CVE-2026-52841

{"id": "CVE-2026-52841", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-52841", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-14T15:45:35.488362Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 3.1, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}, "impactScore": 2.5, "exploitabilityScore": 0.5}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "alextselegidis", "product": "easyappointments", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.6.0"}]}]}], "published": "2026-07-14T16:17:00.800", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/4b2d245d2cd2058dc76e05f6eb65b26699268471", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-639"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-14T16:42:11.910", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}