In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp()
later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?
The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.
Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.
An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
27 Apr 2026, 14:16
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27 Apr 2026, 12:16
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24 Apr 2026, 15:16
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Information
Published : 2026-04-24 15:16
Updated : 2026-04-27 14:16
NVD link : CVE-2026-31614
Mitre link : CVE-2026-31614
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-31614
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.