| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ION-DTN versions before 4.2.0 contain an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the decodeSdnv function that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read memory by sending truncated SDNV values. Attackers can send a UDP datagram to the LTP link service input port with a truncated SDNV to trigger reads up to nine bytes past buffer boundaries and underflow byte counters. |
| A maliciously constructed mail header could lead to a one byte read past the end of a buffer. This vulnerability was fixed in Thunderbird 155, Thunderbird 140.15, and Thunderbird 153.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject implausible blackbox record_count
adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox() loops over a record_count that comes
straight from byte 3 of the BLACKBOX_INFO response. The destination
buffer is data->dev_mem, sized for the nvmem cell's declared 2048
bytes (ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS * ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE = 32 * 64).
A device that reports a record_count greater than 32 -- whether due
to firmware bugs, bus corruption, or a non-responsive slave returning
0xff -- would walk read_buff past the end of the dev_mem allocation
on the trailing iterations.
Cap record_count at ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS (introduced here)
before entering the loop and return -EIO on any larger value, so a
malformed BLACKBOX_INFO response cannot drive the loop out of bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler
The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first
configuration when none is selected:
if (cdev->config)
config = cdev->config;
else
config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs,
struct usb_configuration, list);
if (!config)
goto done;
...
memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value);
list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns
container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead.
When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct
usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that
offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response
buffer.
cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on
gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver
that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds
cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch.
Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup()
kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 *
KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that
skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can
deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or
leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case
underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530.
That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path.
The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from
header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and
skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10,
which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read.
Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before
subtracting them, on every loop iteration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer
usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len)
into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:
if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
(ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
return -EMSGSIZE;
txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.
The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
"act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above.
The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single
buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never
leave the allocation.
Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under
AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s
receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len
checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is
also available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size
struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count);
...
for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) {
struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i;
...
lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix);
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a
fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the
on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from
the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016
drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up
to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device
with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied
image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via
msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().
Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() to pause on subreq failure
Fix netfs_read_to_pagecache() so that it pauses the generation of new
subrequests if an already-issued subrequest fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix cancellation of a DIO and single read subrequests
When the preparation of a new subrequest for a read fails, if the
subrequest has already been added to the stream->subrequests list, it can't
simply be put and abandoned as the collector may see it. Also, if it
hasn't been queued yet, it has two outstanding refs that both need to be
put. Both DIO read and single-read dispatch fail at this; further, both
differ in the order they do things to the way buffered read works.
Fix cancellation of both DIO-read and single-read subrequests that failed
preparation by the following steps:
(1) Harmonise all three reads (buffered, dio, single) to queue the subreq
before prepping it.
(2) Make all three call netfs_queue_read() to do the queuing.
(3) Set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED independently of the queuing as we don't
know the length of the subreq at this point.
(4) In all cases, set the error and NETFS_SREQ_FAILED flag on the subreq
and then call netfs_read_subreq_terminated() to deal with it. This
will pass responsibility off to the collector for dealing with it. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0)
and prior versions. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0)
and prior versions. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI
LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0) and prior versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Validate framework notification message layout
Framework notifications carry an indirect message in the shared RX
buffer. Validate the reported offset and size before using them, reject
zero-length payloads, and ensure that any non-header payload starts at
the UUID field rather than in the middle of the message header.
Use the validated offset and size values for both kmemdup() and the UUID
parsing path so malformed firmware data cannot drive an out-of-bounds
read or an oversized allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR
adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using
for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}
where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.
gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.
Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit. |
| mod_auth_openidc is an OpenID Certified authentication and authorization module for the Apache 2.x HTTP server that implements the OpenID Connect Relying Party functionality. Prior to 2.4.19.4, an out-of-bounds read and a one-byte out-of-bounds write exist in the state-cookie parser of `mod_auth_openidc`. The issue is fixed in version 2.4.19.4 by stopping the scan at the string terminator so a value-less token is rejected. No in-product workarounds are available. As a stop-gap, an upstream reverse proxy or WAF that rejects or normalizes malformed `Cookie` headers (tokens lacking `=`) can reduce exposure, but upgrading is the recommended remediation. |
| A maliciously crafted DWG or DXF file, when parsed through Autodesk AutoCAD, can force an Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash or disclose sensitive information. |
| A maliciously crafted DWG or DXF file, when parsed through Autodesk AutoCAD, can force an Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash or disclose sensitive information. |
| A flaw was found in the file-xwd plugin in GIMP. When processing a specially crafted XWD image file, the plugin validates the image width and bytes-per-line parameters independently rather than ensuring their combined values are consistent with the allocated buffer size. This incorrect validation leads to improper bounds checking, causing a heap out-of-bounds read. This issue can result in an application crash, leading to a denial of service or a limited information disclosure of heap memory contents into the produced image. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps
Previously, when the driver was printing hex dumps, the buffer was cast
to an 8 byte long and printed using string formatters. If the buffer
size was not a multiple of 8 then a read buffer overflow was possible.
Therefore, create a new ibmvnic function that loops over a buffer and
calls hex_dump_to_buffer instead.
This patch address KASAN reports like the one below:
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Login Buffer:
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 01000000af000000
<...>
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 2e6d62692e736261
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 65050003006d6f63
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ibmvnic_login+0xacc/0xffc [ibmvnic]
Read of size 8 at addr c0000001331a9aa8 by task ip/17681
<...>
Allocated by task 17681:
<...>
ibmvnic_login+0x2f0/0xffc [ibmvnic]
ibmvnic_open+0x148/0x308 [ibmvnic]
__dev_open+0x1ac/0x304
<...>
The buggy address is located 168 bytes inside of
allocated 175-byte region [c0000001331a9a00, c0000001331a9aaf)
<...>
=================================================================
ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 000000000033766e |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/util: don't read __page_2 for order-1 folios in snapshot_page()
snapshot_page() currently reads __page_2 after checking nr_pages > 1, but
it should only do so when nr_pages > 2.
If an order-1 folio is allocated at the end of a vmemmap section,
__page_2 will not exist and reading it will cause a fault.
During DLPAR memory remove on a 22 TB ppc64le LPAR, snapshot_page() oopsed
on the page isolation path while reading an order-1 folio's __page_2 from
an adjacent absent section (unmapped vmemmap).
Fix this to avoid reading memmap that doesn't exist (e.g., a vmemmap
hole). |
