In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups
In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to
MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none():
	-       if (!pmd_present(pmde))
	-               return SCAN_PMD_NULL;
	+       if (pmd_none(pmde))
	+               return SCAN_PMD_NONE;
This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where
MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have
khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd.  Such codepaths
include:
A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER
   already in the pagecache.
B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target
   mm/address.
In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not
just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate
from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many
things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly
undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc). 
Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing
pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd.
However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed
!none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmds.  One such example that could leak through are swap
entries.  The pmd values aren't checked again before use in
pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmd.
We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check),
but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and
treatments by various arch.
The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present
bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and
pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this
transitory state.  For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the
_PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also
checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit.
Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value):
1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
   All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either:
   a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE
      is set.
      => huge-pmd
   b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page().  The danger here
      is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are
      looking at a pte-mapping-pmd.  So, what is the risk of this
      danger?
      The only relevant path is:
	madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
      Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really
      the memory isn't pmd-backed.  This is fine, since split could
      happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse().
      So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here.
2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
   Either:
   a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is.
      => pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE)
   b) devmap.  This routine can be called immediately after
      unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see
      khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been
      invalidated.
3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
  Not possible.
4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
  Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set
  => not present
I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv,
powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates
(though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't
necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since
!pmd_present() always takes failure path).
Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none()
---truncated---
                
            References
                    Configurations
                    Configuration 1 (hide)
| 
 | 
History
                    28 Oct 2025, 18:27
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added | 
|---|---|---|
| CPE | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.2:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| CWE | CWE-362 | |
| Summary | 
 | |
| CVSS | v2 : v3 : | v2 : unknown v3 : 4.7 | 
| References | () https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96aaaf8666010a39430cecf8a65c7ce2908a030f - Patch | |
| References | () https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edb5d0cf5525357652aff6eacd9850b8ced07143 - Patch | |
| First Time | Linux linux Kernel Linux | 
27 Mar 2025, 17:15
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added | 
|---|---|---|
| New CVE | 
Information
                Published : 2025-03-27 17:15
Updated : 2025-10-28 18:27
NVD link : CVE-2023-52934
Mitre link : CVE-2023-52934
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2023-52934
JSON object : View
Products Affected
                linux
- linux_kernel
CWE
                
                    
                        
                        CWE-362
                        
            Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
