Total
35613 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-43067 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: handle wraparound when searching for blocks for indirect mapped blocks Commit 4865c768b563 ("ext4: always allocate blocks only from groups inode can use") restricts what blocks will be allocated for indirect block based files to block numbers that fit within 32-bit block numbers. However, when using a review bot running on the latest Gemini LLM to check this commit when backporting into an LTS based kernel, it raised this concern: If ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group is >= ngroups (for instance, if the goal group was populated via stream allocation from s_mb_last_groups), then start will be >= ngroups. Does this allow allocating blocks beyond the 32-bit limit for indirect block mapped files? The commit message mentions that ext4_mb_scan_groups_linear() takes care to not select unsupported groups. However, its loop uses group = *start, and the very first iteration will call ext4_mb_scan_group() with this unsupported group because next_linear_group() is only called at the end of the iteration. After reviewing the code paths involved and considering the LLM review, I determined that this can happen when there is a file system where some files/directories are extent-mapped and others are indirect-block mapped. To address this, add a safety clamp in ext4_mb_scan_groups(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-43065 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: always drain queued discard work in ext4_mb_release() While reviewing recent ext4 patch[1], Sashiko raised the following concern[2]: > If the filesystem is initially mounted with the discard option, > deleting files will populate sbi->s_discard_list and queue > s_discard_work. If it is then remounted with nodiscard, the > EXT4_MOUNT_DISCARD flag is cleared, but the pending s_discard_work is > neither cancelled nor flushed. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260319094545.19291-1-qiang.zhang@linux.dev/ [2] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319094545.19291-1-qiang.zhang%40linux.dev The concern was valid, but it had nothing to do with the patch[1]. One of the problems with Sashiko in its current (early) form is that it will detect pre-existing issues and report it as a problem with the patch that it is reviewing. In practice, it would be hard to hit deliberately (unless you are a malicious syzkaller fuzzer), since it would involve mounting the file system with -o discard, and then deleting a large number of files, remounting the file system with -o nodiscard, and then immediately unmounting the file system before the queued discard work has a change to drain on its own. Fix it because it's a real bug, and to avoid Sashiko from raising this concern when analyzing future patches to mballoc.c. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43063 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't irele after failing to iget in xfs_attri_recover_work xlog_recovery_iget* never set @ip to a valid pointer if they return an error, so this irele will walk off a dangling pointer. Fix that. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43062 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED *connection* response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0). This causes two problems: - The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP packets are rejected with -EPROTO. - rsp->result reads from offset 6 instead of offset 0, returning wrong data when the packet is large enough to pass the check. Fix by using the correct type. Also pass the already byte-swapped result variable to BT_DBG instead of the raw __le16 field. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43060 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal Packets sitting in nfqueue might hold a reference to: - templates that specify the conntrack zone, because a percpu area is used and module removal is possible. - conntrack timeout policies and helper, where object removal leave a stale reference. Since these objects can just go away, drop enqueued packets to avoid stale reference to them. If there is a need for finer grain removal, this logic can be revisited to make selective packet drop upon dependencies. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43057 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: correctly handle tunneled traffic on IPV6_CSUM GSO fallback NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM only advertises support for checksum offload of packets without IPv6 extension headers. Packets with extension headers must fall back onto software checksumming. Since TSO depends on checksum offload, those must revert to GSO. The below commit introduces that fallback. It always checks network header length. For tunneled packets, the inner header length must be checked instead. Extend the check accordingly. A special case is tunneled packets without inner IP protocol. Such as RFC 6951 SCTP in UDP. Those are not standard IPv6 followed by transport header either, so also must revert to the software GSO path. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43055 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: file: Use kzalloc_flex for aio_cmd The target_core_file doesn't initialize the aio_cmd->iocb for the ki_write_stream. When a write command fd_execute_rw_aio() is executed, we may get a bogus ki_write_stream value, causing unintended write failure status when checking iocb->ki_write_stream > max_write_streams in the block device. Let's just use kzalloc_flex when allocating the aio_cmd and let ki_write_stream=0 to fix this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43044 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - fix DMA corruption on long hmac keys When a key longer than block size is supplied, it is copied and then hashed into the real key. The memory allocated for the copy needs to be rounded to DMA cache alignment, as otherwise the hashed key may corrupt neighbouring memory. The rounding was performed, but never actually used for the allocation. Fix this by replacing kmemdup with kmalloc for a larger buffer, followed by memcpy. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43039 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ti: icssg-prueth: fix missing data copy and wrong recycle in ZC RX dispatch emac_dispatch_skb_zc() allocates a new skb via napi_alloc_skb() but never copies the packet data from the XDP buffer into it. The skb is passed up the stack containing uninitialized heap memory instead of the actual received packet, leaking kernel heap contents to userspace. Copy the received packet data from the XDP buffer into the skb using skb_copy_to_linear_data(). Additionally, remove the skb_mark_for_recycle() call since the skb is backed by the NAPI page frag allocator, not page_pool. Marking a non-page_pool skb for recycle causes the free path to return pages to a page_pool that does not own them, corrupting page_pool state. The non-ZC path (emac_rx_packet) does not have these issues because it uses napi_build_skb() to wrap the existing page_pool page directly, requiring no copy, and correctly marks for recycle since the page comes from page_pool_dev_alloc_pages(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-43038 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43034 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: set backing store type from query type bnxt_hwrm_func_backing_store_qcaps_v2() stores resp->type from the firmware response in ctxm->type and later uses that value to index fixed backing-store metadata arrays such as ctx_arr[] and bnxt_bstore_to_trace[]. ctxm->type is fixed by the current backing-store query type and matches the array index of ctx->ctx_arr. Set ctxm->type from the current loop variable instead of depending on resp->type. Also update the loop to advance type from next_valid_type in the for statement, which keeps the control flow simpler for non-valid and unchanged entries. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43033 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could simply be re-copied from the source. However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly. Thanks, | |||||
| CVE-2026-43032 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: pn533: bound the UART receive buffer pn532_receive_buf() appends every incoming byte to dev->recv_skb and only resets the buffer after pn532_uart_rx_is_frame() recognizes a complete frame. A continuous stream of bytes without a valid PN532 frame header therefore keeps growing the skb until skb_put_u8() hits the tail limit. Drop the accumulated partial frame once the fixed receive buffer is full so malformed UART traffic cannot grow the skb past PN532_UART_SKB_BUFF_LEN. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43031 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: xilinx: axienet: Fix BQL accounting for multi-BD TX packets When a TX packet spans multiple buffer descriptors (scatter-gather), axienet_free_tx_chain sums the per-BD actual length from descriptor status into a caller-provided accumulator. That sum is reset on each NAPI poll. If the BDs for a single packet complete across different polls, the earlier bytes are lost and never credited to BQL. This causes BQL to think bytes are permanently in-flight, eventually stalling the TX queue. The SKB pointer is stored only on the last BD of a packet. When that BD completes, use skb->len for the byte count instead of summing per-BD status lengths. This matches netdev_sent_queue(), which debits skb->len, and naturally survives across polls because no partial packet contributes to the accumulator. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43030 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix regsafe() for pointers to packet In case rold->reg->range == BEYOND_PKT_END && rcur->reg->range == N regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43028 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: ensure names are nul-terminated Reject names that lack a \0 character before feeding them to functions that expect c-strings. Fixes tag is the most recent commit that needs this change. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43026 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ctnetlink: zero expect NAT fields when CTA_EXPECT_NAT absent ctnetlink_alloc_expect() allocates expectations from a non-zeroing slab cache via nf_ct_expect_alloc(). When CTA_EXPECT_NAT is not present in the netlink message, saved_addr and saved_proto are never initialized. Stale data from a previous slab occupant can then be dumped to userspace by ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(), which checks these fields to decide whether to emit CTA_EXPECT_NAT. The safe sibling nf_ct_expect_init(), used by the packet path, explicitly zeroes these fields. Zero saved_addr, saved_proto and dir in the else branch, guarded by IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) since these fields only exist when NAT is enabled. Confirmed by priming the expect slab with NAT-bearing expectations, freeing them, creating a new expectation without CTA_EXPECT_NAT, and observing that the ctnetlink dump emits a spurious CTA_EXPECT_NAT containing stale data from the prior allocation. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43024 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: reject immediate NF_QUEUE verdict nft_queue is always used from userspace nftables to deliver the NF_QUEUE verdict. Immediately emitting an NF_QUEUE verdict is never used by the userspace nft tools, so reject immediate NF_QUEUE verdicts. The arp family does not provide queue support, but such an immediate verdict is still reachable. Globally reject NF_QUEUE immediate verdicts to address this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43022 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: hci_cmd_sync_queue_once() return -EEXIST if exists hci_cmd_sync_queue_once() needs to indicate whether a queue item was added, so caller can know if callbacks are called, so it can avoid leaking resources. Change the function to return -EEXIST if queue item already exists. Modify all callsites to handle that. | |||||
| CVE-2026-43017 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request. | |||||