before calling l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu(). [1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ip/361: #0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6 dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210 l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0 ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00 ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0 ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170 __rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0 rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60 netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450 netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80 ____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20 ___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | |||||
| CVE-2024-50295 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: arc: fix the device for dma_map_single/dma_unmap_single The ndev->dev and pdev->dev aren't the same device, use ndev->dev.parent which has dma_mask, ndev->dev.parent is just pdev->dev. Or it would cause the following issue: [ 39.933526] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 39.938414] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 501 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:149 dma_map_page_attrs+0x90/0x1f8 | |||||
| CVE-2024-50256 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_reject_ipv6: fix potential crash in nf_send_reset6() I got a syzbot report without a repro [1] crashing in nf_send_reset6() I think the issue is that dev->hard_header_len is zero, and we attempt later to push an Ethernet header. Use LL_MAX_HEADER, as other functions in net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89b1d008 len:74 put:14 head:ffff88803123aa00 data:ffff88803123a9f2 tail:0x3c end:0x140 dev:syz_tun kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7373 Comm: syz.1.568 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00631-g6d858708d465 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216 Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 60 a6 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 ba 30 38 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffc900045269b0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000088 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: cd66dacdc5d8e800 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88802d39a3d0 R08: ffffffff8174afec R09: 1ffff920008a4ccc R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008a4ccd R12: 0000000000000140 R13: ffff88803123aa00 R14: ffff88803123a9f2 R15: 000000000000003c FS: 00007fdbee5ff6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000005d322000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636 eth_header+0x38/0x1f0 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3208 [inline] nf_send_reset6+0xce6/0x1270 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c:358 nft_reject_inet_eval+0x3b9/0x690 net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:48 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:240 [inline] nft_do_chain+0x4ad/0x1da0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:288 nft_do_chain_inet+0x418/0x6b0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:161 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x63e/0x770 net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c:184 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_bridge_pre net/bridge/br_input.c:277 [inline] br_handle_frame+0x9fd/0x1530 net/bridge/br_input.c:424 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x13e8/0x4570 net/core/dev.c:5562 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5666 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x12f/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5781 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5867 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x1e8/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5926 tun_rx_batched+0x1b7/0x8f0 drivers/net/tun.c:1550 tun_get_user+0x3056/0x47e0 drivers/net/tun.c:2007 tun_chr_write_iter+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/net/tun.c:2053 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:590 [inline] vfs_write+0xa6d/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:683 ksys_write+0x183/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:736 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fdbeeb7d1ff Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 c9 8d 02 00 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 1c 8e 02 00 48 RSP: 002b:00007fdbee5ff000 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fdbeed36058 RCX: 00007fdbeeb7d1ff RDX: 000000000000008e RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000000000c8 RBP: 00007fdbeebf12be R08: 0000000 ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-50251 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 6.2 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_payload: sanitize offset and length before calling skb_checksum() If access to offset + length is larger than the skbuff length, then skb_checksum() triggers BUG_ON(). skb_checksum() internally subtracts the length parameter while iterating over skbuff, BUG_ON(len) at the end of it checks that the expected length to be included in the checksum calculation is fully consumed. | |||||
| CVE-2024-50250 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed. If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will reflect this unalignment. dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the wrong place. If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality because we expose stale pmem contents. Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that we always copy full blocks. We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range, so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed. Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're operating on. | |||||
| CVE-2024-50249 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: CPPC: Make rmw_lock a raw_spin_lock The following BUG was triggered: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.12.0-rc2-XXX #406 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/1:1/62 is trying to lock: ffffff8801593030 (&cpc_ptr->rmw_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by kworker/1:1/62: #0: ffffff897ef5ec98 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: raw_spin_rq_lock_nested+0x2c/0x50 #1: ffffff880154e238 (&sg_policy->update_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sugov_update_shared+0x3c/0x280 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-g9654bd3e8806 #406 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xa4/0x130 show_stack+0x20/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x28 __lock_acquire+0x480/0x1ad8 lock_acquire+0x114/0x310 _raw_spin_lock+0x50/0x70 cpc_write+0xcc/0x370 cppc_set_perf+0xa0/0x3a8 cppc_cpufreq_fast_switch+0x40/0xc0 cpufreq_driver_fast_switch+0x4c/0x218 sugov_update_shared+0x234/0x280 update_load_avg+0x6ec/0x7b8 dequeue_entities+0x108/0x830 dequeue_task_fair+0x58/0x408 __schedule+0x4f0/0x1070 schedule+0x54/0x130 worker_thread+0xc0/0x2e8 kthread+0x130/0x148 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 sugov_update_shared() locks a raw_spinlock while cpc_write() locks a spinlock. To have a correct wait-type order, update rmw_lock to a raw spinlock and ensure that interrupts will be disabled on the CPU holding it. [ rjw: Changelog edits ] | |||||
| CVE-2024-50245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: Fix possible deadlock in mi_read Mutex lock with another subclass used in ni_lock_dir(). | |||||
| CVE-2024-50244 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: Additional check in ni_clear() Checking of NTFS_FLAGS_LOG_REPLAYING added to prevent access to uninitialized bitmap during replay process. | |||||