Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards.
During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault).
net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the net conn network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic.
The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/cd85e0e890ab89815c4cbc0a8fbc03a3efa84dc2 | Patch |
| https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-6c57-xfhw-j26x | Exploit Patch Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
History
14 Jul 2026, 19:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Summary | (en) Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the net conn network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0. |
01 Jul 2026, 14:04
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPE | cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| First Time |
Zephyrproject zephyr
Zephyrproject |
|
| References | () https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/cd85e0e890ab89815c4cbc0a8fbc03a3efa84dc2 - Patch | |
| References | () https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-6c57-xfhw-j26x - Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory |
15 Jun 2026, 16:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-06-15 16:16
Updated : 2026-07-14 19:16
NVD link : CVE-2026-10634
Mitre link : CVE-2026-10634
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-10634
JSON object : View
Products Affected
zephyrproject
- zephyr
CWE
CWE-416
Use After Free