| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in RESTEasy's IIOImageProvider, which decodes attacker-supplied image request bodies without enforcing any limit on the declared image dimensions or pixel count. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a small crafted image declaring enormous dimensions to trigger a very large memory allocation, exhausting the JVM heap and resulting in a denial of service. |
| In sshd and ssh in OpenSSH before 10.6, there is no check for whether the maximum packet length is exceeded during decompression of highly compressed data. |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in hexpm hex_core allows an untrusted repository mirror, or a server answering hex_core's API requests, to exhaust the memory of the Erlang VM running hex_core. The same code is vendored in Hex (mix_hex_repo, mix_hex_api) and rebar3 (r3_hex_repo, r3_hex_api).
hex_repo:get_names/1, hex_repo:get_versions/1, hex_repo:get_package/2 and hex_repo:get_policy/2 decompress the registry response with zlib:gunzip/1 and decode the signed envelope before verifying its signature. A mirror doesn't have the repository's private key, but it chooses the compressed bytes, so a small response decompresses into an envelope of any size before the signature check rejects it.
hex_api decodes responses with the application/vnd.hex+erlang content type through hex_safe_binary_to_term:safe_binary_to_term/1, which calls binary_to_term(Binary, [safe]). The safe option prevents atom creation, but it accepts compressed terms and doesn't limit the size of the decoded term, and the check that rejects functions and ports runs after the term has been built. The fix for CVE-2026-21619 added the safe option and that check without bounding the decoded size.
This issue affects rebar3: from 3.9.1 before 3.27.3; hex: from 2.1.0 before 2.5.2; hex_core: from 0.1.0 before 0.20.0. |
| CompressionUtils.inflate() decompressed attacker-controlled DEFLATE data with no output-size cap. A small (~KB) crafted payload could expand to gigabytes on the heap. Reachable via JWE decryption when zip=DEF (e.g. JoseSessionTokenProvider with RSA-OAEP key wrap) and via SAML redirect/POST binding token inflation — in both cases decompression happens before/independent of trust validation.
Fix: Added a configurable maximum inflated-size cap (default 10 MiB, org.apache.cxf.compression-max-inflated-size system property) to CompressionUtils.inflate(); aborts with DataFormatException once exceeded.
Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.2.4 or 4.1.9 or 3.6.13, which fix this issue. |
| In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.34] or [5.0.0,5.0.12] or [5.1.0,5.1.9] or [5.2.0, 5.2.0], a gRPC endpoint does have a configurable per message maximum size in bytes, however the maximum size applies to the received bytes. When applied to a compressed message, this only applies to the compressed size and not the actual size of the uncompressed content. This can be used to force a gRPC endpoint to allocate more bytes than the value defined by the configuration, making the endpoint vulnerable to compression bomb attacks.
The impacted component is io.vertx:vertx-gprc-server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the
DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which
reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the
same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries
from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers
while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly
initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to
reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct
assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which
properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering
without touching the waitqueue or spinlock. |
| An Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data vulnerability in the gRPC library used by na-grpcd of Juniper Networks Junos OS allows an authenticated network-based attacker to cause a denial of service via a compressed gRPC request. |
| OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCE_EXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2. |
| OpenDocMan 2.4.0 through 2.10.0 contains a decompression bomb vulnerability that allows authenticated users to exhaust PHP memory by uploading crafted office documents. Attackers can upload a small ODT, DOCX, or XLSX file whose XML entries decompress to hundreds of megabytes, crashing PHP workers and degrading availability. |
| Lib/zipfile.py in Python through 3.7.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a ZIP bomb. |
| A Git server that Grafana's Git Sync (provisioning) is configured to use can exhaust Grafana's memory by returning oversized or highly compressed responses (uncontrolled resource consumption). Exploitation requires an administrator to have configured Git Sync with that server. |
| Gumlet php-image-resize before 3.0.1 contains a denial of service vulnerability because the ImageResize constructor in lib/ImageResize.php passes images to GD imagecreatefrom* functions without pixel limits. Remote attackers can upload small, highly compressed images that decode to large bitmaps, exhausting PHP memory and terminating the worker process. |
| SGLang through 0.5.21 contains a decompression amplification vulnerability in load_audio that allows remote attackers to exhaust memory by submitting highly compressed audio decoded without duration or sample limits. Attackers can supply small FLAC-encoded silence files through audio_url or audio_data inputs that expand into massive PCM buffers, exhausting worker memory and CPU for denial of service. |
| Grav before 2.1.7 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows authenticated media authors to exhaust memory by uploading compressed oversized raster images. Attackers can reference a Twig or Markdown transform so GD or Imagick decodes the full source without dimension checks, letting anonymous requests repeatedly cause page unavailability. |
| SGLang through 0.5.21 contains a denial of service vulnerability that disables Pillow decompression bomb protection process-wide by setting Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS to None in NanoNemotronVLImageProcessor. Remote attackers can submit small, highly compressed images with huge dimensions to the generic image loader, exhausting worker memory during decoding. |
| Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users. |
| The network messaging layer contained improper handling of highly compressed data affecting service availability. Software customers upgrade to resolved maintenance release. Update all Commvault installations, including CommServe server, Web Server, Command Center, MediaAgents, clients, and HyperScale. |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in hexpm hex allows an untrusted package mirror to exhaust the memory or disk space of the machine running mix deps.get, mix deps.update, mix hex.package fetch or mix hex.docs fetch.
Hex treats a mirror configured with HEX_MIRROR_URL, HEX_MIRROR or mirror_url as untrusted: it doesn't send credentials to it, and it checks registry signatures and package checksums that the mirror can't forge. Several response paths consume memory or disk in proportion to what the mirror sends before any of those checks run.
Hex.HTTP.request/5 reads the whole response body into memory and decompresses it with :zlib.gunzip/1 whenever the response's Content-Encoding contains gzip, with no limit on the compressed or decompressed size. Hex doesn't ask for compressed responses, so the server decides whether this step runs. It applies to registry, package, docs and API responses.
Package tarballs have no download size limit. Hex 2.5.1 holds the whole tarball in memory and writes it to the cache, and the development branch streams it to a temporary file; the 16 MiB tarball limit is checked only when the file is unpacked. The tarball is then unpacked, into deps/<app> in 2.5.1 and into a staging directory on the development branch, before its checksums are compared with the registry.
mix hex.docs fetch, and mix hex.docs offline when docs are missing, write the docs tarball to disk and extract it with :mix_hex_erl_tar.extract/2 without the 16 MiB compressed and 128 MiB decompressed limits that mix_hex_tarball:unpack_docs/3 applies. The signed registry doesn't cover docs tarballs, so nothing checks them.
Registry responses are also decompressed before their signature is checked, in hex_core code that Hex vendors; that part is tracked in https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/security/advisories/GHSA-7c4r-cgf9-9jmq.
This issue affects hex: from 0.11.2 before 2.5.2. |
| ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Prior to 7.1.2-30 and 6.9.13-55, a crafted highly compressed MAT image can make the MAT decoder create temporary files larger than the configured security-policy limit, bypassing resource restrictions and consuming excessive disk space. This issue is fixed in versions 7.1.2-30 and 6.9.13-55. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. |
