Total
2245 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-47660 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsnotify: clear PARENT_WATCHED flags lazily In some setups directories can have many (usually negative) dentries. Hence __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() function can take a significant amount of time. Since the bulk of this function happens under inode->i_lock this causes a significant contention on the lock when we remove the watch from the directory as the __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() call from fsnotify_recalc_mask() races with __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags() calls from __fsnotify_parent() happening on children. This can lead upto softlockup reports reported by users. Fix the problem by calling fsnotify_update_children_dentry_flags() to set PARENT_WATCHED flags only when parent starts watching children. When parent stops watching children, clear false positive PARENT_WATCHED flags lazily in __fsnotify_parent() for each accessed child. | |||||
| CVE-2024-46734 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mod ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-44954 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: Fix racy access to midibuf There can be concurrent accesses to line6 midibuf from both the URB completion callback and the rawmidi API access. This could be a cause of KMSAN warning triggered by syzkaller below (so put as reported-by here). This patch protects the midibuf call of the former code path with a spinlock for avoiding the possible races. | |||||
| CVE-2024-43866 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Always drain health in shutdown callback There is no point in recovery during device shutdown. if health work started need to wait for it to avoid races and NULL pointer access. Hence, drain health WQ on shutdown callback. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41020 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filelock: Fix fcntl/close race recovery compat path When I wrote commit 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected"), I missed that there are two copies of the code I was patching: The normal version, and the version for 64-bit offsets on 32-bit kernels. Thanks to Greg KH for stumbling over this while doing the stable backport... Apply exactly the same fix to the compat path for 32-bit kernels. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41005 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active KCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10: net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822) <snip> read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2: netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393) netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?) <snip> value changed: 0x0000000a -> 0xffffffff This happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the current CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi->poll_owner non atomically. The ->poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding the lock. Use an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40976 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/lima: mask irqs in timeout path before hard reset There is a race condition in which a rendering job might take just long enough to trigger the drm sched job timeout handler but also still complete before the hard reset is done by the timeout handler. This runs into race conditions not expected by the timeout handler. In some very specific cases it currently may result in a refcount imbalance on lima_pm_idle, with a stack dump such as: [10136.669170] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/gpu/drm/lima/lima_devfreq.c:205 lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0 ... [10136.669459] pc : lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0 ... [10136.669628] Call trace: [10136.669634] lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0 [10136.669646] lima_sched_pipe_task_done+0x5c/0xb0 [10136.669656] lima_gp_irq_handler+0xa8/0x120 [10136.669666] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x48/0x160 [10136.669679] handle_irq_event+0x4c/0xc0 We can prevent that race condition entirely by masking the irqs at the beginning of the timeout handler, at which point we give up on waiting for that job entirely. The irqs will be enabled again at the next hard reset which is already done as a recovery by the timeout handler. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40953 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Fix a data race on last_boosted_vcpu in kvm_vcpu_on_spin() Use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to access kvm->last_boosted_vcpu to ensure the loads and stores are atomic. In the extremely unlikely scenario the compiler tears the stores, it's theoretically possible for KVM to attempt to get a vCPU using an out-of-bounds index, e.g. if the write is split into multiple 8-bit stores, and is paired with a 32-bit load on a VM with 257 vCPUs: CPU0 CPU1 last_boosted_vcpu = 0xff; (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x100) last_boosted_vcpu[15:8] = 0x01; i = (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x1ff) last_boosted_vcpu[7:0] = 0x00; vcpu = kvm->vcpu_array[0x1ff]; As detected by KCSAN: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] / kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] write to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4340 on cpu 16: kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4112) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:? arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) read to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4342 on cpu 4: kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4069) kvm handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:? arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) value changed: 0x00000012 -> 0x00000000 | |||||
| CVE-2024-40943 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO After commit "ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block", fstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed: ======================================================================== [ 473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300 [ 475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal [ 475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. [ 494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found [ 494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted. [ 494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only. [ 494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30 [ 494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3 fio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072 ========================================================================= In __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten extents to a list. extents are also inserted into extent tree in ocfs2_write_begin_nolock. Then another thread call fallocate to puch a hole at one of the unwritten extent. The extent at cpos was removed by ocfs2_remove_extent(). At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list found there is no such extent at the cpos. T1 T2 T3 inode lock ... insert extents ... inode unlock ocfs2_fallocate __ocfs2_change_file_space inode lock lock ip_alloc_sem ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode ocfs2_remove_btree_range ocfs2_remove_extent ^---remove the extent at cpos 78723 ... unlock ip_alloc_sem inode unlock ocfs2_dio_end_io ocfs2_dio_end_io_write lock ip_alloc_sem ocfs2_mark_extent_written ocfs2_change_extent_flag ocfs2_search_extent_list ^---failed to find extent ... unlock ip_alloc_sem In most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO, so fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like ext4. | |||||
| CVE-2024-39503 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.0 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: Fix race between namespace cleanup and gc in the list:set type Lion Ackermann reported that there is a race condition between namespace cleanup in ipset and the garbage collection of the list:set type. The namespace cleanup can destroy the list:set type of sets while the gc of the set type is waiting to run in rcu cleanup. The latter uses data from the destroyed set which thus leads use after free. The patch contains the following parts: - When destroying all sets, first remove the garbage collectors, then wait if needed and then destroy the sets. - Fix the badly ordered "wait then remove gc" for the destroy a single set case. - Fix the missing rcu locking in the list:set type in the userspace test case. - Use proper RCU list handlings in the list:set type. The patch depends on c1193d9bbbd3 (netfilter: ipset: Add list flush to cancel_gc). | |||||
| CVE-2024-39500 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However, sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL. This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map, while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it. That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701 Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840 R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870 FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline] __x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070 Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If, then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel psock->work. As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is less convoluted. After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE anymore. | |||||
| CVE-2024-36894 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 5.6 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix race between aio_cancel() and AIO request complete FFS based applications can utilize the aio_cancel() callback to dequeue pending USB requests submitted to the UDC. There is a scenario where the FFS application issues an AIO cancel call, while the UDC is handling a soft disconnect. For a DWC3 based implementation, the callstack looks like the following: DWC3 Gadget FFS Application dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() ... --> dwc3_stop_active_transfers() --> dwc3_gadget_giveback(-ESHUTDOWN) --> ffs_epfile_async_io_complete() ffs_aio_cancel() --> usb_ep_free_request() --> usb_ep_dequeue() There is currently no locking implemented between the AIO completion handler and AIO cancel, so the issue occurs if the completion routine is running in parallel to an AIO cancel call coming from the FFS application. As the completion call frees the USB request (io_data->req) the FFS application is also referencing it for the usb_ep_dequeue() call. This can lead to accessing a stale/hanging pointer. commit b566d38857fc ("usb: gadget: f_fs: use io_data->status consistently") relocated the usb_ep_free_request() into ffs_epfile_async_io_complete(). However, in order to properly implement locking to mitigate this issue, the spinlock can't be added to ffs_epfile_async_io_complete(), as usb_ep_dequeue() (if successfully dequeuing a USB request) will call the function driver's completion handler in the same context. Hence, leading into a deadlock. Fix this issue by moving the usb_ep_free_request() back to ffs_user_copy_worker(), and ensuring that it explicitly sets io_data->req to NULL after freeing it within the ffs->eps_lock. This resolves the race condition above, as the ffs_aio_cancel() routine will not continue attempting to dequeue a request that has already been freed, or the ffs_user_copy_work() not freeing the USB request until the AIO cancel is done referencing it. This fix depends on commit b566d38857fc ("usb: gadget: f_fs: use io_data->status consistently") | |||||
| CVE-2023-5676 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Openj9 | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.1 MEDIUM |
| In Eclipse OpenJ9 before version 0.41.0, the JVM can be forced into an infinite busy hang on a spinlock or a segmentation fault if a shutdown signal (SIGTERM, SIGINT or SIGHUP) is received before the JVM has finished initializing. | |||||
| CVE-2023-31083 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| An issue was discovered in drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c in the Linux kernel 6.2. In hci_uart_tty_ioctl, there is a race condition between HCIUARTSETPROTO and HCIUARTGETPROTO. HCI_UART_PROTO_SET is set before hu->proto is set. A NULL pointer dereference may occur. | |||||
| CVE-2022-45888 | 2 Linux, Netapp | 11 Linux Kernel, H300s, H300s Firmware and 8 more | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 6.4 MEDIUM |
| An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 6.0.9. drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c has a race condition and use-after-free during physical removal of a USB device. | |||||
| CVE-2025-21688 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Assign job pointer to NULL before signaling the fence In commit e4b5ccd392b9 ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL after job completion"), we introduced a change to assign the job pointer to NULL after completing a job, indicating job completion. However, this approach created a race condition between the DRM scheduler workqueue and the IRQ execution thread. As soon as the fence is signaled in the IRQ execution thread, a new job starts to be executed. This results in a race condition where the IRQ execution thread sets the job pointer to NULL simultaneously as the `run_job()` function assigns a new job to the pointer. This race condition can lead to a NULL pointer dereference if the IRQ execution thread sets the job pointer to NULL after `run_job()` assigns it to the new job. When the new job completes and the GPU emits an interrupt, `v3d_irq()` is triggered, potentially causing a crash. [ 466.310099] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000c0 [ 466.318928] Mem abort info: [ 466.321723] ESR = 0x0000000096000005 [ 466.325479] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 466.330807] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 466.333864] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 466.337010] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault [ 466.341900] Data abort info: [ 466.344783] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 466.350285] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 466.355350] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 466.360677] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000089772000 [ 466.367140] [00000000000000c0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 [ 466.375875] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 466.382163] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep binfmt_misc vc4 snd_soc_hdmi_codec drm_display_helper cec brcmfmac_wcc spidev rpivid_hevc(C) drm_client_lib brcmfmac hci_uart drm_dma_helper pisp_be btbcm brcmutil snd_soc_core aes_ce_blk v4l2_mem2mem bluetooth aes_ce_cipher snd_compress videobuf2_dma_contig ghash_ce cfg80211 gf128mul snd_pcm_dmaengine videobuf2_memops ecdh_generic sha2_ce ecc videobuf2_v4l2 snd_pcm v3d sha256_arm64 rfkill videodev snd_timer sha1_ce libaes gpu_sched snd videobuf2_common sha1_generic drm_shmem_helper mc rp1_pio drm_kms_helper raspberrypi_hwmon spi_bcm2835 gpio_keys i2c_brcmstb rp1 raspberrypi_gpiomem rp1_mailbox rp1_adc nvmem_rmem uio_pdrv_genirq uio i2c_dev drm ledtrig_pattern drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight fuse dm_mod ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [ 466.458429] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 2008 Comm: chromium Tainted: G C 6.13.0-v8+ #18 [ 466.467336] Tainted: [C]=CRAP [ 466.470306] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT) [ 466.476157] pstate: 404000c9 (nZcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 466.483143] pc : v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d] [ 466.487258] lr : __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x228 [ 466.492327] sp : ffffffc080003ea0 [ 466.495646] x29: ffffffc080003ea0 x28: ffffff80c0c94200 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 466.502807] x26: ffffffd08dd81d7b x25: ffffff80c0c94200 x24: ffffff8003bdc200 [ 466.509969] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000000000a7 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 466.517130] x20: ffffff8041bb0000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 466.524291] x17: ffffffafadfb0000 x16: ffffffc080000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 466.531452] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 466.538613] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffd08c527eb0 [ 466.545777] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 466.552941] x5 : ffffffd08c4100d0 x4 : ffffffafadfb0000 x3 : ffffffc080003f70 [ 466.560102] x2 : ffffffc0829e8058 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 466.567263] Call trace: [ 466.569711] v3d_irq+0x118/0x2e0 [v3d] (P) [ 466. ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-57913 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 4.7 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Remove WARN_ON in functionfs_bind This commit addresses an issue related to below kernel panic where panic_on_warn is enabled. It is caused by the unnecessary use of WARN_ON in functionsfs_bind, which easily leads to the following scenarios. 1.adb_write in adbd 2. UDC write via configfs ================= ===================== ->usb_ffs_open_thread() ->UDC write ->open_functionfs() ->configfs_write_iter() ->adb_open() ->gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store() ->adb_write() ->usb_gadget_register_driver_owner ->driver_register() ->StartMonitor() ->bus_add_driver() ->adb_read() ->gadget_bind_driver() <times-out without BIND event> ->configfs_composite_bind() ->usb_add_function() ->open_functionfs() ->ffs_func_bind() ->adb_open() ->functionfs_bind() <ffs->state !=FFS_ACTIVE> The adb_open, adb_read, and adb_write operations are invoked from the daemon, but trying to bind the function is a process that is invoked by UDC write through configfs, which opens up the possibility of a race condition between the two paths. In this race scenario, the kernel panic occurs due to the WARN_ON from functionfs_bind when panic_on_warn is enabled. This commit fixes the kernel panic by removing the unnecessary WARN_ON. Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... [ 14.542395] Call trace: [ 14.542464] ffs_func_bind+0x1c8/0x14a8 [ 14.542468] usb_add_function+0xcc/0x1f0 [ 14.542473] configfs_composite_bind+0x468/0x588 [ 14.542478] gadget_bind_driver+0x108/0x27c [ 14.542483] really_probe+0x190/0x374 [ 14.542488] __driver_probe_device+0xa0/0x12c [ 14.542492] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x220 [ 14.542498] __driver_attach+0x11c/0x1fc [ 14.542502] bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x160 [ 14.542506] driver_attach+0x24/0x34 [ 14.542510] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x270 [ 14.542514] driver_register+0x68/0x104 [ 14.542518] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x48/0xf4 [ 14.542523] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf8/0x144 [ 14.542526] configfs_write_iter+0xf0/0x138 | |||||
| CVE-2024-57893 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: oss: Fix races at processing SysEx messages OSS sequencer handles the SysEx messages split in 6 bytes packets, and ALSA sequencer OSS layer tries to combine those. It stores the data in the internal buffer and this access is racy as of now, which may lead to the out-of-bounds access. As a temporary band-aid fix, introduce a mutex for serializing the process of the SysEx message packets. | |||||
| CVE-2024-57876 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.0 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp_mst: Fix resetting msg rx state after topology removal If the MST topology is removed during the reception of an MST down reply or MST up request sideband message, the drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::up_req_recv/down_rep_recv states could be reset from one thread via drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(false), racing with the reading/parsing of the message from another thread via drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() or drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(). The race is possible since the reader/parser doesn't hold any lock while accessing the reception state. This in turn can lead to a memory corruption in the reader/parser as described by commit bd2fccac61b4 ("drm/dp_mst: Fix MST sideband message body length check"). Fix the above by resetting the message reception state if needed before reading/parsing a message. Another solution would be to hold the drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::lock for the whole duration of the message reception/parsing in drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() and drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(), however this would require a bigger change. Since the fix is also needed for stable, opting for the simpler solution in this patch. | |||||
| CVE-2024-56664 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | N/A | 7.0 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close() Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete() unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element: // set map[0] = s0 map_update_elem(map, 0, s0) // drop fd of s0 close(s0) sock_map_close() lock_sock(sk) (s0!) sock_map_remove_links(sk) link = sk_psock_link_pop() sock_map_unlink(sk, link) sock_map_delete_from_link // replace map[0] with s1 map_update_elem(map, 0, s1) sock_map_update_elem (s1!) lock_sock(sk) sock_map_update_common psock = sk_psock(sk) spin_lock(&stab->lock) osk = stab->sks[idx] sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx]) sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx]) psock = sk_psock(osk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock)) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) unlock_sock(sk) __sock_map_delete spin_lock(&stab->lock) sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1 if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch sk = xchg(psk, NULL) if (sk) sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle psock = sk_psock(sk) sk_psock_put(sk, psock) if (refcount_dec_and_test()) sk_psock_drop(sk, psock) spin_unlock(&stab->lock) release_sock(sk) Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with a KASAN splat [1]. Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that may have been replaced. [1]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 1202: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0 unix_create+0xc5/0x180 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 46: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80 kthread+0x29e/0x360 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The bu ---truncated--- | |||||