| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a4xx: fix error handling in a4xx_gpu_init()
This code returns 1 on error instead of a negative error. It leads to
an Oops in the caller. A second problem is that the check for
"if (ret != -ENODATA)" cannot be true because "ret" is set to 1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: zero-initialize tc skb extension on allocation
Function skb_ext_add() doesn't initialize created skb extension with any
value and leaves it up to the user. However, since extension of type
TC_SKB_EXT originally contained only single value tc_skb_ext->chain its
users used to just assign the chain value without setting whole extension
memory to zero first. This assumption changed when TC_SKB_EXT extension was
extended with additional fields but not all users were updated to
initialize the new fields which leads to use of uninitialized memory
afterwards. UBSAN log:
[ 778.299821] UBSAN: invalid-load in net/openvswitch/flow.c:899:28
[ 778.301495] load of value 107 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[ 778.303215] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2
[ 778.304933] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 778.307901] Call Trace:
[ 778.308680] <IRQ>
[ 778.309358] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107
[ 778.310307] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[ 778.311167] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x43/0x48
[ 778.312454] ? memset+0x20/0x40
[ 778.313230] ovs_flow_key_extract.cold+0xf/0x14 [openvswitch]
[ 778.314532] ovs_vport_receive+0x19e/0x2e0 [openvswitch]
[ 778.315749] ? ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid+0x330/0x330 [openvswitch]
[ 778.317188] ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x20/0x20
[ 778.318220] ? arch_stack_walk+0x82/0xf0
[ 778.319153] ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
[ 778.320399] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0
[ 778.321362] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
[ 778.322517] ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[ 778.323444] netdev_frame_hook+0x323/0x610 [openvswitch]
[ 778.324668] ? ovs_netdev_get_vport+0xe0/0xe0 [openvswitch]
[ 778.325950] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x771/0x2db0
[ 778.327067] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6f0
[ 778.328021] ? lock_acquire+0x565/0x720
[ 778.328940] ? generic_xdp_tx+0x4f0/0x4f0
[ 778.329902] ? inet_gro_receive+0x2a7/0x10a0
[ 778.330914] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 778.331867] ? udp4_gro_receive+0x4c4/0x13e0
[ 778.332876] ? lock_release+0x52e/0x760
[ 778.333808] ? dev_gro_receive+0xcc8/0x2380
[ 778.334810] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 778.335769] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x295/0x820
[ 778.336955] ? process_backlog+0x780/0x780
[ 778.337941] ? mlx5e_rep_tc_netdevice_event_unregister+0x20/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.339613] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0xa7/0xc0
[ 778.341033] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 778.342072] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f5/0xcb0
[ 778.343288] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90
[ 778.344234] ? mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq+0x9e0/0x9e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.345676] ? mlx5e_xmit_xdp_frame_mpwqe+0x14d0/0x14d0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.347140] ? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x820/0x820
[ 778.348351] ? mlx5e_post_rx_mpwqes+0xa6/0x25d0 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.349688] ? napi_gro_flush+0x26c/0x3c0
[ 778.350641] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6b0
[ 778.351627] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x373/0x1b80 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.352853] __napi_poll+0x9f/0x510
[ 778.353704] ? mlx5_flow_namespace_set_mode+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]
[ 778.355158] net_rx_action+0x34c/0xa40
[ 778.356060] ? napi_threaded_poll+0x3d0/0x3d0
[ 778.357083] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x190
[ 778.358041] ? __common_interrupt+0x8e/0x1a0
[ 778.359045] __do_softirq+0x1ce/0x984
[ 778.359938] __irq_exit_rcu+0x137/0x1d0
[ 778.360865] irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x20
[ 778.361708] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0
[ 778.362640] </IRQ>
[ 778.363212] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[ 778.364204] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10
[ 778.365273] Code: 4f ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 50 3f 40 fe e9 dc fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 43 3f 40 fe eb 90 cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 74 05 62 00 fb f4 <c3> 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 64 05 62 00 f4 c3 cc cc 0f 1f 44 00
[ 778.369355] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e48 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ 778.370570] RAX
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs/hfsplus: zero-initialize buffer in hfs_bnode_read
hfs_bnode_read() can return early without writing to the output buffer
when is_bnode_offset_valid() fails or when check_and_correct_requested_
length() corrects the length to zero. Callers such as hfs_bnode_read_
u16() and hfs_bnode_read_u8() pass stack-allocated buffers and use the
result unconditionally, leading to KMSAN uninit-value reports.
Rather than initializing at each individual call site, zero the buffer
at the start of hfs_bnode_read() before any validation checks. This
ensures all callers in both hfs and hfsplus get a deterministic zero
value regardless of which early-return path is taken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: wean fast IN from emulator_pio_in
Use __emulator_pio_in() directly for fast PIO instead of bouncing through
emulator_pio_in() now that __emulator_pio_in() fills "val" when handling
in-kernel PIO. vcpu->arch.pio.count is guaranteed to be '0', so this a
pure nop.
emulator_pio_in_emulated is now the last caller of emulator_pio_in.
No functional change intended. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT)
Sashiko notes:
> if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
> userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
> SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
> execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
> host?
The SNP_COMMIT command does not require the firmware to be in any
particular state. Skip initializing it if it was previously uninitialized.
The SEV-SNP firmware specification doc 56860 does not mention SNP_COMMIT in
Table 5 as a command that is allowed in the UNINIT state, but it is in fact
allowed and a future documentation update will reflect that. |
| Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. From 4.5.2 through 4.14.0, when Coturn is started with --acme-redirect <URL> and exposes a plaintext-TCP listener, an unauthenticated remote client can send a single ordinary HTTP GET request and receive a 301 response whose Location header contains up to ~870 bytes of adjacent process heap memory. The leaked region is a recycled network receive buffer that is reused without being zeroed, so on a busy server it can contain data from other clients' requests (TURN credentials, OAuth tokens, relayed payloads). Root cause is a signed→unsigned conversion. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix uninitialised heap leak in snd_seq_event_dup()
snd_seq_event_dup() copies an incoming event into a pool cell and, in
the UMP-enabled build, clears the trailing cell->ump.raw.extra word that
the memcpy() did not cover. The guard deciding whether to clear it
compares the copied size against sizeof(cell->event):
memcpy(&cell->ump, event, size);
if (size < sizeof(cell->event))
cell->ump.raw.extra = 0;
For a legacy (non-UMP) event, size == sizeof(struct snd_seq_event) ==
sizeof(cell->event), so the condition is false and the extra word keeps
stale data. The cell pool is allocated with kvmalloc() (not zeroed) and
cells are reused via a free list, so that word holds uninitialised heap
or leftover event data.
When such a cell is delivered to a UMP client (client->midi_version > 0)
that set SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_NO_CONVERT -- so the legacy event reaches it
unconverted -- snd_seq_read() reads it out as the larger struct
snd_seq_ump_event and copies the stale word to user space, a 4-byte
kernel heap infoleak to an unprivileged /dev/snd/seq client.
Compare against sizeof(cell->ump) instead, so the trailing word is zeroed
for every event shorter than the UMP cell. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an use of uninitialized resource vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to information exposure. |
| Use of uninitialized resource in Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Uninitialized Use in WebGL in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Initialize new folios before use
KMSAN reports an uninitialized value in longest_match_std(), invoked
from ntfs_compress_write(). When new folios are allocated without being
marked uptodate and ni_read_frame() is skipped because the caller expects
the frame to be completely overwritten, some reserved folios may remain
only partially filled, leaving the rest memory uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Initialize allocated memory before use
KMSAN reports: Multiple uninitialized values detected:
- KMSAN: uninit-value in ntfs_read_hdr (3)
- KMSAN: uninit-value in bcmp (3)
Memory is allocated by __getname(), which is a wrapper for
kmem_cache_alloc(). This memory is used before being properly
cleared. Change kmem_cache_alloc() to kmem_cache_zalloc() to
properly allocate and clear memory before use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix oops due to uninitialised variable
Fix smb3_init_transform_rq() to initialise buffer to NULL before calling
netfs_alloc_folioq_buffer() as netfs assumes it can append to the buffer it
is given. Setting it to NULL means it should start a fresh buffer, but the
value is currently undefined. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: pci-epf: Do not complete commands twice if nvmet_req_init() fails
Have nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete failed commands.
Description of the problem:
nvmet_req_init() calls __nvmet_req_complete() internally upon failure,
e.g., unsupported opcode, which calls the "queue_response" callback,
this results in nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() being called, which will
call nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() if data_len is 0 or if dma_dir is
different from DMA_TO_DEVICE. This results in a double completion as
nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() also calls nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod()
when nvmet_req_init() fails.
Steps to reproduce:
On the host send a command with an unsupported opcode with nvme-cli,
For example the admin command "security receive"
$ sudo nvme security-recv /dev/nvme0n1 -n1 -x4096
This triggers a double completion as nvmet_req_init() fails and
nvmet_pci_epf_queue_response() is called, here iod->dma_dir is still
in the default state of "DMA_NONE" as set by default in
nvmet_pci_epf_alloc_iod(), so nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is called.
Because nvmet_req_init() failed nvmet_pci_epf_complete_iod() is also
called in nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() leading to a double completion.
This not only sends two completions to the host but also corrupts the
state of the PCI NVMe target leading to kernel oops.
This patch lets nvmet_req_init() and req->execute() complete all failed
commands, and removes the double completion case in
nvmet_pci_epf_exec_iod_work() therefore fixing the edge cases where
double completions occurred. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls
When sending plaintext data, we initially calculated the corresponding
ciphertext length. However, if we later reduced the plaintext data length
via socket policy, we failed to recalculate the ciphertext length.
This results in transmitting buffers containing uninitialized data during
ciphertext transmission.
This causes uninitialized bytes to be appended after a complete
"Application Data" packet, leading to errors on the receiving end when
parsing TLS record. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data
on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might
read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline]
ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314
pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
__release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix initialization of data for instructions that write to subdevice
Some Comedi subdevice instruction handlers are known to access
instruction data elements beyond the first `insn->n` elements in some
cases. The `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` functions
allocate at least `MIN_SAMPLES` (16) data elements to deal with this,
but they do not initialize all of that. For Comedi instruction codes
that write to the subdevice, the first `insn->n` data elements are
copied from user-space, but the remaining elements are left
uninitialized. That could be a problem if the subdevice instruction
handler reads the uninitialized data. Ensure that the first
`MIN_SAMPLES` elements are initialized before calling these instruction
handlers, filling the uncopied elements with 0. For
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, the same data buffer elements are used for
handling a list of instructions, so ensure the first `MIN_SAMPLES`
elements are initialized for each instruction that writes to the
subdevice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: ep: Update read pointer only after buffer is written
Inside mhi_ep_ring_add_element, the read pointer (rd_offset) is updated
before the buffer is written, potentially causing race conditions where
the host sees an updated read pointer before the buffer is actually
written. Updating rd_offset prematurely can lead to the host accessing
an uninitialized or incomplete element, resulting in data corruption.
Invoke the buffer write before updating rd_offset to ensure the element
is fully written before signaling its availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix iteration of extrefs during log replay
At __inode_add_ref() when processing extrefs, if we jump into the next
label we have an undefined value of victim_name.len, since we haven't
initialized it before we did the goto. This results in an invalid memory
access in the next iteration of the loop since victim_name.len was not
initialized to the length of the name of the current extref.
Fix this by initializing victim_name.len with the current extref's name
length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() should always initialize iterator
BPF programs may call next() and destroy() on BPF iterators even after new()
returns an error value (e.g. bpf_for_each() macro ignores error returns from
new()). bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() could leave the iterator in an uninitialized
state after an error return causing bpf_iter_scx_dsq_next() to dereference
garbage data. Make bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() always clear $kit->dsq so that
next() and destroy() become noops. |
