| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Vulnerability in Oracle Essbase (component: Security). The supported version that is affected is 21.8.3.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Essbase. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Essbase, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Essbase accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.7 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix exe mark UAF in kill_rules()
kill_rules() removes mixed AUDIT_DIR and AUDIT_EXE rules when an audit
tree is pruned. It drops entry->rule.exe before removing the rule from
the RCU-visible filter lists.
After a rule has been installed with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, which requires
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, removing the watched directory can race with another
task that is still evaluating the rule. In that case, fsnotify can free
the executable mark before the reader reaches audit_mark_compare(),
causing a use-after-free.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in audit_mark_compare+0x8d/0xa0
Unlink the published rules from the RCU-visible lists and retain them
on tree->rules for cleanup. If any rule has an executable mark, wait for
a single RCU grace period before removing the marks and scheduling the
entries for freeing. Otherwise, call_rcu() already provides the required
deferred freeing without a synchronous wait. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: stop the release timer from being rearmed on remove
mt_remove() quiesces the sticky-finger timer before stopping the
hardware:
timer_delete_sync(&td->release_timer);
sysfs_remove_group(&hdev->dev.kobj, &mt_attribute_group);
hid_hw_stop(hdev);
timer_delete_sync() waits for a running callback and dequeues the timer,
but it does not stop the timer from being armed again. The transport is
still delivering reports at that point, and the report path rearms it:
if (app->quirks & MT_QUIRK_STICKY_FINGERS) {
if (td->mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK)
mod_timer(&td->release_timer,
jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));
A report that arrives after timer_delete_sync() has returned therefore
leaves the timer queued. td is allocated with devm_kzalloc() against
hdev->dev, so it is freed when the driver is unbound, after mt_remove()
returns. When the timer fires afterwards, mt_expired_timeout()
dereferences the freed td:
struct mt_device *td = timer_container_of(td, t, release_timer);
struct hid_device *hdev = td->hdev;
if (test_and_set_bit_lock(MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING, &td->mt_io_flags))
Simply moving the teardown after hid_hw_stop() does not fix this on its
own, because mt_expired_timeout() calls mt_release_contacts(), which
walks hdev->inputs; the timer still has to be quiesced before
hid_hw_stop() tears the input devices down.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() instead, which additionally makes any later
mod_timer() a no-op, so neither ordering constraint has to be traded off
against the other. This is the final-teardown pattern the function was
introduced for, and hid-wiimote already uses it for the same reason. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: bound LBLCR and LBLC cache growth
ip_vs_lblcr_new() and ip_vs_lblc_new() create cache entries for
every previously unseen destination address. The table max_size only
tells the periodic collector to reclaim entries after the cache has
already exceeded the limit. It does not reclaim entries that the
attacker continues to use.
Reject new cache entries once either table reaches max_size * 3 / 2.
The extra headroom lets the periodic collector catch up while the
existing scheduler fallback continues to use the selected destination
when cache creation fails. New traffic therefore stays serviceable
without growing the tables further. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kprobes: Skip disarmed probes when checking optkprobe overlap
On x86, an optkprobe at A replaces five bytes with a jump. If a disabled
probe B is at A+2, get_optimized_kprobe() stops at B when arming a new
probe C at A+4. It leaves A optimized:
A A+1 A+2 A+3 A+4
A's jump | e9 | d0 | d1 | d2 | d3 |
after C | e9 | d0 | d1 | d2 | cc |
The INT3 for C overwrites the last byte of A's jump displacement, so
execution can jump to the wrong address. B can have prepared optinsns
while disarmed, but has no jump to unoptimize.
Continue past disarmed and unprepared probes to find the active optimized
probe before arming a probe in its jump. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of/overlay: put property on deadprops only after changeset add succeeds
add_changeset_property() links a new property of a not-yet-live
target node into the node's deadprops list before handing it to
of_changeset_add_property(). If that fails, the error path frees the
property but leaves the freed pointer linked in deadprops, and
of_node_release() frees it a second time when the aborted overlay's
node is released.
Record the changeset entry first and link the property into deadprops
only on success. of_changeset_add_property() never looks at the
node's property lists, so the order of the two steps is otherwise
immaterial, and the error path frees a property that nothing
references. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of/overlay: only treat a positive changeset id as registered
of_overlay_fdt_apply() stores the idr_alloc() return value in
ovcs->id before checking it. On failure the stored id is negative,
free_overlay_changeset()'s "if (ovcs->id)" check passes, idr_remove()
is called with a negative id and list_del() runs on ovcs->ovcs_list,
which is not initialized until after the id allocation. An allocation
failure at that point dereferences NULL.
Make free_overlay_changeset() treat only a strict-positive id as
registered. The rest of the function already copes with a
partially-initialized ovcs, so the error path stays a plain
goto err_free_ovcs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: extend IPv6 exthdr detection of tunneled packets
Commit c4336a07eb6b ("net: correctly handle tunneled traffic on IPV6_CSUM
GSO fallback") split skb_gso_has_extension_hdr() into mutually exclusive
branches on skb->encapsulation. This did not yet address all paths:
1. With skb->encapsulation set, the outer header is not checked. IPv6
tunnels such as ip6_gre and ip6_tunnel add an outer Destination
Options header by default (encap_limit). Their GSO packets skip
software GSO, then skb_csum_hwoffload_help() sees the outer extension
header and calls skb_checksum_help() on the GSO skb, which warns and
drops it.
2. Tunnels over IPv6 without an outer transport header, such as
ip6_tunnel, leave skb->transport_header at the inner transport
header. skb_network_header_len() then spans the outer IPv6, tunnel
and inner IP headers, a false positive.
3. UDP tunnels without an inner network header, such as SCTP-in-UDP or
PSP, have no inner IPv6 header to check. Decide on the outer header
alone.
4. Directly dereferencing inner_ip_hdr(skb)->version without
skb_header_pointer() is unsafe.
Instead, check ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) on the outer IPv6 header and, if
set, on the inner IPv6 header. Read the headers with skb_header_pointer().
Keep the skb_network_header_len() check when !skb->encapsulation to also
catch encapsulated packets without skb->encapsulation (e.g., virtio).
Use the same helper in skb_csum_hwoffload_help(). Its open coded test
has the false positive of (2) and ignores the inner header.
Background: checksum offload of tunneled packets invariants:
Non-GSO skb:
- If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_PARTIAL, Local Checksum Offload computes
the outer checksum in software and the device offloads only the inner L4
checksum.
- If the inner packet is CHECKSUM_NONE (e.g., SCTP-in-UDP, ESP-in-UDP,
Remote Checksum Offload), the device offloads the outer UDP or GRE
checksum instead.
GSO skb:
- A device with NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL_CSUM or NETIF_F_GSO_GRE_CSUM
computes both inner and outer checksums per segment.
The outer checksum is seeded with only the pseudo-header checksum.
A NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM device must parse through the outer headers to
reach the inner ones. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_flow_offload: drop flowtable reference on init error path
nft_flow_offload_init() bumps the flowtable use count with
nft_use_inc() before calling nf_ct_netns_get(). When the latter
fails, the error is returned as-is and the reference is leaked.
The upper layers do not balance it either: nf_tables_newexpr()
clears expr->ops when the expression init callback fails, so the
nft_expr_more() iteration in nft_rule_expr_deactivate() and
nf_tables_rule_destroy() stops right before the failed expression
and its ->destroy callback, which would drop the reference, never
runs.
Each failed rule addition therefore leaks one flowtable reference
and the flowtable can no longer be removed: NFT_MSG_DELFLOWTABLE
keeps reporting -EBUSY even though no rule references it.
Save the nf_ct_netns_get() return value and undo the nft_use_inc()
when it fails, restoring the inc/dec pairing within
nft_flow_offload_init() itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: prevent TX_RING byte count overflow
tpacket_snd() drains every SEND_REQUEST frame in a TX ring and adds
each valid packet length to the signed int len_sum. Userspace can
recycle completed frames concurrently, so a single blocking send call
is not bounded by the ring size.
After enough successful transmissions len_sum wraps into the negative
range. In particular, 65536 65535-byte frames followed by a 65007-byte
frame produce 0xfffffdef, or -EIOCBQUEUED. sock_sendmsg_nosec() treats
that as an impossible return and triggers a BUG. On systems configured
to panic on oops, a CAP_NET_RAW holder can panic the host kernel.
Stop before the next frame would make the byte count exceed INT_MAX.
The positive short count leaves that frame pending for a later send
call.
A two-thread TPACKET_V2 reproducer triggered the BUG on an arm64 build
of Linux 7.3-rc4. With this change, the same reproducer returned the
expected positive short count without an oops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws
Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with
__counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data'
with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS)
about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[]
is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by
member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first
array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access
prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero.
This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only
after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With
CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC
15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report
during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.
Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was
allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop
counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider's
behaviour is unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: spear: initialize IRQ state before requesting alarm IRQ
devm_request_irq() enables the interrupt before it returns, so the handler
may run while probe is still initializing the device. Initialize the MMIO
address and spinlock before requesting the alarm IRQ. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: check RCV_SHUTDOWN after the sendmsg connect wait
sctp_wait_for_connect() drops the socket lock while it sleeps. An
out-of-the-blue ABORT can then be processed from the socket backlog and
unlink the association. If a concurrent shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) sets
RCV_SHUTDOWN, the waiter breaks with err == 0 before checking
asoc->base.dead. Its final sctp_association_put() can then free the
association, leaving sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() to continue with a dangling
pointer.
Check RCV_SHUTDOWN along with the wait error in sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc()
before using the association again. The check only accesses the socket,
so it needs no additional association reference. Return the existing
-ESRCH so that sctp_sendmsg() skips freeing a new association that may
already have been destroyed.
Keep sctp_wait_for_connect() unchanged to preserve its behavior for the
connect() caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vc_screen: reload vc pointer before if (ret) in vcs_write() to avoid UAF
The reload of 'vc' added by commit 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load
of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF") sits after the
'if (ret)' block, so the copy-failure break path exits the loop without
reloading vc. If the vc was kfree()'d via vc_port_destruct during the
unlocked copy_from_user() window, the post-loop
'if (written && vc) vcs_scr_updated(vc)' is reached with a stale
non-NULL vc. The '&& vc' guard from commit a287620312dc ("vc_screen:
fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write") only
handles the NULL case, not this stale-non-NULL case; vcs_notifier() then
reads param->vc->vc_num from freed memory:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888007149190
Call Trace:
vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa0
vcs_scr_updated+0x77/0xa0
vcs_write+0x71b/0x7e0
Allocated by task: vc_allocate -> con_install -> tty_open
Freed by task: kfree <- vt_ioctl (VT_DISALLOCATE -> vc_port_destruct)
Move the reload to immediately after console_lock(), before 'if (ret)',
so every break path below passes a fresh vc to the post-loop
vcs_scr_updated(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: skip screen update for DEC alignment test on backgroup consoles
[BUG]
Recently, we encountered a KASAN warning as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140
Read of size 1 at addr ff1100015fd9f6a4 by task tty_fbcon_oob/1239
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1239 Comm: tty_fbcon_oob Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #100 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
kasan_report+0xf0/0x120
fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140
ccw_putcs+0x86c/0xa80
fbcon_putcs+0x338/0x410
do_update_region+0x21d/0x450
do_con_write+0x1e0e/0x4880
con_write+0x13/0x80
n_tty_write+0x374/0x1010
file_tty_write.isra.0+0x404/0x7a0
...
reproduce:
1) open /dev/tty0, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET,
op.width = 8 and op.height = 16 (visible VC1)
2) open /dev/tty1, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET,
op.width = 28 and op.height = 24 (invisible VC2)
3) echo 3 > /sys/devices/virtual/graphics/fbcon/rotate_all
4) write EShash8(esc hash8) to tty1
[CAUSE]
All VCs render to the framebuffer. setfont only modifies the target VC's
font without resizing the framebuffer backing buffer (par->rotated.buf);
the buffer is only resized for the visible VC
(fbcon_do_set_font -> ... -> vc_do_resize -> update_screen). This relies on
the con_should_update() check performed before every update_region().
However, the ESC # 8 path (do_con_trol -> do_update_region) omits the
con_should_update() check. After changing the font size of an invisible VC,
do_update_region() fills using the new font size against a buffer that was
never resized, causing an out-of-bounds access.
[FIX]
Only push the update when the console is visible and not blanked, add
the con_should_update() check in the do_con_trol() like every other call
site of do_update_region() (update_region(), invert_screen(), ...). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: unregister the input device when probe fails
setup_card() registers the input device, whose name and phys point into
struct snd_usb_caiaqdev, and then goes on to snd_card_register() and
snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(). If either fails, snd_probe() calls
snd_card_free(), which frees the device state but leaves the input
device registered: card_free() only clears the pointer, and the input
device is unregistered from snd_disconnect() alone. Reading its "uevent"
attribute afterwards dereferences freed memory:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x4a9/0x4f0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880208f5043 by task caiaq/4967
add_uevent_var+0x183/0x3a0
input_dev_uevent+0x162/0x900
dev_uevent+0x2f1/0x870
uevent_show+0x1ca/0x3a0
...
Unregister the input device on the probe error path, as
snd_disconnect() does. snd_usb_caiaq_input_disconnect() is a no-op when
no input device was registered.
Reproduced with a raw-gadget Audio Kontrol 1 and a temporary hack that
makes snd_usb_caiaq_control_init() fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets
Each playback URB is handed a slice of out.buffer that is exactly
LINE6_ISO_PACKETS * max_packet_size_out bytes, sized from the OUT
endpoint, but the number of bytes written into that slice is never
compared against it.
submit_audio_out_urb() takes the frame count from prev_fsize, which
audio_in_callback() derived from the *IN* endpoint's received packet
length, and rescales it with the playback frame size; when prev_fsize is
still zero it synthesizes a length from the sample rate instead. On a
device declaring a large IN wMaxPacketSize and a small OUT
wMaxPacketSize, the resulting memcpy(), or the memset() when the
playback stream is idle, runs past its slice and, as the reproducer
below shows, beyond the allocation.
usb_submit_urb() is not a backstop. max_packet_size_out comes from
usb_maxpacket(), which returns only the low 11 bits of wMaxPacketSize,
while USB core validates a high-speed isochronous length against that
base scaled by usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(). A length of up to three times
the allocated slice is therefore accepted, and even a rejected URB is
only rejected after the write.
Reject a packet that does not fit the slice the driver allocated for it.
Clamping it instead would silently shorten the capture-derived rate
feedback and desynchronize the two streams.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229)
Write of size 1024 at addr ffff888100bbd400 by task kworker/1:2/5002
Workqueue: events line6_startup_work
Call Trace:
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106)
submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229)
line6_submit_audio_out_all_urbs (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:291)
line6_stream_start (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:194)
line6_pcm_acquire (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:337)
line6_startup_work (sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100bbd400
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
allocated 256-byte region [ffff888100bbd400, ffff888100bbd500) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: kionix-kx022a: Fix array boundary check
The driver performs a sanity check for an array size, when converting a
register value to an array index. The check incorrectly accepts the
sizeof(array) as a last index, when last valid index should be
sizeof(array) - 1.
Fix the check by bailing out when index >= sizeof(array). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: core: call _get_device() with the master MTD
__get_mtd_device() calls the master's _get_device() callback with mtd,
which may be a partition. __put_mtd_device() passes the master.
This breaks gluebi partitions because gluebi_get_device() uses
container_of() and therefore requires the master MTD. Pass the master
to _get_device(), matching _put_device(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of/overlay: don't leak fragment references when changeset init fails
init_overlay_changeset() stores the number of initialized fragments
in ovcs->count only on full success. When find_target() or the
__symbols__ lookup fails partway through, the target and overlay
references taken for the fragments initialized so far are never
dropped: free_overlay_changeset() bounds its cleanup loop by
ovcs->count, which is still 0.
Store the running count on the error path so free_overlay_changeset()
puts whatever was set up. The store is guarded by ovcs->fragments
because on the allocation-failure path cnt still holds the counting
pass total while there is no fragments array; everywhere else cnt
only counts fully-initialized fragments. |
