Total
14168 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-41445 | 1 Ihedvall | 1 Mdf Library | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Library MDF (mdflib) v2.1 is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overread via a crafted mdf4 file is parsed using the ReadData function | |||||
| CVE-2024-41443 | 1 Dbohdan | 1 Hicolor | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| A stack overflow in the function cp_dynamic() (/vendor/cute_png.h) of hicolor v0.5.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted PNG file. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41439 | 1 Dbohdan | 1 Hicolor | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| A heap buffer overflow in the function cp_block() (/vendor/cute_png.h) of hicolor v0.5.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted PNG file. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41437 | 1 Dbohdan | 1 Hicolor | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| A heap buffer overflow in the function cp_unfilter() (/vendor/cute_png.h) of hicolor v0.5.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted PNG file. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41311 | 2 Debian, Struktur | 2 Debian Linux, Libheif | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| In Libheif 1.17.6, insufficient checks in ImageOverlay::parse() decoding a heif file containing an overlay image with forged offsets can lead to an out-of-bounds read and write. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41285 | 1 Fastcom | 2 Fw300r, Fw300r Firmware | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| A stack overflow in FAST FW300R v1.3.13 Build 141023 Rel.61347n allows attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted file path. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41131 | 1 Sixlabors | 1 Imagesharp | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| ImageSharp is a 2D graphics API. An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability has been found in the ImageSharp gif decoder, allowing attackers to cause a crash using a specially crafted gif. This can potentially lead to denial of service. All users are advised to upgrade to v3.1.5 or v2.1.9. | |||||
| CVE-2024-41042 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE). It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there appears no reason to iterate the maps again. nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed. This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s. This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in unbounded recursion: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at .... Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1 [..] with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores. I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph. For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier (for improved error reporting to userspace). | |||||
| CVE-2024-41003 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in one of the probes: [...] 13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar() 14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff 16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff 17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff)) 18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) 19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1 REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) 19: R6_w=0x7fffffff 20: (95) exit from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 23: (95) exit from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0 [...] What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value, meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1, true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2). Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant. Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now, for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101). When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in regs_refine_cond_op(): [...] t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); reg1->var_o ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-40987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c Adds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40974 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size plpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to provide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this is communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has no idea. For example, if I write a bug like this: long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...); This compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack corruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end of the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not found a real instance yet.) To make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized array parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall APIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now provokes a diagnostic like this: error: array argument is too small; is of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds] 60 | plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, | ^ ~~~~~~ [1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit 0da6e5fd6c37 ("gcc: disable '-Warray-bounds' for gcc-13 too") and related changes. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40955 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix slab-out-of-bounds in ext4_mb_find_good_group_avg_frag_lists() We can trigger a slab-out-of-bounds with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/$disk 10G mount /dev/$disk /tmp/test echo 2147483647 > /sys/fs/ext4/$disk/mb_group_prealloc echo test > /tmp/test/file && sync ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ext4_mb_find_good_group_avg_frag_lists+0x8a/0x200 [ext4] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888121b9d0f0 by task kworker/u2:0/11 CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Tainted: GL 6.7.0-next-20240118 #521 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x2c/0x50 kasan_report+0xb6/0xf0 ext4_mb_find_good_group_avg_frag_lists+0x8a/0x200 [ext4] ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x19e9/0x2370 [ext4] ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x88a/0x1370 [ext4] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x14f7/0x2390 [ext4] ext4_map_blocks+0x569/0xea0 [ext4] ext4_do_writepages+0x10f6/0x1bc0 [ext4] [...] ================================================================== The flow of issue triggering is as follows: // Set s_mb_group_prealloc to 2147483647 via sysfs ext4_mb_new_blocks ext4_mb_normalize_request ext4_mb_normalize_group_request ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mb_group_prealloc ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_mb_choose_next_group ext4_mb_choose_next_group_best_avail mb_avg_fragment_size_order order = fls(len) - 2 = 29 ext4_mb_find_good_group_avg_frag_lists frag_list = &sbi->s_mb_avg_fragment_size[order] if (list_empty(frag_list)) // Trigger SOOB! At 4k block size, the length of the s_mb_avg_fragment_size list is 14, but an oversized s_mb_group_prealloc is set, causing slab-out-of-bounds to be triggered by an attempt to access an element at index 29. Add a new attr_id attr_clusters_in_group with values in the range [0, sbi->s_clusters_per_group] and declare mb_group_prealloc as that type to fix the issue. In addition avoid returning an order from mb_avg_fragment_size_order() greater than MB_NUM_ORDERS(sb) and reduce some useless loops. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40901 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpt3sas: Avoid test/set_bit() operating in non-allocated memory There is a potential out-of-bounds access when using test_bit() on a single word. The test_bit() and set_bit() functions operate on long values, and when testing or setting a single word, they can exceed the word boundary. KASAN detects this issue and produces a dump: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _scsih_add_device.constprop.0 (./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:60 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:29 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c:7331) mpt3sas Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26e3c60 by task kworker/u1536:2/2965 For full log, please look at [1]. Make the allocation at least the size of sizeof(unsigned long) so that set_bit() and test_bit() have sufficient room for read/write operations without overwriting unallocated memory. [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZkNcALr3W3KGYYJG@gmail.com/ | |||||
| CVE-2024-40897 | 1 Gstreamer | 1 Orc | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.7 MEDIUM |
| Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in orcparse.c of ORC versions prior to 0.4.39. If a developer is tricked to process a specially crafted file with the affected ORC compiler, an arbitrary code may be executed on the developer's build environment. This may lead to compromise of developer machines or CI build environments. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40841 | 1 Apple | 1 Macos | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15, macOS Sonoma 14.7. Processing a maliciously crafted video file may lead to unexpected app termination. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40810 | 1 Apple | 1 Macos | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.6. An app may be able to cause a coprocessor crash. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40777 | 1 Apple | 6 Ipados, Iphone Os, Macos and 3 more | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 17.6 and iPadOS 17.6, macOS Sonoma 14.6, tvOS 17.6, visionOS 1.3, watchOS 10.6. Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app termination. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40764 | 1 Sonicwall | 32 Nsa 2700, Nsa 3700, Nsa 4700 and 29 more | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the SonicOS IPSec VPN allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause Denial of Service (DoS). | |||||
| CVE-2024-40724 | 1 Assimp | 1 Assimp | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Assimp versions prior to 5.4.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code by inputting a specially crafted file into the product. | |||||
| CVE-2024-40723 | 1 Changingtec | 1 Hwatai Servisign | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 4.3 MEDIUM |
| The specific API in HWATAIServiSign Windows Version from CHANGING Information Technology does not properly validate the length of server-side inputs. When a user visits a spoofed website, unauthenticated remote attackers can cause a stack-based buffer overflow in the HWATAIServiSign, temporarily disrupting its service. | |||||