CVE-2025-66559

Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent, permissionless, based rollup designed to scale Ethereum without compromising its fundamental properties. In 2.3.1 and earlier, TaikoInbox._verifyBatches (packages/protocol/contracts/layer1/based/TaikoInbox.sol:627-678) advanced the local tid to whatever transition matched the current blockHash before knowing whether that batch would actually be verified. When the loop later broke (e.g., cooldown window not yet passed or transition invalidated), the function still wrote that newer tid into batches[lastVerifiedBatchId].verifiedTransitionId after decrementing batchId. Result: the last verified batch could end up pointing at a transition index from the next batch (often zeroed), corrupting the verified chain pointer.

CVSS

No CVSS.

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/taikoxyz/taiko-mono/commit/379f5cb4ffe9e1945563ab2c7740bc9f4ea004d8
https://github.com/taikoxyz/taiko-mono/security/advisories/GHSA-5mxh-r33p-6h5x

Configurations

No configuration.

History

04 Dec 2025, 23:15

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
New CVE

Information

Published : 2025-12-04 23:15

Updated : 2025-12-08 18:27

NVD link : CVE-2025-66559

Mitre link : CVE-2025-66559

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2025-66559

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-129

Improper Validation of Array Index

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