CVE-2026-42769

{"id": "CVE-2026-42769", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-42769", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-06-09T19:38:00.495097Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 3.6, "exploitabilityScore": 1.6}]}, "affected": [{"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "OpenSSL", "product": "OpenSSL", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.0.0", "lessThan": "4.0.1", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.6.0", "lessThan": "3.6.3", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.5.0", "lessThan": "3.5.7", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "3.4.0", "lessThan": "3.4.6", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}]}], "published": "2026-06-09T17:17:08.377", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/54d0989997e5fc26057009a9782c3441ce3842fb", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d35cd473a271bf3ce7bf3d32af53217fb83ae92c", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d531f21c0fe99067a66fc0ff1161ef127f9cd70b", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}, {"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt", "tags": ["Vendor Advisory"], "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}], "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-295"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate\nprovided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)\nmessage response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual, which\ncould lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration Authority (RA)\nlevel to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.\n\nImpact Summary: The Registration Autority could replace the root CA\ncertificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.\n\nOne of the parts of the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), specified in\nRFC 9810, is Root Certification Authority (root CA) key Rollover,\nwhich is sent by the server in a message with type 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'.\nAs part of these messages, 'newWithOld' certificate, the new root CA\ncertificate signed with the old root CA key, is provided, and verifying its\nsignature is crucial for transferring the trust from the old CA key to the\nnew one.\n\nThe 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' messages are expected to be processed with\nOSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), that is expected to verify the 'newWithOld'\ncertificate. A typo in the certificate chain building code led to adding\nan incorrect certificate ('newWithOld' instead of 'oldRoot') to the\ncertificate chain, rendering the certificate verification process ineffectual\n(only the issuer name and the algorithm OIDs were verified by other parts\nof the verification code).\n\nAn attacker who already has credentials that satisfy the CMP message\nprotection checks can generate a new key pair and use a crafted self-signed\ncertificate in its 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' CMP messages which affected CMP\nclients would accept as a new trust anchor.\n\nSignificant preconditions for the attack (having valid RA-level credentials)\nare the reason the issue was assigned Low severity.\n\nThe FIPS modules are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is\noutside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Resumen del Problema: Un error en la funci\u00f3n de devoluci\u00f3n de llamada utilizada para verificar el certificado proporcionado en una respuesta de mensaje del Protocolo de Gesti\u00f3n de Certificados (CMP) de actualizaci\u00f3n de clave de CA ra\u00edz hizo que la validaci\u00f3n del certificado fuera ineficaz, lo que podr\u00eda llevar a la escalada de credenciales del nivel de Autoridad de Registro (RA) al nivel de Autoridad de Certificaci\u00f3n ra\u00edz (CA ra\u00edz).\n\nResumen del Impacto: La Autoridad de Registro podr\u00eda reemplazar el certificado de CA ra\u00edz para los clientes CMP con un certificado de CA ra\u00edz arbitrario.\n\nUna de las partes del Protocolo de Gesti\u00f3n de Certificados (CMP), especificado en RFC 9810, es la Sustituci\u00f3n de Clave de Autoridad de Certificaci\u00f3n ra\u00edz (CA ra\u00edz), que es enviada por el servidor en un mensaje de tipo 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate'. Como parte de estos mensajes, se proporciona el certificado 'newWithOld', el nuevo certificado de CA ra\u00edz firmado con la clave de CA ra\u00edz antigua, y verificar su firma es crucial para transferir la confianza de la clave de CA antigua a la nueva.\n\nSe espera que los mensajes 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' sean procesados con OSSL_CMP_get1_rootCaKeyUpdate(), que se espera que verifique el certificado 'newWithOld'. Un error tipogr\u00e1fico en el c\u00f3digo de construcci\u00f3n de la cadena de certificados llev\u00f3 a a\u00f1adir un certificado incorrecto ('newWithOld' en lugar de 'oldRoot') a la cadena de certificados, haciendo que el proceso de verificaci\u00f3n del certificado fuera ineficaz (solo el nombre del emisor y los OID del algoritmo fueron verificados por otras partes del c\u00f3digo de verificaci\u00f3n).\n\nUn atacante que ya tiene credenciales que satisfacen las comprobaciones de protecci\u00f3n de mensajes CMP puede generar un nuevo par de claves y usar un certificado autofirmado manipulado en sus mensajes CMP 'id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate' que los clientes CMP afectados aceptar\u00edan como un nuevo ancla de confianza.\n\nLas precondiciones significativas para el ataque (tener credenciales v\u00e1lidas a nivel de RA) son la raz\u00f3n por la que el problema fue asignado con severidad Baja.\n\nLos m\u00f3dulos FIPS no se ven afectados por este problema, ya que el c\u00f3digo afectado est\u00e1 fuera del l\u00edmite del m\u00f3dulo FIPS de OpenSSL."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-23T08:10:00.137", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "BF7E21E7-AEC0-4882-B1F1-2D056B506F22", "versionEndExcluding": "3.4.6", "versionStartIncluding": "3.4.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "6B6B9930-C549-4D88-9784-AF32CCDDB87A", "versionEndExcluding": "3.5.7", "versionStartIncluding": "3.5.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "D41B3C45-EC73-4DC8-989D-B2E2792E102F", "versionEndExcluding": "3.6.3", "versionStartIncluding": "3.6.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:4.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "6E881B9A-1A0A-4BC0-8160-20C00561167D"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org"}