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Search Results (4431 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90203 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Squashfs: check block offset is not negative If a negative offset is read off disk (for example the offset into the decompressed fragment block), this will cause squashfs_copy_data() to perform an out of bounds access. Fix by checking if offset is negative, and returning 0. This matches existing behaviour where an offset beyond the block returns 0 bytes copied. To trigger this out of bounds access requires a crafted Squashfs filesystem and CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount it. Unprivileged users will not be able to mount such a filesystem, but once mounted, an unprivileged user can trigger the out of bounds access by reading the crafted file with the negative offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93313 | 1 Freedesktop | 1 Poppler | 2026-09-19 | 6.3 Medium |
| A vulnerability was found in Freedesktop Poppler 26.07.0. The impacted element is the function JBIG2Stream::readCodeTableSeg of the file poppler/JBIG2Stream.cc. Performing a manipulation results in integer overflow. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named eb87cf711563894649bd0c365baa479401dc6d51. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40531 | 1 Synology | 1 Diskstation Manager | 2026-09-19 | 4.3 Medium |
| An integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability in File Operation in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.2.1-69057-10, 7.2.2-72806-7 and 7.3.2-86009-2 allows remote authenticated users to conduct limited denial-of-service attacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93652 | 1 D3tn | 1 Ud3tn | 2026-09-19 | 7.5 High |
| Integer overflow in µD3TN v0.15.0 TCPCLv3 handshake causes heap overflow, allowing remote attackers to reliably cause DoS | ||||
| CVE-2026-90245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: kyro: Validate overlay viewport coordinates The overlay viewport end coordinates are computed from the viewport origin and dimensions using 32-bit unsigned arithmetic. Large input values can cause these calculations to wrap around before the resulting coordinates are passed to SetOverlayViewPort(). SetOverlayViewPort() packs the viewport coordinates into 16-bit register fields. The X coordinates are additionally adjusted by +2 and +1 before being written. Validate the coordinate calculations for 32-bit wraparound and ensure that the adjusted coordinates fit within their 16-bit register fields before calling SetOverlayViewPort(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93065 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: fix counter type in iwl_fwrt_dump_error_logs The loop counter 'count' was declared as u8 while num_pc is u32. If firmware advertises more than 255 PC entries the counter wraps back to zero and the loop never terminates potentially causing an infinite loop or reading past the allocated pc_data array. Change the declaration to u32 to match num_pc. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90314 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry() table->offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed int. A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes before the table buffer. The subsequent avail check was bypassed because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the expression "table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)", yielding a large positive avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr->type read proceed undetected. Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before any pointer arithmetic. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90331 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence Multiple issues have been found within the hid-asus driver: - unchecked size in asus_raw_event() - unclean teardown of asus_probe on failure - possible use-after-free in asus_probe - multiple workqueue used for jobs where one was enough - sleeping calls in atomic context - packets of incorrect size being sent to the keyboard controller Join the two workqueues into one reusing the stopping mechanism of the brightness workqueue, use the joined workqueue to also move the asus_wmi_send_event() sleeping call away from atomic context and add a size check in asus_raw_event(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90259 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data() In that function, we round down the start position and round up the ending position. But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len, sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up length. Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using "start + len", which is completely incorrect. Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90246 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob. For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by that count stays inside sets.table[]: u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i]; if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) { i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32. sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob, and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation. Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied count. With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }: i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 + 0 >= 2 is false, inner loop does not run i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 + 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 >= 2 is false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads sets.table[2] -- one element past a two element allocation The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be >= hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an out-of-bounds read on the policy load path (aa_replace_profiles -> aa_unpack -> unpack_policydb -> unpack_tags -> verify_tags). unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it. Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject's own user namespace rather than the init user namespace, so with the default unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a globally privileged one. Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the intended i + cnt < sets.size guarantee. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90109 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit: sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ) gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ) sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo) sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug) sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32. Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel can be driven to OOM. Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and the stored u32 backlog never wraps. The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup): attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB, leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len, or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32, admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. | ||||
| CVE-2026-11725 | 1 Ibm | 1 Mq | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| IBM MQ could allow an authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code due to an integer overflow in MQINQ request processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56711 | 1 Videolan | 1 Vlc Media Player | 2026-09-18 | 7 High |
| VLC media player versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.23 contain a memory-safety vulnerability reachable when processing crafted media. Exploitation requires user interaction and may result in application termination or code execution with the privileges of the VLC process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46655 | 1 Virtio-win | 1 Kvm-guest-drivers-windows | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| virtio-win provides Windows paravirtualized drivers for QEMU and KVM. From mm210 until mm320, the Viosock driver permits a low-privilege local process to submit an IOCTL_SELECT request with attacker-controlled VIRTIO_VSOCK_SELECT.Fdss[*].fd_count values that overflow the 32-bit sum used by VIOSockSelect for bounds checking. The wrapped sum can pass the FD_SETSIZE check even though an individual descriptor count is much larger than the expected limit. VIOSockSelectCopyFds then iterates using the unchecked count and writes beyond the allocated pPkt->Fds array in the NonPagedPool kernel heap. Successful exploitation can corrupt kernel memory and enable privilege escalation in a Windows guest running the driver. This issue is fixed in mm320. | ||||
| CVE-2023-4734 | 3 Apple, Neovim, Vim | 3 Macos, Neovim, Vim | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| Integer Overflow or Wraparound in GitHub repository vim/vim prior to 9.0.1846. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92259 | 1 Samsung Open Source | 1 Escargot | 2026-09-18 | 5.5 Medium |
| Integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability in Samsung Opensource Escargot allows attackers with write access to the bytecode-cache directory to cause a heap-based buffer overflow and denial of service via a crafted cache file. This issue affects Escargot: ac94df78493ee6fede286620d94f724e46b4d238. | ||||
| CVE-2026-91728 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-09-18 | 9.6 Critical |
| Integer overflow in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-89775 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Handle negative S1 walk levels in VNCR TLB size evaluation Computing the effects of a TLB invalidation involves looking at the size of the mapping cached by the TLB. For S1 mappings such as VNCR, this is deducted from the combination of the base granule size and the mapping level. However, this implies that the S1 MMU is *on*. When the MMU is off, we indicate this with the level being set to a "creative" value of -127 (S1_MMU_DISABLED). This ends-up being misinterpreted by pgshift_level_to_ttl() as it doesn't handle negative levels at all (the level is immediately cast to a u8 and only the bottom two bits considered), leading to an invalidation size of 0. Not helpful. Tidy-up pgshift_level_to_ttl() to handle these negative levels, and ttl_to_size() to always return SZ_1G when no valid TTL is present. This allows the removal of open-coded checks for similar situations. Note that the check for a negative value not explicitely checking for S1_MMU_DISABLED is deliberate, so that actual negative levels introduced with LVA2 and D128 can take the same path if we ever support them. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89856 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Clamp MSI-X derived queue counts to avoid truncation ha->msix_count is u16, but ha->max_req_queues, ha->max_rsp_queues and ha->max_qpairs are u8. Deriving the queue count as "ha->max_req_queues = ha->msix_count - 1" therefore truncates: a board (or a misconfigured/malicious hot-plugged device) advertising 257 MSI-X vectors yields msix_count - 1 == 256, which truncates to 0. An MSI-X count of 1 zeroes it as well, and in target mode the subsequent "ha->max_req_queues--" then underflows 0 to 255. When the count is 0, qla2x00_alloc_queues() calls kzalloc_objs(struct req_que *, 0), which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. That is not NULL, so the allocation check passes and the following "ha->req_q_map[0] = req" dereferences ZERO_SIZE_PTR, corrupting memory or crashing the kernel. Add qla_calc_queue_count() to clamp the derived value into [1, QLA_MAX_QUEUES - 1] so it always fits in u8 and is never zero, and use it at all three derivation sites (qla25xx_iospace_config(), qla83xx_iospace_config() and qla24xx_enable_msix()). Also guard the target-mode decrement so it cannot reintroduce a zero (which would in turn underflow max_qpairs). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89825 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: fix firmware control interface bounds checks panthor_init_cs_iface() and panthor_init_csg_iface() validate firmware control interface offsets with 32-bit arithmetic and the size of the host wrapper structures. The offsets are derived from firmware-provided strides, so the arithmetic can wrap before the bounds check, and the host wrapper size is not the size of the firmware control interface being mapped. Use 64-bit arithmetic for the computed offsets and validate against the actual firmware control interface structure sizes with subtraction-based bounds checks. Also validate that the shared section is large enough for the global control interface before using it. | ||||