| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip detached progs in trampoline images that are still in use
bpf_tramp_image_put() makes sure a trampoline image is not freed while
a task may still be running in it, but nothing similar is done for the
progs called by that image. Detach drops the last prog reference right
away and the prog is freed after grace periods, on the basis that a
task still in the traced function skips the fexit progs once the nop at
ip_after_call is patched to a jump.
That leaves out a task sleeping in a sleepable prog that runs before
the detached one, which no grace period waits for:
CPU 0 CPU 1
in image I, sleeping in prog S
detach P from I's trampoline
-> new image, bpf_tramp_image_put(I)
bpf_prog_put(P), last ref
grace periods, P freed
back from S
__bpf_prog_enter(P)
call P->bpf_func
If S and P are fexit progs the task is already past the patched jump,
and fentry only images don't have one. On x86 this is an int3 in
poisoned bpf_prog_pack memory:
Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 94573 Comm: x169 Not tainted 6.18.44 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0601d8d
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? bpf_trampoline_6442515411+0x1a4/0x21b
bpf_lsm_bprm_committed_creds+0x5/0x10
security_bprm_committed_creds+0x5f/0x70
begin_new_exec+0x2d6/0x410
...
We hit this in production when progs attached through trampolines got
detached while their hooks were busy, and it was independently found
with a fuzzer and KASAN.
Have the JITs emit a patchable nop in front of each prog call sequence
and record it in the image. When a prog is detached, patch its nop to a
jump over the call sequence. Progs that stay attached keep running for
the tasks that are in the image, and ip_after_call isn't needed anymore.
The task can be in any image that isn't freed yet, not only in the
current one. It sleeps in image I1 that calls S, P and Q, then P is
detached and the trampoline moves to image I2, then Q is detached and
its call is still in I1. So the trampoline keeps a list of its images
until they are freed, and detaching a prog patches its nop in all of
them. Images hold a reference on the trampoline for that long.
On riscv and loongarch a jump of any range takes several instructions,
and a task preempted in the middle of them could resume into half of the
new sequence. The nop is a single instruction there, patched to a near
branch through arch_bpf_trampoline_skip().
With the extra nops, BPF_MAX_TRAMP_LINKS progs no longer fit in a page
on x86 and arm64 (and already didn't on powerpc), so lower the limit
there like s390 does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix rx Scatter-Gather support
When a received frame is larger than dma_buf_sz, the DMA scatters it
across multiple RX descriptors (rx Scatter-Gather). The secondary RX
buffer (sec_page) was only allocated and programmed when split-header
(SPH) was active, so for regular frames buffer2 was neither allocated
nor backed by a valid mapping. As soon as an incoming frame overflowed
buffer1, the DMA wrote the overflow into the unmapped secondary-buffer
address, triggering an SMMU translation fault on IOMMU-based platforms:
arm-smmu 15000000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x00000000, fsynr=0x7f0011, cbfrsynra=0x1c90, cb=11
arm-smmu 15000000.iommu: FSR = 00000402 [Format=2 TF], SID=0x1c90
arm-smmu 15000000.iommu: FSYNR0 = 007f0011 [S1CBNDX=127 WNR PLVL=1]
Enable scatter-gather for non-SPH frames on cores that can program an
independent secondary RX buffer (GMAC4/XGMAC): allocate and mark buffer2
as valid in stmmac_init_rx_buffers() and stmmac_rx_refill(), and account
for it in the buffer length computation. Legacy cores have no set_sec_addr
op, so they keep buffer2 disabled.
Since buffer2 is handed to the DMA at page offset 0, the page pool sync
window is widened to cover both buffers in every mode: offset is set to 0
and max_len to dma_buf_sz + stmmac_rx_offset().
The FCS can straddle the buffer1/buffer2 boundary and a descriptor
boundary, so it is now stripped from the tail of the assembled frame with
pskb_trim() instead of from a single buffer, avoiding an unsigned underflow
for frames that overflow a buffer by 1..3 bytes. For single-buffer frames
the XDP program must not see the FCS, so it is removed from the XDP buffer
before the program runs.
Native XDP currently only supports single-buffer (linear) frames. An
oversized frame accepted by the MAC (jumbo enabled) is received via
buffer2; the XDP program only sees buffer1, so on a TX/REDIRECT verdict
the frame is forwarded truncated. XDP multi-buffer support to handle
this case is planned as a follow-up.
AF_XDP zero-copy RX is not covered by this change: a ZC queue still
programs buffer2 at DMA address 0 (and XGMAC has no buffer2-valid bit),
so an oversized frame overflowing buffer1 can still trigger the same
SMMU translation fault. Handling is planned as a follow-up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix aura BPID assignment when CONFIG_DCB is enabled
Previously, BPID assignment under CONFIG_DCB assumed
`queue_to_pfc_map` was always initialized. For SDP VFs this leads to
invalid memory access as it was not initialized.
This patch adds a NULL check for `queue_to_pfc_map` before
dereferencing it. Also, simplifies the logic by always assigning a
default BPID first, then conditionally overriding it if CONFIG_DCB is
enabled and the map exists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix slab-out-of-bounds when handling team device events
The mlx5_handle_changeupper_event() and mlx5_handle_changeinfodata_event()
functions check for LAG masters (which includes both bonding and team
devices) but only call bonding-specific APIs. When processing team device
events, calling bond_slave_get_rcu() and bond_is_slave_inactive() on
team_port structures causes KASAN to detect an out-of-bounds memory access
since team_port is smaller than bond slave.
Fix this by wrapping the bond-specific API calls with a check for bonding
devices. This allows the function to still process LAG events for both
bonding and teams but only calls bond-specific functions when dealing with
actual bonding devices.
For mlx5_handle_changeinfodata_event(), keep the explicit bond check as
mlx5 doesn't handle state information for team ports anyway.
Tested with Mellanox ConnectX-5 on Linux 7.2.0-rc6:
- Bonding: PASS (no regressions)
- Team device: PASS (no KASAN errors) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue()
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue() validates the skb length using skb->len
before dereferencing pointers into skb->data to access the 802.11 header.
However, skb->len includes data in both the linear head buffer and
non-linear fragments/pages. When AF_PACKET sends a packet large enough to
become non-linear, the 802.11 header at skb->data + len_rthdr may extend
past the linear head buffer even though skb->len appears sufficient.
This leads to a slab-out-of-bounds read when accessing hdr->frame_control,
as the kernel reads beyond the allocated skb head buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0x1ed/0x220
syzbot has hit the same issues.
Fix this by checking skb_headlen(skb) (which gives the length of the
linear data region) instead of skb->len before dereferencing skb->data
pointers. This ensures the required bytes are actually present in the
linear portion of the skb.
Apply the same fix to ieee80211_validate_radiotap_len() which has the
same class of bug: it uses skb->len to validate accesses to skb->data,
and to the corresponding checks in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit(): for
drivers advertising NETIF_F_SG the skb is not linearized before
ndo_start_xmit, so the 802.11 header can be read past the linear
buffer there as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overflow of jump offset in constant blinding
bpf_jit_blind_insn() rewrites 'if rX op imm goto off' into:
AX = imm ^ rnd
AX ^= rnd
if rX op AX goto off
and subtracts 2 from off when the jump is backward. off is s16, so
-32767 and -32768 wrap and the jump goes 32767 insns forward, past the
end of the prog. The jump is inside the patch, hence bpf_adj_branches()
doesn't check it. The kernel crashes when such prog runs with
bpf_jit_harden=2.
Return -ERANGE in such case. bpf_jit_blind_constants() fails the same
way when blinding of other insns moves a jump out of range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: do not wake up kswapd in __kfree_rcu_sheaf()
Since kfree_rcu() can be called under pi_lock (a raw spinlock in the
scheduler), kfree_rcu() itself should never allocate memory with
__GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM as waking up kswapd ends up acquiring pi_lock,
which leads to a deadlock.
Reproducing the issue even intentionally was not straightforward.
The set_cpus_allowed_force() path that is called under pi_lock is
exercised very rarely, and competing tasks that allocate memory will
most likely wake kswapd up.
Therefore the existence of the deadlock was verified with a modified
kernel that has a lockdep map for waking up kswapd:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
7.2.0-rc1-slab-for-next+ #10 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
git/6660 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8e524533c550 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x20
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8e57bffff1a0 (&pgdat->kswapd_wait){....}-{3:3}, at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x20
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&pgdat->kswapd_wait){....}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x5a4/0xc50
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb7/0x240
lock_acquire+0x70/0x170
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x20
__wake_up_common_lock+0x31/0xa0
__wake_up+0x20/0x40
kswapd_wakeup_wake+0x7e/0x110
wakeup_kswapd+0x295/0x320
wake_all_kswapds+0xac/0x1a0
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x282/0xf80
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x32a/0x360
alloc_slab_page+0x2e/0x160
allocate_slab+0x82/0x420
new_slab+0x52/0xb0
refill_objects+0x13d/0x190
refill_sheaf+0x5d/0xd0
__pcs_replace_empty_main+0x230/0xb10
[...]
-> #1 (kswapd_wakeup){-.-.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x5a4/0xc50
lock_sync.part.0+0x75/0x100
lock_sync+0x36/0x70
might_wakeup_kswapd+0x61/0xa0
__kfree_rcu_sheaf+0x33/0xd90
kvfree_call_rcu+0x1d4/0x3b0
set_cpus_allowed_force+0x163/0x220
cpuset_cpus_allowed_fallback+0x18b/0x240
select_fallback_rq+0x1e6/0x250
[...]
-> #0 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add+0xe6/0xe00
validate_chain+0x51e/0x6e0
__lock_acquire+0x5a4/0xc50
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb7/0x240
lock_acquire+0x70/0x170
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x12/0x20
try_to_wake_up+0x77/0xa90
default_wake_function+0x27/0x60
autoremove_wake_function+0x23/0xb0
__wake_up_common+0xb8/0x170
__wake_up_common_lock+0x51/0xa0
__wake_up+0x20/0x40
kswapd_wakeup_wake+0x7e/0x110
wakeup_kswapd+0x295/0x320
wake_all_kswapds+0xac/0x1a0
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x282/0xf80
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x32a/0x360
alloc_slab_page+0x2e/0x160
allocate_slab+0x82/0x420
new_slab+0x52/0xb0
refill_objects+0x13d/0x190
refill_sheaf+0x5d/0xd0
__pcs_replace_empty_main+0x230/0xb10
[...]
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&p->pi_lock --> kswapd_wakeup --> &pgdat->kswapd_wait
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&pgdat->kswapd_wait);
lock(kswapd_wakeup);
lock(&pgdat->kswapd_wait);
lock(&p->pi_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by git/6660:
#0: ffff8e519f0e9e20 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6){++++}-{4:4}, at: lookup_slow+0x2d/0x60
#1: ffffffff8a31c460 (kswapd_wakeup){-.-.}-
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: validate TX status rate metadata
minstrel_ht_tx_status() converts the HT/VHT rate reported in a TX status
into a group and rate index and uses those to index the minstrel_ht rate
tables. The existing validation only checked that an entry was present
and had tries recorded; it did not check that the reported MCS, spatial
stream count and bandwidth are representable by the tables, so malformed
metadata passed to minstrel_ht_get_stats() or
minstrel_ht_ri_get_stats() could be used as an out-of-bounds index.
Validate the rate metadata in the common TX status path instead of only
in minstrel_ht, since the values are used by more than rate control.
The legacy ieee80211_tx_rate array and the rate_info based entries are
sanitized in ieee80211_tx_status_ext() and ieee80211_tx_rate_update()
before any consumer runs: an entry that does not describe a valid rate
for its encoding is dropped. minstrel_ht keeps the checks that depend
on its own tables, i.e. the supported number of spatial streams, the MCS
group size and the supported bandwidths.
This does not take away the driver's responsibility to report sane
values, it only prevents a single bad report from corrupting mac80211
state. No WARN_ON() is added: with panic_on_warn a driver bug would
otherwise turn into a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: reject short WMI command responses
ath9k_wmi_rsp_callback() removes the validated WMI header and copies
the number of bytes expected by the waiting command into its response
buffer. A device response shorter than that expectation can therefore
be read beyond the skb payload.
Record -EMSGSIZE for a short response, complete the waiter, and return
the stored status from the command path. This also prevents callers from
consuming stale response bytes as a successful reply. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/altera: Drop __init from ECC setup paths for re-probe safety
Sashiko reports:
"Does suppressing sysfs unbinding fully prevent the execution of freed __init
memory? If altr_sysmgr_regmap_lookup_by_phandle() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, the
probe is deferred until after __init memory is freed."
The a10 EDAC .setup callbacks (sdmmc, ethernet, nand, dma, usb, qspi) and
their helpers (altr_init_a10_ecc_device_type, altr_init_a10_ecc_block) were
marked __init. These run from the probe path, which may execute after init
memory is freed -- e.g. a probe deferred via -EPROBE_DEFER that only succeeds
once a late/module dependency appears, or a manual unbind/rebind. Calling
__init code then dereferences freed memory. Remove __init so these functions
remain valid at runtime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: save IRQ state in blkg_tryget_closest()
bio_set_dev() associates the bio with a blkg through bio_associate_blkg().
If the blkg lookup misses, blkg_tryget_closest() takes q->queue_lock with
spin_lock_irq() and releases it with spin_unlock_irq(), which
unconditionally enables local interrupts.
Callers may call bio_set_dev() with interrupts already disabled, e.g.
dm-thin's pool_map() does so while holding pool->lock taken with
spin_lock_irq(). The nested spin_unlock_irq() then enables interrupts
while pool->lock is still held, so an I/O completion softirq can run on
the same CPU, re-acquire pool->lock (thin_endio(), or overwrite_endio()
-> complete_mapping_preparation()) and deadlock. lockdep reports this
as inconsistent SOFTIRQ-ON-W to IN-SOFTIRQ-W usage.
Commit 3a762de55b4e ("block: save irq state in blkg_lookup_create()")
fixed the same problem while the lock lived in blkg_lookup_create(), but
commit 9327a865e395 ("blk-cgroup: don't nest queue_lock under rcu in
blkg_lookup_create()") moved the locking into blkg_tryget_closest() and
reverted it to spin_lock_irq().
Save and restore the caller's IRQ state instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic: Take a refcount on IRQs referenced by last_lr_irq
Referencing the last interrupt inserted in an LR is rather fragile, as
this interrupt can vanish if a concurrently unmapped LPI.
Solve this by bumping up the refcount on the interrupt when populating
last_lr_irq, and drop it at vgic_prune_ap_list() time, when LPIs are
being reclaimed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Apply the fine-grained UNDEFs without FEAT_FGT
FGUs don't actually require hardware support, so don't gate fgt trap
config insertion on FGT. This is the only action required to allow FGUs
always, as kvm_calculate_traps() already computes the FGU bits with or
without FEAT_FGT.
This also fixes a spurious WARN when a TLBI OS is run on a guest in vEL1
without FEAT_TLBIOS on non FEAT_FGT hardware. In this configuration the
course-grained HCR_EL2.TTLBOS trap reaches the handler handle_tlbi_el1(),
which expects an EL1 TLBI only from vEL2. With FGUs enabled the UNDEF
will be injected without needing the specific handler.
[oliver: Take Wei-Lin's suggested changelog] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Preserve TLB control (i.e. pending TLB flush) on failed VMRUN
Don't reset the VMCB's TLB control back to "do nothing" on a failed VMRUN,
as empirical testing shows that the CPU performs the requested TLB flush if
and only if VMRUN is successful, i.e. clearing TLB control on a failed
VMRUN effectively drops a TLB flush.
Explicitly track the need to flush all ASIDs on a per-CPU basis, as the
ASID reuse condition is tied to the pCPU, not to the vCPU. As a bonus,
this also obviates the need to avoid clobbering FLUSH_ALL_ASID with
TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID, e.g. in svm_flush_tlb_asid().
Deliberately don't bother saving/restoring the "old" tlb_ctl on failure,
in quotes because it's not exactly the old tlb_ctl, it's the tlb_ctl from
after pre_svm_run(), but before updating tlb_ctl for flush_all_asids. If
VMRUN fails and TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID is forced, then the next
successful run of the VMCB *may* unnecessarily flush all ASIDs, which
strictly speaking could result in noisy neighbor issues. However, the
fact that new_asid() is already guest-triggerable, because of KVM's flawed
behavior of clearing the ASID on emulated INIT, means that a guest can
already trigger a flush of all ASIDs at roughly the same rate. And once
KVM stops clobbering the ASID on emulated INIT, *or* assigns a static ASID
to each vCPU, this flaw goes away. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM *before* clearing SEV state
Explicitly flush caches after intra-host migration before clearing "SEV
active" on the source VM, as doing cache maintenance afterwards creates a
tiny window where memory reclaim could return memory to the host without
performing a cache flush, e.g. as pointed out by Sashiko:
CPU1 in sev_migrate_from():
src->active = false;
CPU2 running concurrent unmap:
Since active is false, the automatic cache flush in
sev_guest_memory_reclaimed is skipped.
The host frees and reallocates the page.
CPU1 in sev_migrate_from():
sev_writeback_caches(src_kvm);
Executes a hardware cache flush (wbnoinvd), which writes the guest's old
dirty ciphertext over the new page owner's data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Force MSR bitmap refresh if runtime eVMCS controls are modified
Force a refresh of the vmcs02 MSR bitmap during nested VM-Enter if the
runtime eVMCS controls (pin, primary, secondary, etc.) are being updated.
If L1 isn't intercepting TPR writes, runs L2 with TPR virtualization, and
then runs the same L2 with TPR virtualization disabled, KVM will fail to
refresh msr_bitmap02 and leave TPR in passthrough mode even though TPR
virtualization is disabled. I.e. failure to refresh the bitmap lets L2 (or
L1 by proxy) read and write L0's TPR. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: pci-epf: reject too-short SGL segments
The host controls an SGL segment's length. A nonzero length smaller than
one SGL descriptor makes nr_descs zero, so
nvmet_pci_epf_get_sgl_segment() reads the type byte of sgls[-1] outside
the allocated buffer. If that byte contains a segment descriptor type,
the function also copies the preceding 16 bytes and returns a negative
descriptor count.
The read was reproduced in 3/3 KASAN boots with only the host transfer
mocked by a KUnit test:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nvmet_pci_epf_get_sgl_segment
Read of size 1 by task kunit_try_catch
Call Trace:
nvmet_pci_epf_get_sgl_segment
nvmet_pci_epf_short_sgl_test
Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ...
Reject segments that cannot hold one descriptor before allocating or
transferring their contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Don't apply va_align to hugetlb mappings on AMD F15h
get_align_mask() returns huge_page_mask_align() for hugetlbfs, but get_align_bits()
adds va_align.bits regardless, so vm_unmapped_area() returns an address off the huge
page boundary and __unmap_hugepage_range() hits BUG_ON(start & ~huge_page_mask(h)) at
teardown.
This can be triggered on Carrizo and FX-8370E, both hstates.
Pass the file to get_align_bits() and skip the randomisation for hugetlbfs.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: reject oversized TX packets in send_frame()
btintel_pcie_send_frame() eventually copies skb->data into a fixed
BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE (4096) DMA buffer via memcpy() in
btintel_pcie_prepare_tx(), with a 4-byte PCIe type header prepended.
A user-space process with HCI_CHANNEL_USER access can inject an
oversized packet and overflow the buffer.
Reject packets larger than
BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE - BTINTEL_PCIE_HCI_TYPE_LEN on entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Disable device buffer exporting
Device buffers are never intended to be exported. Disable exporting
support explicitly. |
