shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws `TypeError`.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
23 May 2026, 04:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-05-22 14:16
Updated : 2026-05-23 04:16
NVD link : CVE-2026-9277
Mitre link : CVE-2026-9277
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-9277
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.