bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf->len < 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf->data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/dfac5224ab65fc7b81be2926386173c169318335 | |
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p93g-3r68-cj53 | Exploit Patch Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
History
17 Jul 2026, 16:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CWE | CWE-617 |
14 Jul 2026, 19:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
|
| CWE | ||
| Summary | (en) bt_sdp_parse_attribute() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c validated only that the SDP record buffer held the type-marker byte plus the 2-byte attribute ID (a check of buf->len < 3) but then read a fourth byte, the data-element descriptor (type), via net_buf_simple_pull_u8(). Because net_buf_simple_pull_u8() dereferences buf->data[0] before its only bounds guard (an __ASSERT_NO_MSG that compiles out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), a record of exactly three bytes (0x09 followed by a 2-byte attribute ID) causes a one-byte read past the end of the logical buffer. The parser is reachable from inbound, remote-controlled data: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer acting as an SDP server returns discovery-response records that are stored verbatim in the client receive buffer and parsed via the public bt_sdp_get_attr()/bt_sdp_has_attr()/bt_sdp_record_parse() helpers. The over-read is bounded to a single byte that is used only as an internal length selector and is never leaked to the attacker; subsequent length checks then reject the malformed record. Realistic impact is therefore limited to an edge-case denial of service (a fault only if the record ends exactly at a mapped-memory boundary, or a deterministic assert panic when CONFIG_ASSERT=y). Affects Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0; fixed by adding sizeof(type) to the length check. |
06 Jul 2026, 19:40
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPE | cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| First Time |
Zephyrproject zephyr
Zephyrproject |
|
| References | () https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p93g-3r68-cj53 - Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory |
23 Jun 2026, 01:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-06-23 01:16
Updated : 2026-07-17 16:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-10651
Mitre link : CVE-2026-10651
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-10651
JSON object : View
Products Affected
zephyrproject
- zephyr