{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-57142", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-06-24T01:45:48.697Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:07:46.547Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T12:07:46.547Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-78", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-94", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-863", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "MervinPraison", "product": "PraisonAI", "versions": [{"version": ">= 4.5.87, < 4.6.61", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T12:07:46.547Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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