Total
75 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-48748 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Starting in version 4.2.0.Final and prior to version 4.2.15.Final, a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Netty HTTP/3 codec allows the creation of an infinite number of blocked streams, which can cause OOM error. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-50010 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SimpleTrustManagerFactory.engineGetTrustManagers() and related paths wrap any user-supplied plain X509TrustManager in X509TrustManagerWrapper, which extends X509ExtendedTrustManager but implements the 3-arg checkServerTrusted(chain, authType, SSLEngine) by discarding the SSLEngine and calling the 2-arg delegate. Because the object now IS an X509ExtendedTrustManager, neither SunJSSE's internal AbstractTrustManagerWrapper nor Netty's own OpenSslX509TrustManagerWrapper will re-wrap it to add endpoint-identification. Consequently, even though Netty 4.2 sets endpointIdentificationAlgorithm="HTTPS" by default, a client built with `SslContextBuilder.forClient().trustManager(somePlainX509TrustManager)` performs no hostname verification at all. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-47691 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 8.7 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-45674 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 8.7 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-45416 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-44249 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-handler prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can bypass IPv6 subnet rules due to an incorrect masking operation in IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo(). Valid public IP addresses can bypass the restrictions. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33871 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, a remote user can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) against a Netty HTTP/2 server by sending a flood of `CONTINUATION` frames. The server's lack of a limit on the number of `CONTINUATION` frames, combined with a bypass of existing size-based mitigations using zero-byte frames, allows an user to cause excessive CPU consumption with minimal bandwidth, rendering the server unresponsive. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33870 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, Netty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-44248 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-03 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, the MQTT 5 header Properties section is parsed and buffered before any message size limit is applied. Specifically, in MqttDecoder, the decodeVariableHeader() method is called before the bytesRemainingBeforeVariableHeader > maxBytesInMessage check. The decodeVariableHeader() can call other methods which will call decodeProperties(). Effectively, Netty does not apply any limits to the size of the properties being decoded. Additionally, because MqttDecoder extends ReplayingDecoder, Netty will repeatedly re-parse the enormous Properties sections and buffer the bytes in memory, until the entire thing parses to completion. This can cause high resource usage in both CPU and memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-42587 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-08-03 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56820 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.4 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55851 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final up to (but not including) 4.2.16.Final, and 4.1.0.Final up to (but not including) 4.1.135, the `HAProxyMessageDecoder` in Netty's `codec-haproxy` module performs protocol version detection by reading the 13th byte as a signed Java `byte` and widening it to `int` without masking; a PROXY protocol v2 binary prefix followed by version byte `0xFF` sign-extends to `-1`, collides with the decoder's need-more-data sentinel, and causes `ByteToMessageDecoder` to accumulate inbound bytes in an unbounded `cumulation` buffer until direct memory is exhausted. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56817 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, any caller that can deliver bytes to a Netty channel pipeline containing `XmlDecoder` can send XML with a `DOCTYPE` declaration to an `AsyncXMLInputFactory` instantiated with no security configuration, leaving DTD and entity handling active depending on Aalto XML async parser behavior and creating conditional XML external entity risk. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56816 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.2.16.Final, Netty's `Http3FrameCodec` buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the wire-specified payload length without limits; `decodeFrame` trusts `payLoadLength`, allowing an attacker to open multiple QUIC streams and send reserved frames with very large payload lengths to cause memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56746 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, are vulnerable to security control bypass during the origin evaluation process. CorsHandler provides a shortCircuit() configuration designed to reject unauthorized cross-origin requests immediately, acting as a security control before requests reach the application. However, due to a logical operator error in the origin evaluation process, this protection can be entirely bypassed. An attacker can bypass the short-circuit mechanism by sending a request with an Origin: null header. This failure forwards unauthorized requests to the backend application, bypassing intended access controls. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56745 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, the `SpdyHttpDecoder` handler in Netty's SPDY-to-HTTP codec allocates a pooled `ByteBuf` when processing a client-initiated `SYN_STREAM` frame with `FLAG_FIN=0` and stores the partially constructed `FullHttpRequest` in `messageMap`; when the remote peer sends `RST_STREAM` for that stream or the accumulated content exceeds `maxContentLength`, the decoder removes the entry but does not release the pooled `ByteBuf`, causing native memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-56819 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, a remote unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`. When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed, `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` calls `decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain())` and does not release the retained buffer on the error path, eventually exhausting direct memory and crashing the JVM. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | |||||
| CVE-2026-48059 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec in netty leaks native or heap memory on every connection when a client sends a syntactically valid header containing nested `PP2_TYPE_SSL` TLVs (type-length-value records) at depth two or greater. The leak occurs on the successful parse path — no exception is thrown, the message fires downstream, the decoder removes itself, and the application releases the `HAProxyMessage` normally. Yet the underlying cumulation buffer (a pooled, potentially direct `ByteBuf` allocated by the channel) remains permanently pinned. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-48043 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-http2 prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener` class orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-stream `EmbeddedChannel` that runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooled `ByteBuf` handed to an anonymous `ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter` tail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it. A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-44893 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls `header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length)` and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | |||||