CVE-2026-58482

{"id": "CVE-2026-58482", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-58482", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-20T17:33:19.793160Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.9, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}, "impactScore": 4.2, "exploitabilityScore": 1.6}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "Jovancoding", "product": "Network-AI", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": ">= 5.0.0, < 5.12.2"}]}]}], "published": "2026-07-20T17:18:15.997", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-352"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-862"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port \u2014 a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) \u2014 can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-21T19:49:44.020", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}