CVE-2026-49454

Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.

CVSS v3 9.1 CRITICAL

9.1^/10

CVSS v3 : CRITICAL

Vector :

Exploitability : 3.9 / Impact : 5.2

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required NONE

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact HIGH

Integrity Impact HIGH

Availability Impact NONE

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/commit/2e456897af3158c175bb490ce7fc51d6241c8922
https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/commit/8910200
https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/security/advisories/GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7

Configurations

No configuration.

History

18 Jun 2026, 21:16

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
New CVE

Information

Published : 2026-06-18 21:16

Updated : 2026-06-22 18:16

NVD link : CVE-2026-49454

Mitre link : CVE-2026-49454

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-49454

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-287

Improper Authentication

CWE-347

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

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