| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Tahoe 26.6, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Fix number of temperature registers for NCT6116
Unlike NCT6106, NCT6116 only has three temperature registers, and with
it only three temperature source and temperature source configuration
registers. The register addresses match those of NCT6106 and can be
re-used.
The code used a separate array to list the temperature source registers
for NCT6116, but used the size of the NCT6106 register array to set
the number of registers. The NCT6106 register array provides six addresses,
while the temperature source register array for NCT6116 only provides three
addresses. This causes a KASAN report.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffffc19561a6 by task modprobe/954
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7d/0xa7
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x194/0x5b0
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
...
Fix the problem by hard-coding the number of temperature and temperature
configuration registers to three for NCT6116. Drop the unnecessary
NCT6116_REG_TEMP_SOURCE array and re-use NCT6106_REG_TEMP_SOURCE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.
A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.
Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.
ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. |
| In Modem, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY00741071; Issue ID: MSV-7620. |
| In display, there is a possible information disclosure due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local information disclosure if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11004276; Issue ID: MSV-7757. |
| In display, there is a possible information disclosure due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local information disclosure if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11004274; Issue ID: MSV-7749. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers
Sashiko reports:
During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num
to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP.
These arrays only contain 3 elements.
In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If
data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for
nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these
3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can
be caught by KASAN.
Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as
hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This
leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware
misconfiguration or system crashes.
The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan
control channels, but only the first three support weight control.
Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with
zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine
if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported
registers. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an off-by-one error in bounds checking. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate datagram bounds in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
When unpacking host-supplied NTBs, ncm_unwrap_ntb() checks datagram length
against frame_max but does not verify that the datagram fits within the
declared block length. Additionally, when decoding multiple NTBs from a
single socket buffer, subsequent block lengths are not checked against the
actual remaining buffer data.
With these checks missing, a malicious USB host can specify datagram
offsets and lengths that point beyond the block, or supply secondary NTB
headers declaring lengths larger than the buffer. skb_put_data() then
copies adjacent kernel memory from skb_shared_info into the network skb.
Fix this by verifying that sufficient buffer space remains for the NTB
header before parsing, handling zero-length block declarations, ensuring
that block lengths never exceed the remaining buffer space, and verifying
that each datagram payload stays strictly within the block boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer
uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied
struct uvc_request_data:
req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length);
...
memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length);
req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the
host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to
data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is
only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only
60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both
greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data.
Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read
When the firmware sends a command response with a length mismatch,
carl9170_cmd_callback() logs the mismatch and calls carl9170_restart()
but then falls through to memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4).
Since len comes from the firmware and can exceed ar->readlen, this
copies more data than the readbuf was allocated for.
Bound the memcpy to min(len - 4, ar->readlen) so that the response
is still completed -- avoiding repeated restarts from queued garbage --
while preventing an overread past the response buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: carl9170: fix OOB read from off-by-two in TX status handler
The bounds check in carl9170_tx_process_status() uses
`i > ((cmd->hdr.len / 2) + 1)` which is off by two, allowing
2 extra iterations past valid _tx_status entries when the firmware-
controlled hdr.ext exceeds hdr.len/2. Fix by using the correct
comparison `i >= (cmd->hdr.len / 2)`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: occ: validate poll response sensor blocks
The OCC poll response parser walks a counted list of sensor data blocks.
It used the static backing-array capacity as the parse boundary, but a
transport response makes only data_length bytes current and valid. A
truncated response can therefore make the parser consume a block header or
block extent outside the current response.
Use data_length as the parent boundary, prove the fixed poll header and
each current block header before reading them, and prove the complete block
before advancing. Keep parsed sensor metadata local until the complete
response has passed validation, then publish it. Propagate
malformed-response errors before publishing the OCC as active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cedrus: skip invalid H.264 reference list entries
Cedrus consumes H.264 ref_pic_list0/ref_pic_list1 entries from the
stateless slice control and later uses their indices to look up
decode->dpb[] in _cedrus_write_ref_list().
Rejecting such controls in cedrus_try_ctrl() would break existing
userspace, since stateless H.264 reference lists may legitimately carry
out-of-range indices for missing references. Instead, guard the actual
DPB lookup in Cedrus and skip entries whose indices do not fit the fixed
V4L2_H264_NUM_DPB_ENTRIES array.
This keeps the fix local to the driver use site and avoids out-of-bounds
reads from malformed or unsupported reference list entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header
wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as
ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);
without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct
wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a
received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes
hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be
validated before the driver accesses the fixed header.
For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps.
For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of
65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at
buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data
(CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an
out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3.
Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the
header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure
on this path: the caller falls through to a
"conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser
returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short
response be treated as a successful association. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie()
rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without
validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining
buffer before reading them. Specifically:
- in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len
- memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check
- in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits
Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer
than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload
extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of
payload before comparing the WPS OUI. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()
The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable
is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes
zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true.
After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and
bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array.
The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to
kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that
lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't
terminate either...
Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU
bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only
constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e.
that each individual string still fits in what is left.
bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a
single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves
it in the first page:
Oops - load access fault [#1]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1
epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae
s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000
a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000
status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005
[<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
[<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e
[<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316
[<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138
[<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it.
Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop,
stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every
other value of stop.
Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used
by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only.
The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434
("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it
from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used
part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged
from 2.6.12-rc2. |
