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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98846 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: check RCV_SHUTDOWN after the sendmsg connect wait sctp_wait_for_connect() drops the socket lock while it sleeps. An out-of-the-blue ABORT can then be processed from the socket backlog and unlink the association. If a concurrent shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) sets RCV_SHUTDOWN, the waiter breaks with err == 0 before checking asoc->base.dead. Its final sctp_association_put() can then free the association, leaving sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() to continue with a dangling pointer. Check RCV_SHUTDOWN along with the wait error in sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() before using the association again. The check only accesses the socket, so it needs no additional association reference. Return the existing -ESRCH so that sctp_sendmsg() skips freeing a new association that may already have been destroyed. Keep sctp_wait_for_connect() unchanged to preserve its behavior for the connect() caller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98840 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vc_screen: reload vc pointer before if (ret) in vcs_write() to avoid UAF The reload of 'vc' added by commit 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF") sits after the 'if (ret)' block, so the copy-failure break path exits the loop without reloading vc. If the vc was kfree()'d via vc_port_destruct during the unlocked copy_from_user() window, the post-loop 'if (written && vc) vcs_scr_updated(vc)' is reached with a stale non-NULL vc. The '&& vc' guard from commit a287620312dc ("vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write") only handles the NULL case, not this stale-non-NULL case; vcs_notifier() then reads param->vc->vc_num from freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888007149190 Call Trace: vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa0 vcs_scr_updated+0x77/0xa0 vcs_write+0x71b/0x7e0 Allocated by task: vc_allocate -> con_install -> tty_open Freed by task: kfree <- vt_ioctl (VT_DISALLOCATE -> vc_port_destruct) Move the reload to immediately after console_lock(), before 'if (ret)', so every break path below passes a fresh vc to the post-loop vcs_scr_updated(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98838 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: skip screen update for DEC alignment test on backgroup consoles [BUG] Recently, we encountered a KASAN warning as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100015fd9f6a4 by task tty_fbcon_oob/1239 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1239 Comm: tty_fbcon_oob Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #100 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> ... kasan_report+0xf0/0x120 fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 ccw_putcs+0x86c/0xa80 fbcon_putcs+0x338/0x410 do_update_region+0x21d/0x450 do_con_write+0x1e0e/0x4880 con_write+0x13/0x80 n_tty_write+0x374/0x1010 file_tty_write.isra.0+0x404/0x7a0 ... reproduce: 1) open /dev/tty0, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 8 and op.height = 16 (visible VC1) 2) open /dev/tty1, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 28 and op.height = 24 (invisible VC2) 3) echo 3 > /sys/devices/virtual/graphics/fbcon/rotate_all 4) write EShash8(esc hash8) to tty1 [CAUSE] All VCs render to the framebuffer. setfont only modifies the target VC's font without resizing the framebuffer backing buffer (par->rotated.buf); the buffer is only resized for the visible VC (fbcon_do_set_font -> ... -> vc_do_resize -> update_screen). This relies on the con_should_update() check performed before every update_region(). However, the ESC # 8 path (do_con_trol -> do_update_region) omits the con_should_update() check. After changing the font size of an invisible VC, do_update_region() fills using the new font size against a buffer that was never resized, causing an out-of-bounds access. [FIX] Only push the update when the console is visible and not blanked, add the con_should_update() check in the do_con_trol() like every other call site of do_update_region() (update_region(), invert_screen(), ...). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98837 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: unregister the input device when probe fails setup_card() registers the input device, whose name and phys point into struct snd_usb_caiaqdev, and then goes on to snd_card_register() and snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(). If either fails, snd_probe() calls snd_card_free(), which frees the device state but leaves the input device registered: card_free() only clears the pointer, and the input device is unregistered from snd_disconnect() alone. Reading its "uevent" attribute afterwards dereferences freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x4a9/0x4f0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880208f5043 by task caiaq/4967 add_uevent_var+0x183/0x3a0 input_dev_uevent+0x162/0x900 dev_uevent+0x2f1/0x870 uevent_show+0x1ca/0x3a0 ... Unregister the input device on the probe error path, as snd_disconnect() does. snd_usb_caiaq_input_disconnect() is a no-op when no input device was registered. Reproduced with a raw-gadget Audio Kontrol 1 and a temporary hack that makes snd_usb_caiaq_control_init() fail. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98836 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets Each playback URB is handed a slice of out.buffer that is exactly LINE6_ISO_PACKETS * max_packet_size_out bytes, sized from the OUT endpoint, but the number of bytes written into that slice is never compared against it. submit_audio_out_urb() takes the frame count from prev_fsize, which audio_in_callback() derived from the *IN* endpoint's received packet length, and rescales it with the playback frame size; when prev_fsize is still zero it synthesizes a length from the sample rate instead. On a device declaring a large IN wMaxPacketSize and a small OUT wMaxPacketSize, the resulting memcpy(), or the memset() when the playback stream is idle, runs past its slice and, as the reproducer below shows, beyond the allocation. usb_submit_urb() is not a backstop. max_packet_size_out comes from usb_maxpacket(), which returns only the low 11 bits of wMaxPacketSize, while USB core validates a high-speed isochronous length against that base scaled by usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(). A length of up to three times the allocated slice is therefore accepted, and even a rejected URB is only rejected after the write. Reject a packet that does not fit the slice the driver allocated for it. Clamping it instead would silently shorten the capture-derived rate feedback and desynchronize the two streams. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) Write of size 1024 at addr ffff888100bbd400 by task kworker/1:2/5002 Workqueue: events line6_startup_work Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) line6_submit_audio_out_all_urbs (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:291) line6_stream_start (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:194) line6_pcm_acquire (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:337) line6_startup_work (sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100bbd400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 256-byte region [ffff888100bbd400, ffff888100bbd500) | ||||
| CVE-2026-98835 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: kionix-kx022a: Fix array boundary check The driver performs a sanity check for an array size, when converting a register value to an array index. The check incorrectly accepts the sizeof(array) as a last index, when last valid index should be sizeof(array) - 1. Fix the check by bailing out when index >= sizeof(array). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98833 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: core: call _get_device() with the master MTD __get_mtd_device() calls the master's _get_device() callback with mtd, which may be a partition. __put_mtd_device() passes the master. This breaks gluebi partitions because gluebi_get_device() uses container_of() and therefore requires the master MTD. Pass the master to _get_device(), matching _put_device(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98831 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: of/overlay: don't leak fragment references when changeset init fails init_overlay_changeset() stores the number of initialized fragments in ovcs->count only on full success. When find_target() or the __symbols__ lookup fails partway through, the target and overlay references taken for the fragments initialized so far are never dropped: free_overlay_changeset() bounds its cleanup loop by ovcs->count, which is still 0. Store the running count on the error path so free_overlay_changeset() puts whatever was set up. The store is guarded by ovcs->fragments because on the allocation-failure path cnt still holds the counting pass total while there is no fragments array; everywhere else cnt only counts fully-initialized fragments. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98830 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wfx: validate MIB read length before copying to caller wfx_hif_read_mib() copies reply->length bytes from the firmware response into the caller-provided buffer without checking that reply->length does not exceed val_len. A firmware response with a length field larger than expected overruns the caller buffer and reads past the end of the reply allocation. Replace the dead -ENOMEM check with an active validation that reply->length fits within val_len before the memcpy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98825 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: mpfs: fix unchecked devm_clk_get() error pointer in probe() devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "rtcref")'s return value was passed straight into clk_get_rate() without checking it for an error first, unlike the "rtc" clock a few lines above which is correctly checked with IS_ERR(). clk_get_rate() only guards against a NULL clk, not an error pointer: if (!clk) return 0; ... rate = clk_core_get_rate_recalc(clk->core); so if devm_clk_get() ever returns an error pointer here (for example ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER), which is the normal, expected outcome if the clkcfg clock-provider this RTC depends on has not registered its clocks yet by the time this driver probes), clk_get_rate() dereferences that error pointer instead of returning 0, crashing instead of letting probe defer. Capture the clock in the existing 'clk' local and check it with IS_ERR() before calling clk_get_rate(), matching the handling already used for the "rtc" clock in this same function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98823 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: preserve hidden-group beacon IE ownership A hidden-group probe-response entry borrows its beacon IEs from the group's beacon entry. cfg80211_update_assoc_bss_entry() can pass such an entry to cfg80211_update_known_bss() when merging scan entries after a channel switch. Copying the borrowed beacon_ies into the associated entry gives the same allocation two owners. Releasing the group's beacon entry can then leave the associated entry pointing to freed IEs, which are freed again when that entry is released. Skip beacon IE replacement when the source entry belongs to a hidden group. Preserve probe-response processing, the subsequent metadata updates, and the existing rejection path for conflicting hidden beacon updates. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98822 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: prevent AP VLAN tx from other interfaces Since the station lookup was factored out of ieee80211_build_hdr(), ieee80211_lookup_ra_sta() uses sta_info_get_bss() for all AP and AP VLAN frames, not only for control port frames. A unicast frame sent on one interface thus matches a station of a different VLAN of the same BSS and is transmitted to it. Only match stations of the interface the frame is sent on, except for control port frames, since those may be sent for VLAN stations directly on the BSS interface. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98819 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel: validate DDC record lengths Parse DDC record lengths in unsigned storage so 0xFF does not wrap. Reject records smaller than the mandatory three-byte header, records exceeding U8_MAX, and records exceeding remaining firmware bytes before issuing Intel_Write_DDC. This issue was reported by Claude Mythos. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98812 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mctp: publish the mctp_dev only after it is initialised mctp_add_dev() links the new mctp_dev into dev->mctp_ptr before mdev->dev is assigned, so a reader that picks the device up in that window dereferences a net_device pointer that is still NULL: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000b0-0x00000000000000b7] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_mctp_sendmsg (./include/linux/sockptr.h:49) ? __pfx_mctp_dst_output (net/mctp/route.c:41) ? selinux_socket_sendmsg (security/selinux/hooks.c:5278) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:790 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2684 (discriminator 1)) ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:1131) ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user (net/socket.c:2590) ? update_cfs_rq_load_avg (kernel/sched/fair.c:5478) ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738) ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2625) ? perf_event_task_tick (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:838) ? sched_tick (kernel/sched/core.c:5818) ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:372) ? fdget (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:873 fs/file.c:1100) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2770) ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2751) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) </TASK> Fix by publishing only once the object is fully initialised: __mctp_dev_get() runs under rcu_read_lock() only and hands this object to readers as soon as mctp_ptr is assigned, so they must never observe mdev->dev == NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98811 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path Two racing tc filter add requests on the same chain/prio of an unlocked classifier both run change() on the shared proto and both can fail: the winner's tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() attempt gives up because the loser's handle is still in the idr, and the loser's error path drops only its own reference without a second reclamation attempt. The empty proto stays linked in the chain, holding the chain reference, a block reference and the classifier module reference until the chain or block is torn down. Reclaim the proto on the error path of any failed request that holds a proto reference. The reclamation is emptiness-gated: tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() unlinks the proto only when delete_empty() admits it is empty, so a live shared proto is never unlinked. A proto the request created is reclaimed unconditionally - it is the only owner, so marking it for deletion is safe even without a delete_empty callback. Classifiers without one (the check marks the proto unconditionally) are rtnl-serialized, so the raced window this guard closes cannot arise for them. This is a follow-up to commit d4e359b3608a ("net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss"), which stopped the loser of the insert race from unlinking the winner's live proto but left the empty-proto residual in place. Conditions to recreate: - CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOWER=y; veth pair - tc qdisc add dev veth0 ingress - two concurrent `tc filter add dev veth0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 flower skip_sw ... action drop` (both fail in fl_hw_replace_filter after publishing their handle in the idr); repeat in a loop - an empty flower tp stays linked after both requests fail; visible as a bare `filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0` header in `tc filter show` with no filter entries - CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices) | ||||
| CVE-2026-98809 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: don't drain cmd_sync backlog on unregister hci_unregister_dev() disables cmd_work and cmd_timer, then calls hci_cmd_sync_clear(), whose cancel_work_sync() waits for hci_cmd_sync_work() to return. That worker dequeues and runs every entry on cmd_sync_work_list. With cmd_work disabled nothing reaches the controller, so each queued HCI command waits the full HCI_CMD_TIMEOUT (2s). The backlog has no bound. Userspace can keep queuing MGMT commands such as MGMT_OP_GET_CLOCK_INFO against a controller that doesn't answer. Closing /dev/vhci then blocks in vhci_release() for backlog * 2s: INFO: task syz-executor:5749 blocked for more than 143 seconds. cancel_work_sync hci_cmd_sync_clear hci_unregister_dev vhci_release In a local reproduction the backlog held more than 5000 entries, which comes to hours of hang. Stop the worker from taking new entries once HCI_UNREGISTER is set, and wake any request still waiting with -ENODEV before cancelling the work. The entries left over are destroyed with -ECANCELED by the existing sweep in hci_cmd_sync_clear(). They stay on the list until the work has stopped, so hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() and friends still see them. A callback already running may still issue another command, which delays unregister by at most one timeout per remaining command, not by the whole backlog. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98808 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: systemport: Fix buffer overflow in bcm_sysport_get_stats() When running on SYSTEMPORT Lite, certain statistics are unsupported and skipped during bcm_sysport_get_stats(). The variable 'j' tracks the compacted index into the destination data buffer, whereas 'i' iterates over all elements in bcm_sysport_gstrings_stats. Because the buffer allocated by ethtool is sized only according to bcm_sysport_get_sset_count(), storing values at data[i] instead of data[j] writes past the allocated array bounds, leading to memory corruption. Fix this by writing to data[j] instead of data[i]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98805 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes TIPC can encrypt traffic between nodes using a different transmit key for each node. In this mode, the AES-GCM nonce for a packet sent to a known peer consists of a 32-bit prefix (a per-key salt XOR the peer's address) followed by a 64-bit counter. That counter is stored in the peer's RX crypto object. When the peer reports a change in which key it uses to receive packets, TIPC resets this counter. The sender can still be using the same TX key and salt, so subsequent packets reuse earlier nonces. This nonce reuse breaks confidentiality and exposes GCM's authentication key. This makes forgeries trivial: an attacker can exploit CTR malleability to alter captured ciphertexts and use the recovered authentication key to compute a valid tag for the modified ciphertext, under the same key and nonce. Use the TX key's existing aead->seqno counter instead. All encryptions using that key object share the same atomic counter, so concurrent encryptions get distinct nonce counter values. The counter survives key activation and peer reconnection, and peer key-status reports cannot reset it. This prevents those transitions from causing nonce reuse while the same TX key remains installed. The nonce format is unchanged, and receivers do not require consecutive counter values, so sharing the counter across peers remains compatible with existing receivers. A pre-existing check still invokes key revocation in the unlikely event that the counter wraps to zero. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98798 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: fix NULL dereference in set_coalesce before first open The Rx ring priv and index are only set in bcmgenet_init_rx_ring(), which runs at open. Setting the Rx coalescing parameters on an interface that was never opened, e.g. "ethtool -C eth0 rx-usecs 50", dereferences a NULL ring->priv. The oops happens with RTNL held, so networking stays stuck until a reboot: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000002788 pc : bcmgenet_set_rx_coalesce.isra.0+0x10/0x88 lr : bcmgenet_set_coalesce+0xe8/0x180 Call trace: bcmgenet_set_rx_coalesce.isra.0+0x10/0x88 (P) __ethnl_set_coalesce.isra.0+0x490/0x570 ethnl_set_coalesce+0x48/0xc0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xf4/0x230 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x160 genl_rcv_msg+0x220/0x2a0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x68/0x140 genl_rcv+0x40/0x60 netlink_unicast+0x338/0x3c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x19c/0x3f8 __sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xc0 __sys_sendto+0x124/0x198 __arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x48 Set priv and index at probe. Writing the registers while the interface is down is harmless because open resets the MAC and bcmgenet_init_rx_coalesce() reapplies the stored values. It was observed on a Raspberry Pi CM4, but should apply to all other genet devices. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98796 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: allocate dummy netdev sooner The RX rings and the shared NAPI are carried by an internal "dummy" netdev (eth->dummy_dev). mtk_probe() creates that dummy device, and adds the shared tx/rx NAPI to it, only after the MAC netdevs have been registered. That order has been there since the MT7623 support was added and leaves a window in which the netdevs are visible to the network core before the shared NAPI and the dummy device exist. If anything brings the first netdev up during that window (e.g. netifd opening the WAN link the instant the interface is registered), the first-open path runs without them. On NETSYS v2 and later SoCs mtk_rx_alloc() -> __xdp_rxq_info_reg() then dereferences eth->dummy_dev == NULL: WARNING: CPU: ... Missing net_device from driver in net/core/xdp.c and mtk_open() fails with -ENODEV. On NETSYS v1 SoCs (MT7621/MT7622/MT7623/MT7629) there is no page pool, so the same open instead calls napi_enable() on a napi_struct that netif_napi_add() has not initialised yet and dereferences a NULL napi->dev. Allocate the dummy netdev and add the shared tx/rx NAPI to it before the register_netdev() loop. Both the dummy-allocation failure and a register_netdev() failure now unwind through mtk_unreg_dev(), which unregisters the net_device notifiers and the netdevs registered so far, stopping a concurrently-opened netdev (ndo_stop) and its NAPI before the dummy carrier is freed. A netdev that opened during the window can also have queued the frame-engine reset worker (via the tx watchdog or phylink), so the probe error path now cancels eth->pending_work before freeing the shared state, as mtk_cleanup() already does on remove. | ||||