Total
2 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-49241 | 1 Angular | 1 Angular Language Service | 2026-06-26 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| The Angular Language Service VS Code Extension provides a rich editing experience for Angular templates. Prior to 21.2.4, the client-side Angular Language Service VS Code extension reads the custom TypeScript SDK paths typescript.tsdk and js/ts.tsdk.path directly from workspace configurations (.vscode/settings.json) without verifying VS Code Workspace Trust state or asking for user consent (located in client/src/client.ts). The client-side extension then passes the parsed settings path as a command-line argument (--tsdk) to the background Node.js language server process. During server initialization, the background language server resolves and dynamically imports (via standard Node.js require()) the module library tsserverlibrary.js relative to the workspace-specified custom directory path. An attacker can exploit this behavior by committing a repository containing a local malicious tsserverlibrary.js script inside a custom folder, and a crafted .vscode/settings.json file pointing to that folder. When a developer opens the repository folder in VS Code, the extension automatically attempts to initialize and load the server, which dynamically resolves, loads, and executes the malicious script silently in the background. This vulnerability is fixed in 21.2.4. | |||||
| CVE-2026-50178 | 1 Angular | 1 Angular Language Service | 2026-06-26 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| The Angular Language Service VS Code Extension provides a rich editing experience for Angular templates. the client-side Angular Language Service VS Code extension configures the tooltip Markdown renderer with the isTrusted: true option (located in client/src/client.ts). This setting instructs VS Code to trust all rendered content it receives, which enables active elements such as command: URIs. However, the background Angular Language Server process fails to escape or sanitize brackets, raw links, and control characters from JSDoc strings before forwarding the hover Markdown content (located in server/src/handlers/hover.ts and server/src/text_render.ts). An attacker can leverage this behavior by crafting a project TypeScript or JavaScript file (or a third-party npm package dependency) containing a malicious JSDoc tooltip with an embedded active command link. When a developer hovers over the target symbol to render the tooltip and clicks the malicious link, the IDE executes the command sequence directly on the developer's host machine. Prior to 21.2.4, This vulnerability is fixed in 21.2.4. | |||||