CVE-2026-45446

{"id": "CVE-2026-45446", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-45446", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-06-09T18:48:41.903041Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 4.8, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}, "impactScore": 2.5, "exploitabilityScore": 2.2}]}, "affected": [{"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "OpenSSL", "product": "OpenSSL", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.0.0", "lessThan": "4.0.1", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.6.0", "lessThan": "3.6.3", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.5.0", "lessThan": "3.5.7", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.4.0", "lessThan": "3.4.6", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.0.0", "lessThan": "3.0.21", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}]}], "published": "2026-06-09T17:17:19.137", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/25b32cd9d41d2bc01b6abc425bb4baf2c2236fdc", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/71e2a5d263518cf5866043bd60ee4994d59e53a3", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fe3f33a3b3a4c487aa4dcdbc87057f66ffd2b85", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/daca0f48e4a69a2892a62262bad59e62a8a76598", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/eec5e9bf0d867333b8495e456f5235d225798a68", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt", "tags": ["Vendor Advisory"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}], "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-325"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Issue summary: The implementations of AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV\n(RFC 8452) mishandle the authentication of AAD (Additional Authenticated\nData) with an empty ciphertext allowing a forgery of such messages.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker can forge empty messages with arbitrary AAD\nto the victim's application using these ciphers.\n\nAES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) are nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD\nmodes: they accept a key, nonce, optional AAD (bytes that are authenticated\nbut not encrypted), and plaintext, and produces ciphertext plus a 16-byte\ntag. On decrypt, `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` is documented to return success only\nif the tag is verified succesfully.\n\nIn OpenSSL's provider implementation of these ciphers, the expected tag is\ncomputed only when decryption function is invoked with non-empty data.\nIf the caller supplies AAD and then calls `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` without\ninvocation of the ciphertext update, which can happen when the received\nciphertext length is zero, the tag is never recalculated and still holds its\nall-zeros value.\n\nWhen AES-GCM-SIV is used, an attacker who sends arbitrary AAD, empty\nciphertext, and all-zeros tag passes authentication under any key they do not\nknow, single-shot. When AES-SIV is used, for mounting the attack it's\nnecessary for the application to reuse the decryption context without\nresetting the key.\n\nAES-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.0. AES-GCM-SIV is implemented since\nOpenSSL 3.2.\n\nNo protocols implemented in OpenSSL itself (TLS/CMS/PKCS7/HPKE/QUIC) support\neither AES-GCM-SIV or AES-SIV. To mount an attack, the applications must\nimplement their own protocol and use the EVP interface. Also they must skip the\nciphertext update when a message with an empty ciphertext arrives.\n\nThe FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this\nissue, as these algorithms are not FIPS approved and the affected code is\noutside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Resumen del problema: Las implementaciones de AES-SIV (RFC 5297) y AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) manejan incorrectamente la autenticaci\u00f3n de AAD (Datos Autenticados Adicionales) con un texto cifrado vac\u00edo, permitiendo una falsificaci\u00f3n de dichos mensajes.\n\nResumen del impacto: Un atacante puede falsificar mensajes vac\u00edos con AAD arbitrario a la aplicaci\u00f3n de la v\u00edctima usando estos cifrados.\n\nAES-SIV (RFC 5297) y AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) son modos AEAD resistentes al uso indebido de nonce: aceptan una clave, nonce, AAD opcional (bytes que son autenticados pero no cifrados) y texto plano, y producen texto cifrado m\u00e1s una etiqueta de 16 bytes. Al descifrar, 'EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()' est\u00e1 documentado para devolver \u00e9xito solo si la etiqueta se verifica con \u00e9xito.\n\nEn la implementaci\u00f3n del proveedor de OpenSSL de estos cifrados, la etiqueta esperada se calcula solo cuando la funci\u00f3n de descifrado se invoca con datos no vac\u00edos. Si el llamador suministra AAD y luego llama a 'EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()' sin invocar la actualizaci\u00f3n del texto cifrado, lo que puede ocurrir cuando la longitud del texto cifrado recibido es cero, la etiqueta nunca se recalcula y a\u00fan mantiene su valor de todo ceros.\n\nCuando se usa AES-GCM-SIV, un atacante que env\u00eda AAD arbitrario, texto cifrado vac\u00edo y una etiqueta de todo ceros pasa la autenticaci\u00f3n bajo cualquier clave que no conozca, de una sola vez. Cuando se usa AES-SIV, para montar el ataque es necesario que la aplicaci\u00f3n reutilice el contexto de descifrado sin restablecer la clave.\n\nAES-SIV est\u00e1 implementado desde OpenSSL 3.0. AES-GCM-SIV est\u00e1 implementado desde OpenSSL 3.2.\n\nNing\u00fan protocolo implementado en OpenSSL mismo (TLS/CMS/PKCS7/HPKE/QUIC) soporta AES-GCM-SIV o AES-SIV. Para montar un ataque, las aplicaciones deben implementar su propio protocolo y usar la interfaz EVP. Tambi\u00e9n deben omitir la actualizaci\u00f3n del texto cifrado cuando llega un mensaje con un texto cifrado vac\u00edo.\n\nLos m\u00f3dulos FIPS en 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 y 3.0 no se ven afectados por este problema, ya que estos algoritmos no est\u00e1n aprobados por FIPS y el c\u00f3digo afectado est\u00e1 fuera del l\u00edmite del m\u00f3dulo FIPS de OpenSSL."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-23T08:10:00.137", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "EDB88756-EDFE-4886-A267-3F19342A6042", "versionEndExcluding": "3.0.21", "versionStartIncluding": "3.0.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "BF7E21E7-AEC0-4882-B1F1-2D056B506F22", "versionEndExcluding": "3.4.6", "versionStartIncluding": "3.4.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "6B6B9930-C549-4D88-9784-AF32CCDDB87A", "versionEndExcluding": "3.5.7", "versionStartIncluding": "3.5.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "D41B3C45-EC73-4DC8-989D-B2E2792E102F", "versionEndExcluding": "3.6.3", "versionStartIncluding": "3.6.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:4.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "6E881B9A-1A0A-4BC0-8160-20C00561167D"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}