| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: fix potential buffer overflow in i2c_hid_get_report()
`i2c_hid_xfer` is used to read `recv_len + sizeof(__le16)` bytes of data
into `ihid->rawbuf`.
The former can come from the userspace in the hidraw driver and is only
bounded by HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE(16384) by default (unless we also set
`max_buffer_size` field of `struct hid_ll_driver` which we do not).
The latter has size determined at runtime by the maximum size of
different report types you could receive on any particular device and
can be a much smaller value.
Fix this by truncating `recv_len` to `ihid->bufsize - sizeof(__le16)`.
The impact is low since access to hidraw devices requires root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: add bounds checks in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec
nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() could walk past cmd->req.sg when a PDU
length or offset exceeds sg_cnt and then use bogus sg->length/offset
values, leading to _copy_to_iter() GPF/KASAN. Guard sg_idx, remaining
entries, and sg->length/offset before building the bvec. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix potential underflow in virtio_transport_get_credit()
The credit calculation in virtio_transport_get_credit() uses unsigned
arithmetic:
ret = vvs->peer_buf_alloc - (vvs->tx_cnt - vvs->peer_fwd_cnt);
If the peer shrinks its advertised buffer (peer_buf_alloc) while bytes
are in flight, the subtraction can underflow and produce a large
positive value, potentially allowing more data to be queued than the
peer can handle.
Reuse virtio_transport_has_space() which already handles this case and
add a comment to make it clear why we are doing that.
[Stefano: use virtio_transport_has_space() instead of duplicating the code]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message] |
| ProjectSend 2.0.0 before 2.7.0 contains a path validation flaw in OrphanFileScanner::isOrphan() that allows staff with import_orphans permission to treat tracked files as orphans. Attackers can submit ./ path aliases to the orphans import or delete endpoints, deleting or adopting other owners' files while bypassing delete_others_files. |
| Vanus 0.8.0 through 0.9.0 contains a default credentials vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain cluster-admin access by using the hardcoded admin token. Attackers can send the fixed Bearer token to the gateway gRPC proxy port to manage namespaces, eventbuses, users, tokens, and role bindings, and read or publish events. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: disable recursive forward error correction
There are two problems with the recursive correction:
1. It may cause denial-of-service. In fec_read_bufs, there is a loop that
has 253 iterations. For each iteration, we may call verity_hash_for_block
recursively. There is a limit of 4 nested recursions - that means that
there may be at most 253^4 (4 billion) iterations. Red Hat QE team
actually created an image that pushes dm-verity to this limit - and this
image just makes the udev-worker process get stuck in the 'D' state.
2. It doesn't work. In fec_read_bufs we store data into the variable
"fio->bufs", but fio bufs is shared between recursive invocations, if
"verity_hash_for_block" invoked correction recursively, it would
overwrite partially filled fio->bufs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - zero initialize memory allocated via sock_kmalloc
Several crypto user API contexts and requests allocated with
sock_kmalloc() were left uninitialized, relying on callers to
set fields explicitly. This resulted in the use of uninitialized
data in certain error paths or when new fields are added in the
future.
The ACVP patches also contain two user-space interface files:
algif_kpp.c and algif_akcipher.c. These too rely on proper
initialization of their context structures.
A particular issue has been observed with the newly added
'inflight' variable introduced in af_alg_ctx by commit:
67b164a871af ("crypto: af_alg - Disallow multiple in-flight AIO requests")
Because the context is not memset to zero after allocation,
the inflight variable has contained garbage values. As a result,
af_alg_alloc_areq() has incorrectly returned -EBUSY randomly when
the garbage value was interpreted as true:
https://github.com/gregkh/linux/blame/master/crypto/af_alg.c#L1209
The check directly tests ctx->inflight without explicitly
comparing against true/false. Since inflight is only ever set to
true or false later, an uninitialized value has triggered
-EBUSY failures. Zero-initializing memory allocated with
sock_kmalloc() ensures inflight and other fields start in a known
state, removing random issues caused by uninitialized data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: add VLAN id validation before using
Currently, the VLAN id may be used without validation when
receive a VLAN configuration mailbox from VF. The length of
vlan_del_fail_bmap is BITS_TO_LONGS(VLAN_N_VID). It may cause
out-of-bounds memory access once the VLAN id is bigger than
or equal to VLAN_N_VID.
Therefore, VLAN id needs to be checked to ensure it is within
the range of VLAN_N_VID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: 8192cu: fix tid out of range in rtl92cu_tx_fill_desc()
TID getting from ieee80211_get_tid() might be out of range of array size
of sta_entry->tids[], so check TID is less than MAX_TID_COUNT. Othwerwise,
UBSAN warn:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/trx.c:514:30
index 10 is out of range for type 'rtl_tid_data [9]' |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust
Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel
in ip6gre_header() [1].
This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically
change their dev->needed_headroom and/or dev->hard_header_len
In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb
with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack()
was called, syzbot managed to attach an ip6gre device.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a1d69a8 len:136 put:40 head:ffff888059bc7000 data:ffff888059bc6fe8 tail:0x70 end:0x6c0 dev:team0
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 !
<TASK>
skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline]
skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641
ip6gre_header+0xc8/0x790 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:1371
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline]
neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:556 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xfb3/0x1480 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:-1 [inline]
ip6_finish_output+0x234/0x7d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:220
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318
mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iavf: fix off-by-one issues in iavf_config_rss_reg()
There are off-by-one bugs when configuring RSS hash key and lookup
table, causing out-of-bounds reads to memory [1] and out-of-bounds
writes to device registers.
Before commit 43a3d9ba34c9 ("i40evf: Allow PF driver to configure RSS"),
the loop upper bounds were:
i <= I40E_VFQF_{HKEY,HLUT}_MAX_INDEX
which is safe since the value is the last valid index.
That commit changed the bounds to:
i <= adapter->rss_{key,lut}_size / 4
where `rss_{key,lut}_size / 4` is the number of dwords, so the last
valid index is `(rss_{key,lut}_size / 4) - 1`. Therefore, using `<=`
accesses one element past the end.
Fix the issues by using `<` instead of `<=`, ensuring we do not exceed
the bounds.
[1] KASAN splat about rss_key_size off-by-one
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888102c50134 by task kworker/u8:6/63
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 63 Comm: kworker/u8:6 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2-enjuk-tnguy-00378-g3005f5b77652-dirty #156 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: iavf iavf_watchdog_task
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
print_report+0x170/0x4f3
kasan_report+0xe1/0x1a0
iavf_config_rss+0x619/0x800
iavf_watchdog_task+0x2be7/0x3230
process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
kthread+0x344/0x660
ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 63:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x246/0x6f0
iavf_watchdog_task+0x28fc/0x3230
process_one_work+0x7fd/0x1420
worker_thread+0x4d1/0xd40
kthread+0x344/0x660
ret_from_fork+0x249/0x320
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888102c50100
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 52-byte region [ffff888102c50100, ffff888102c50134)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x102c50
flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000418c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888102c50000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888102c50080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888102c50100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888102c50180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888102c50200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr()
There exists a kernel oops caused by a BUG_ON(nhead < 0) at
net/core/skbuff.c:2232 in pskb_expand_head().
This bug is triggered as part of the calipso_skbuff_setattr()
routine when skb_cow() is passed headroom > INT_MAX
(i.e. (int)(skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta) < 0).
The root cause of the bug is due to an implicit integer cast in
__skb_cow(). The check (headroom > skb_headroom(skb)) is meant to ensure
that delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb) is never negative, otherwise
we will trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head(). However, if
headroom > INT_MAX and delta <= -NET_SKB_PAD, the check passes, delta
becomes negative, and pskb_expand_head() is passed a negative value for
nhead.
Fix the trigger condition in calipso_skbuff_setattr(). Avoid passing
"negative" headroom sizes to skb_cow() within calipso_skbuff_setattr()
by only using skb_cow() to grow headroom.
PoC:
Using `netlabelctl` tool:
netlabelctl map del default
netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:7
netlabelctl map add default address:0::1/128 protocol:calipso,7
Then run the following PoC:
int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
// setup msghdr
int cmsg_size = 2;
int cmsg_len = 0x60;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_in6 dest_addr;
struct cmsghdr * cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) calloc(1,
sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + cmsg_len);
msg.msg_name = &dest_addr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(dest_addr);
msg.msg_iov = NULL;
msg.msg_iovlen = 0;
msg.msg_control = cmsg;
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_len;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
// setup sockaddr
dest_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dest_addr.sin6_port = htons(31337);
dest_addr.sin6_flowinfo = htonl(31337);
dest_addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback;
dest_addr.sin6_scope_id = 31337;
// setup cmsghdr
cmsg->cmsg_len = cmsg_len;
cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IPV6;
cmsg->cmsg_type = IPV6_HOPOPTS;
char * hop_hdr = (char *)cmsg + sizeof(struct cmsghdr);
hop_hdr[1] = 0x9; //set hop size - (0x9 + 1) * 8 = 80
sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: bound check rq_pages index in inline path
svc_rdma_copy_inline_range indexed rqstp->rq_pages[rc_curpage] without
verifying rc_curpage stays within the allocated page array. Add guards
before the first use and after advancing to a new page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query
The ethtool -S command operates across three ioctl calls:
ETHTOOL_GSSET_INFO for the size, ETHTOOL_GSTRINGS for the names, and
ETHTOOL_GSTATS for the values.
If the number of stats changes between these calls (e.g., due to device
reconfiguration), userspace's buffer allocation will be incorrect,
potentially leading to buffer overflow.
Drivers are generally expected to maintain stable stat counts, but some
drivers (e.g., mlx5, bnx2x, bna, ksz884x) use dynamic counters, making
this scenario possible.
Some drivers try to handle this internally:
- bnad_get_ethtool_stats() returns early in case stats.n_stats is not
equal to the driver's stats count.
- micrel/ksz884x also makes sure not to write anything beyond
stats.n_stats and overflow the buffer.
However, both use stats.n_stats which is already assigned with the value
returned from get_sset_count(), hence won't solve the issue described
here.
Change ethtool_get_strings(), ethtool_get_stats(),
ethtool_get_phy_stats() to not return anything in case of a mismatch
between userspace's size and get_sset_size(), to prevent buffer
overflow.
The returned n_stats value will be equal to zero, to reflect that
nothing has been returned.
This could result in one of two cases when using upstream ethtool,
depending on when the size change is detected:
1. When detected in ethtool_get_strings():
# ethtool -S eth2
no stats available
2. When detected in get stats, all stats will be reported as zero.
Both cases are presumably transient, and a subsequent ethtool call
should succeed.
Other than the overflow avoidance, these two cases are very evident (no
output/cleared stats), which is arguably better than presenting
incorrect/shifted stats.
I also considered returning an error instead of a "silent" response, but
that seems more destructive towards userspace apps.
Notes:
- This patch does not claim to fix the inherent race, it only makes sure
that we do not overflow the userspace buffer, and makes for a more
predictable behavior.
- RTNL lock is held during each ioctl, the race window exists between
the separate ioctl calls when the lock is released.
- Userspace ethtool always fills stats.n_stats, but it is likely that
these stats ioctls are implemented in other userspace applications
which might not fill it. The added code checks that it's not zero,
to prevent any regressions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: adjust read range correctly for non-block-aligned positions
iomap_adjust_read_range() assumes that the position and length passed in
are block-aligned. This is not always the case however, as shown in the
syzbot generated case for erofs. This causes too many bytes to be
skipped for uptodate blocks, which results in returning the incorrect
position and length to read in. If all the blocks are uptodate, this
underflows length and returns a position beyond the folio.
Fix the calculation to also take into account the block offset when
calculating how many bytes can be skipped for uptodate blocks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix middle attribute validation in push_nsh() action
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))
The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions(). The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr(). But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK. We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH. We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect. The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ #115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
__asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
__sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action. Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today. So, keeping as it is. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Remote Desktop Gateway Service allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Memory corruption in DOM in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.84 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Memory corruption in Workers in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.84 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| SGLang through 0.5.22 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows API clients to abort other users' in-flight generation requests by supplying a short client-controlled rid. Attackers can submit streaming /generate requests with single hex character rids and disconnect, triggering prefix-matching abort logic that terminates all other clients' requests. |
