| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
sk_msg_free_partial() ensures consistency of the skmsg at every
iteration, without having to manually handle uncharges and offsets.
This simplifies the code, and fixes some bugs in skmsg accounting when
we don't send the full contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: nsm: pin the module while the device is open
misc_open() installs a misc driver's file operations with fops_get(),
which pins file_operations::owner before replacing the file's f_op. The
NSM misc device leaves nsm_dev_fops.owner unset, so opening /dev/nsm does
not take a module reference on the nsm driver.
If the driver is built as a module, an open file descriptor can therefore
survive rmmod of the module that provides its ioctl callbacks. A later
ioctl through that descriptor can call into unloaded module text.
Set nsm_dev_fops.owner to THIS_MODULE so the misc core holds the module
while any /dev/nsm file descriptor is open, matching the lifetime
expectation for the installed file operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migration
Manually perform cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host
migration to ensure no stale data is left in CPU caches after the VM is
destroyed. Because the source VM is "converted" to a non-SEV VM, KVM's
memory reclaim flows won't trigger cache maintenance, e.g. when all guest
memory is reclaimed in response to detaching from the mmu_notifier.
Note, relying on the destination VM to do cache maintenance isn't an option
as KVM doesn't require identical guest memory configurations, i.e. the
source VM may have access to memory that the destination VM does not.
Enforcing equivalent memory configurations is infeasible, as it would
require a *deep* comparison of memslots, e.g. to verify that not only are
the memslot identical, but what the memslots point at is also identical. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phylink: record the PHY only once bringup cannot fail
phylink_bringup_phy() stores the PHY in pl->phydev before its last
fallible step: on a MAC whose phylink ops implement LPI,
phy_eee_rx_clock_stop() can fail with a real MDIO error. The callers
unwind with phy_detach(), which knows nothing about pl->phydev, so a
pointer to a PHY that is no longer attached outlives the failed
connect.
What that costs depends on how the caller got here.
phylink_connect_phy() goes through phylink_attach_phy(), which refuses
to attach while pl->phydev is set, turning a transient MDIO error into
a permanent -EBUSY. The SFP path is worse than that: sfp_sm_probe_phy()
answers the failure with phy_device_remove() and phy_device_free(), and
it assigns sfp->mod_phy only past that error return, so nothing clears
pl->phydev and it is left pointing at a freed phy_device that
phylink_resolve() and the ethtool helpers go on reading.
phylink_fwnode_phy_connect() has no such check, so a later connect
overwrites the stale pointer and hides the problem. A disconnect does
not: phylink_disconnect_phy() hands that pointer to phy_disconnect(),
and the second phy_detach() on the same PHY drops references the first
one already released.
Found while making a DSA port survive a PHY whose driver arrives after
the switch probes: keeping the port across a failed connect and
retrying is what makes this window reachable.
Publish the pointer after the last call that can fail instead of
unwinding it afterwards. Nothing between the two points reads
pl->phydev, and the registration that follows cannot fail:
phy_request_interrupt() falls back to polling on its own. The PHY-side
state keeps the order it had, so no MDIO operation moves relative to
another. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size
recv_dless_read() receives a P_DATA_REPLY from a peer into the bio of an
outstanding read request. The peer-supplied payload length reaches it as
the signed int data_size, and two peer-controlled inputs can make it
negative. With a negotiated data-integrity-alg the digest length is
subtracted first, so a reply whose payload is smaller than the digest
underflows data_size. With no integrity algorithm (the default) data_size
is assigned from the unsigned h95/h100 wire length and drbdd() never
bounds it for a payload-carrying command, so a length above INT_MAX casts
it negative; this path needs no non-default feature. The bio receive loop
then computes expect = min_t(int, data_size, bv_len), which is negative,
and drbd_recv_all_warn(mapped, expect) receives with a size_t of SIZE_MAX
into the first mapped page.
The sibling receive path read_in_block() is not affected: it uses an
unsigned size and rejects it against DRBD_MAX_BIO_SIZE before receiving.
Reject a data reply whose size is negative after the optional digest
subtraction, covering both triggers.
Impact: a malicious or man-in-the-middle DRBD peer copies attacker-chosen
bytes past a bio page in the receiver, corrupting kernel memory. A node
that reads from its peer (a diskless node, or read-balancing to the peer)
is exposed in the default configuration; data-integrity-alg is not
required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/cmf: Fix virtual vs physical address confusion
The measurement block address is an absolute address. Define the
associated schib_config and schib fields as dma64_t to enable automatic
detection of incorrect assignments. Also add the missing virt_to_dma64()
translation.
Without this fix, a wrong address will be used by firmware when storing
extended format channel measurement data on kernels built with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_IDENTITY_BASE=y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/cio: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ccw_device_get_util_str()
The channel path registry entry associated with a CHPID may be removed
while the subchannel's PMCW still references that CHPID. In this case,
chpid_to_chp() can return NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Add the missing NULL check before dereferencing the returned pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Keep internal commands dispatchable during error handling
Commit 08b12cda6c44 ("scsi: ufs: core: Switch to scsi_get_internal_cmd()")
switched UFS internal commands to allocate requests on
hba->host->pseudo_sdev->request_queue, which shares the host tagset with
regular LUNs.
During error recovery, ufshcd_err_handling_prepare() calls
blk_mq_quiesce_tagset(&hba->host->tag_set), marking all queues in the
tagset as quiesced, including pseudo_sdev->request_queue. When
ufshcd_verify_dev_init() subsequently issues internal commands (e.g. NOP
OUT UPIU) via blk_execute_rq(), blk_mq_run_hw_queue() skips running the
quiesced queue, resulting in an unrecoverable circular wait deadlock.
Keep quiescing the tagset and unquiesce the pseudo SCSI device on top of
that, so internal commands stay dispatchable while the logical units remain
quiesced. Re-quiesce the pseudo device before unquiescing the tagset so
that quiesce_depth stays balanced.
Clock scaling and ufshcd_pause_command_processing() are unaffected: they
keep quiescing the whole tagset, internal commands included. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nfcmrvl: validate helper command length before pull
The firmware download receive path removes the NCI data header and
reads the helper command before validating the remaining packet length.
A short frame can therefore reach the data access before the malformed
packet is rejected.
Validate the complete helper command length before stripping the NCI
data header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1: fix soft lockup on out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean read
Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net:
atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware
can report an out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff)
while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can
never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as
"nothing new to clean" instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mt7530: fix NULL dereference on unbind of MT7531 and MT7621
The core and io supplies are only requested for ID_MT7530: both the
devm_regulator_get() in probe and the regulator_enable() in
mt7530_setup() are guarded by the switch id, but mt7530_remove()
disables them unconditionally. On an MT7621 or an MT7531 both pointers
are still NULL from devm_kzalloc(), so rmmod or a sysfs unbind calls
regulator_disable() on NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: xps: reject an out of range traffic class
Only the entries below dev->num_tc are valid in dev->tc_to_txq[], and
dev->prio_tc_map[] may only name classes below it. netdev_set_num_tc()
lowers dev->num_tc without touching either array.
netdev_txq_to_tc() walks all TC_MAX_QUEUE slots and
netdev_get_prio_tc_map() returns the entry as it stands, so a leftover
entry is handed out as a traffic class >= dev->num_tc. Taking that
class from netdev_txq_to_tc(), __netif_set_xps_queue() rejects only a
negative one and indexes an XPS map sized for dev->num_tc classes:
tci = j * num_tc + tc;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(new_dev_maps->attr_map[tci], map);
attr_map[] holds nr_ids * num_tc entries and j runs over the ids named
in the mask, so a class that is not below num_tc pushes tci past the end
of the map for the last ids and the store overruns it.
Any caller that lowers num_tc leaves such entries behind, and
mqprio_destroy() tears down with netdev_set_num_tc(dev, 0) rather than
netdev_reset_tc(). After mqprio with 8 classes then 1, tc_to_txq[1..7]
still describe txq 1..7. The splat is from an XPS write to txq 2 on a
veth with 8 rx queues: attr_map[] has 8 * 1 entries, tci = j + 2, and
j == 6 stores one past the end of the 88-byte map:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88813016bc58 by task xps_oob/634
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
xps_rxqs_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1880)
netdev_queue_attr_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1390)
Allocated by task 634:
__kmalloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:5439)
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2937)
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 88-byte region [ffff88813016bc00, ffff88813016bc58)
Reject a class the map has no room for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: set new_stream to NULL after release
In dm_update_crtc_state(), the skip_modeset path releases new_stream
via dc_stream_release() but does not set the pointer to NULL.
If a later error (e.g., color management failure) triggers the fail
label, the error path calls dc_stream_release() again on the same
dangling pointer, causing a double release and potential use-after-free.
Fix this by setting new_stream to NULL after the initial release.
(cherry picked from commit 99f3af19073b3ddbfd96e789124cce12c4277b28) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfp: hold IPsec RX state under the XArray lock
nfp_net_ipsec_rx() drops the XArray lock before taking a reference to the
xfrm_state it found. The delete path can erase the entry and drop the last
state reference in that interval. RX can then try to increment a zero
refcount after the state has been queued for destruction.
The driver queues firmware invalidation asynchronously; the delete path
does not wait for the command to complete or drain pending RX processing.
The XFRM garbage collector waits for an RCU grace period before freeing
the state. That delays reclamation but does not make acquiring a reference
from zero valid.
Take the xfrm_state reference before releasing the XArray lock so
xa_erase() cannot run between lookup and reference acquisition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: Fix error code in smb2_aead_req_alloc()
The "*num_sgs" variable is a u32 so "ERR_PTR(*num_sgs)" doesn't work.
We would have to do something similar to the previous line where it's
cast to int and then long. However, it's simpler to store the return in
an int ret variable.
This bug would eventually result in a crash when dereference the invalid
error pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe()
When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already
unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path.
meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls
meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn
down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown
re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN
reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker().
Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within
meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available.
The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1,
using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer
forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to
return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial
initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a
slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer
emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_report+0xcb/0x5e0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]
platform_probe+0x99/0x140
really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
__device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320
bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
__device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220
device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0
bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130
device_add+0xcfd/0x1430
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? insert_resource+0x34/0x50
? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590
? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450
? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
? __create_object+0x59/0x80
? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60
do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0
? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10
? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0
? kfree+0x32c/0x510
? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0
load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0
? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40
? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0
? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0
? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0
init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180
? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0
? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610
? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
? lock
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()
decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations
that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds
reads:
1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds
check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the
internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an
OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with
p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads
4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is
passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count.
The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses
ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call.
decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant.
2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding
bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop
advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads
one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed
directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by
callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct
influence over the lock type field.
Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers,
err_inval)
ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type,
err_free_lockers)
The goto targets differ intentionally:
err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for
the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated
and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers().
err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the
post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must
be freed.
ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that
err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation.
Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from
the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error.
-EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the
OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure
class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition).
[ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: st21nfca: validate received frame size
st21nfca_hci_i2c_repack() trims a received frame at its EOF marker
before removing byte stuffing. It then assumes the truncated frame
contains the LLC header and two CRC bytes, and it unconditionally reads
the byte after an escape marker.
A malformed frame can place EOF immediately after the start marker or can
end its data portion with an escape marker. The former leaves too few
bytes for check_crc(), while the latter makes the unstuffing loop read past
the current skb length.
Require the minimum framing bytes both before and after unstuffing. Use
separate input and output cursors while removing byte stuffing, and reject
an escape marker without its encoded byte. This keeps malformed frames
within the received frame boundary before CRC processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate device-supplied DMA indices
In btintel_pcie_msix_rx_handle(), the driver processes RX completion
descriptors (urbd1) written by the PCIe device into DMA-coherent memory.
urbd1->frbd_tag (a 16-bit field fully controlled by the device firmware
via DMA) is used directly as an array index into rxq->bufs[] without any
bounds check. rxq->bufs[] has only BTINTEL_PCIE_RX_DESCS_COUNT (64)
entries, while frbd_tag can be any value 0-65535. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can write an out-of-range frbd_tag, causing the
driver to dereference an out-of-bounds data_buf pointer.
Additionally, cr_hia is read from a DMA-shared index array also writable
by the device; if the device sets cr_hia >= rxq->count, the while-loop
never terminates because cr_tia is wrapped via modulo rxq->count and can
never equal an out-of-range cr_hia.
Add bounds validation for cr_hia and frbd_tag in the RX path, and cr_hia
in the TX path. Log invalid values with bt_dev_err before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing:
1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c),
use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte,
filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and
return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to
Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow.
2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >=
ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet
header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short
AF_PACKET TX frames. |
