| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| With `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` set to a matching entry such as `*` or a hostname wildcard, Gitea's migration URL validation could permit reserved and link-local addresses, such as `169.254.169.254`, even when `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`. The local-network block list did not cover these ranges, and a hostname matching the allow list was accepted regardless of its resolved address. A user who can start migrations on such an instance could reach these addresses from the Gitea server; the default empty `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configuration is not affected. |
| When Gitea's web installer is reachable against a database that already contains users, such as after `INSTALL_LOCK` has been reset to `false`, submitting the install form with an administrator username matching an existing account issued an authenticated session for that account without verifying its password. If the account is an administrator, the session grants full administrative access, including changing the account's password. Databases with a single user also did not require the reinstall confirmation. |
| Gitea expanded a workflow's static `strategy.matrix` into its full Cartesian product without a size limit when creating a run, before the fork pull request approval gate applied. A user who can open a pull request from a fork could submit a small workflow file whose matrix expands to a very large number of jobs, consuming server memory and potentially terminating the Gitea process. No runner is required. Static matrices above 256 combinations are now rejected before expansion. |
| When a private repository is transferred to a user who lacks access, Gitea grants that recipient temporary read access as a collaborator so they can review the repository. Rejecting or cancelling the transfer did not revoke this collaboration, so the named recipient kept persistent read access to the private repository, including its code, issues, pull requests and wiki, and could clone it. The repository owner was not notified. Transfer-granted access is now removed while collaborations that existed before the transfer are preserved. |
| Gitea's OAuth2 token endpoint verified the signature and grant of a token submitted with the `refresh_token` grant type, but not that the token was a refresh token. An unexpired access token for the same OAuth2 application and grant could be exchanged for a new access token and refresh token. Whoever holds such an access token could keep access beyond the token's original lifetime. |
| When migrating a repository from another Gitea instance, Gitea used the page size reported in the source server's API settings to end its paginated downloads. A source that reported `max_response_items` as `0` made these loops run indefinitely and grow server memory until it was exhausted. Any user who can migrate repositories could point a migration at a server they control and cause a denial of service. |
| The Gitea web route for deleting tags (`POST /{owner}/{repo}/tags/delete`) requires only write access to the Code unit, but shares its handler with release deletion and did not check that the target was a plain tag. A collaborator with Code write access and without Releases write access could permanently delete published releases of that repository, including their attachments. Protected tag rules covering the release tag still blocked the deletion. |
| The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue could rename or delete attachments that other users had posted in comments on that issue. The contents of the attachments could not be changed. |
| Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included. |
| Changing an organization team's permission through the API with only the `permission` field did not rebuild the team's per-unit access, and the requested level was not applied as a cap. After an organization owner demoted a team, for example from admin to read, the team's members kept their previous unit permissions, including write access to the team's repositories. The web form was not affected. |
| Gitea before 1.27.1 allows remote code execution via the diffpatch API through Git hook installation. |
| OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) |
| Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API |
| Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session |
| Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access |
| Branch Protection Bypass via PR Retargeting Preserves Stale `official` Approval Flag |
| Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content (incomplete revocation cleanup in `DeleteCollaboration`) |
| Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content |
| Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options |
| SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata |
